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Summary in Norwegian 
Denne avhandlingen har som mål å diskutere og analysere den politiske posisjonen til den 
Islamistiske motstandsbevegelsen Hamas på Vestbredden, i perioden 1987 til 2007. 
Utgangspunktet for analysen er den politiske situasjonen som har utviklet seg i de palestinske 
områdene etter sommeren 2007. Uenigheter mellom Fatah og Hamas brøt ut i regulære 
kamper mellom de to bevegelsenes sikkerhetsstyrker i juni 2007, der Hamas festet et grep om 
Gaza stripen. Den militære styrken til Hamas i Gaza var den utløsende årsaken til seieren, 
men overtakelsen var også basert på solid støtte i befolkningen, som følge av et bredt nettverk 
av sosiale velferdsorganisasjoner, og et solid politisk fundament.  
Hamas har også vært politisk aktive på Vestbredden. Vestbredden er kjerneområdet i Israel-
Palestina konflikten, og utgjør det største landområdet av de okkuperte områdene som Hamas 
ønsker å frigjøre. I etterkant av 2007 har det internasjonale samfunnet støttet den palestinske 
presidenten Mahmoud Abbas i å skape en bærekraftig sekulær stat basert på Vestbredden. Et 
av de viktigste målene i denne prosessen har vært å marginalisere Hamas, inkludert 
nedstengning av institusjoner og arrestasjoner, for å unngå en liknende situasjon som da 
Hamas overtok Gaza. I denne sammenheng reiser det seg interessante spørsmål. Det er tydelig 
at Israel og PA anser Hamas på Vestbredden som en politisk og militær trussel. Men hadde 
Hamas samme politiske styrke på Vestbredden som i Gaza i 2007? Hvorfor tok ikke Hamas 
også over Vestbredden samtidig? Eller var det motsatt: Hamas var en marginal bevegelse på 
Vestbredden, noe Israel/PA ønsket skulle vedvare?      
Denne studien baserer seg på en tredeling av de viktigste aktivitetene til Hamas på 
Vestbredden; sosialt arbeid for fattige palestinere, militante aksjoner mot den israelske 
okkupasjonsmakten i tråd med ideologiske mål, og politisk arbeid for å oppnå økt innflytelse. 
Denne tredelingen viste seg som en suksess i overtakelsen av Gaza stripen, men det er mangel 
på akademisk litteratur rundt den tilsvarende aktiviteten på Vestbredden. For å besvare 
problemstillingen vil avhandlingen også undersøke en rekke andre nøkkelfaktorer. Ved å 
undersøke de historiske røttene til Hamas i det Muslimske Brorskapet vil avhandlingen vise 
hvordan Hamas utviklet organisasjonen på Vestbredden. Den politiske konteksten på 
Vestbredden vil også bli analysert, for å gi svar på hvilke eksterne faktorer som har påvirket 
Hamas i den aktuelle perioden. Avhandlingen vil også analysere den indre strukturen i Hamas 
på Vestbredden for å avdekke faktorer som har betydning for politisk innflytelse. Oppgaven 
er basert på den akademiske litteraturen om Hamas, og et feltarbeid på Vestbredden i oktober 
2010 der det ble foretatt intervjuer med Hamas ledere.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and research question 
Introduction 
The name Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya in Arabic, meaning 
the Islamic Resistance Movement. It is today the largest and most popular Islamist movement 
in Palestine, operating both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. Hamas was established 
immediately after the first Palestinian Intifada broke out in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) in 1987. Until that time, the most important Islamic movement in Palestine, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, had avoided active resistance against the Israeli occupation. The 
Brotherhood`s limited focus on social and religious activities stood in the way of its full 
development as a popular force when the Intifada broke out. The dimension of the Intifada led 
the Brotherhood to create Hamas from its own ranks, in order to play an active role in the 
resistance for the first time. Hamas was established in the Gaza Strip, where it also conducted 
its first Intifada activities. In early 1988 Hamas expanded its organization and activities to the 
West Bank. However, in the West Bank it immediately faced difficulties in establishing a 
strong and viable organization, compared to the powerful branch developing in Gaza.  
 
The main goal of Hamas, as expressed in the charter from 1988 and later political statements, 
implies resistance against the occupation of Palestine, in other words areas which are now 
known as Israel, Gaza and the West Bank (Hroub 2006:21-30). The resistance and other 
political strategies have been pursued during several historical phases in the Israeli – 
Palestinian conflict. In short, the history of Hamas started with the first Intifada period, which 
also led to the simultaneous Oslo negotiations. Hamas`s resistance continued during the Oslo 
years from 1993, until the Second Intifada erupted in 2000. Further resistance was initiated 
from 2000, until the end of the Intifada in 2004/2005. The second Intifada was followed by 
Palestinian local and national elections in 2005/2006, won by Hamas. The Hamas government 
of 2006 turned out to be short-lived, and was succeeded by the National Unity government in 
March 2007. Three months later, the unity government was dissolved immediately after the 
militant takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007 (Edwards 2010:310-317).    
In this complex political context, this last incident marks a watershed in modern Palestinian 
history. In the following period, between 2007 and 2011, the Israeli blockade of the Gaza 
Strip has isolated the local population and the Hamas movement. In addition, the international 
community has increasingly focused on building a viable secular Palestinian state, based in 
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the West Bank. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip has thus been effectively separated since 
2007, with Fatah controlling the West Bank, and Hamas in control of Gaza. Furthermore, 
Palestinian security sector reform has been a key instrument in building the secular West 
Bank state. Security cooperation between Israel and the PA in the West Bank has thus focused 
on marginalizing the Hamas branch. Their reasons have overlapped, as the PA feared a 
similar takeover by Hamas in the West Bank,2
The current marginalization of Hamas in the West Bank is well documented in research, 
carried out by think tanks like the International Crisis Group,
 while Israel was intent on dismantling all 
militant groups (ICG 2010:i). Today Hamas members and leaders in the West Bank are thus 
frequently arrested, social institutions closed, and the movement is not allowed to operate in 
public.  
3 and the Carnegie Endowment.4 
However, research and media coverage regarding the development, activity and political 
position of Hamas in the West Bank, is scarce in covering the period between 1987 and 2007. 
Hamas`s raison d'être, the struggle to liberate Palestine,5
                                                          
2 Popular opinion polls from 2009 showed an increase in the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank, versus a 
decrease in Gaza 
 imply that it has a strong strategic 
interest in developing a powerful organization in the West Bank. After all the West Bank is 
the core area of the OPT, it is much larger than Gaza, houses more Palestinians, and it is the 
seat of the Palestinian Authority (PA). But the political interests of Israel and the PLO led to 
the current campaigns against Hamas in the West Bank. This raises interesting questions 
regarding the historical political position of Hamas in the West Bank prior to 2007. We can 
assume that both the PLO and Israel saw Hamas as serious political contender to be 
marginalized, by force if necessary. But, did this happen because Hamas always has been a 
strong force in the West Bank? Was Hamas in the West Bank an influential militant Islamist 
force, armed with Qassam-rockets and suicide bombers? What caused it to be popular, and 
did it reach its peak in terms of popular support simultaneously as the Gaza branch in 2007? 
Or was it the other way around: Hamas was a marginal force on the West Bank, and Israel/PA 
wanted to keep it that way? In the literature on Hamas there is a lacuna regarding the West 
Bank branch of Hamas. Information regarding Hamas in the West Bank is scattered in 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=24120&zoom_highlight=hamas+west+bank 
3 See the report “Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation” from 2010.   
4 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=24120&zoom_highlight=hamas+west+bank  
5 Originally Hamas aimed to liberate the historical Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. 
This position has later been flexible, and other solutions have been considered, including the interim solution 
with a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with armistice (Hroub 2000:69-73). 
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academic books and articles, often only referred to in short references or general phrases 
regarding the movement as an entirety (the literature will be elaborated in chapter two).  
This thesis takes the 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas as a starting point. The takeover itself 
was violent, facilitated by Hamas`s militant strength. However, the takeover was grounded in 
real political influence in Gaza, established as a result of significant political, militant and 
social activity in Gaza over the past twenty years. But, why did Hamas only takeover Gaza in 
2007, and not the West Bank? To be able to answer this question, one needs to know more 
about the political positions of Hamas in the West Bank. It is thus the goal of this thesis to 
establish the political position of Hamas in the West Bank, between 1987 and 2007. It does so 
by analyzing the core factors enabling Hamas to take control in Gaza; namely social activity, 
militant activity and political activity.  
Defining Hamas 
Hamas is a multi-faceted and adaptable movement. It is thus useful to establish a definition of 
Hamas as a movement, which will serve as a platform in my discussions on Hamas. First of 
all, as the name implies, Hamas is an Islamic resistance movement, with a history of using 
violence to achieve its political goals. The use of violence as a strategy began already in late 
1987, and later involved suicide attacks inside Israeli cities, and rocket attacks from Gaza. 
The aim of this resistance is to force the unconditional Israeli withdrawal, without 
surrendering any other Palestinian rights in return, and without recognizing Israel (Hroub 
2006:44). A large number of Palestinians has stated its support for the violent approach of 
Hamas (Tamimi 2007:161, 162). Furthermore, Hamas inherited its focus on social and 
religious work from its mother movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas thus provides 
social welfare services and religious education to numerous poor Palestinians in Gaza and the 
West Bank. The unstoppable growth of Hamas between 1987 and 2007, including the victory 
in the 2006 elections, is largely attributed to its success in social work (Hroub 2006:70). 
However, despite the fact that Hamas probably won the 2006 elections because of its strong 
grassroots support, it is not possible to make clear connections between the social work and 
its political stature. There is no evidence that Hamas provides welfare assistance to 
Palestinians conditional upon political support (Knudsen 2005:1373). Still, social work is a 
major part of the activity of the West Bank branch of Hamas. In the academic literature this 
work is often explored in general terms, which makes it even more important to investigate 
how this work is performed, and whether it may influence the political standing of Hamas in 
the West Bank.     
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It is my assumption in this thesis, that the political position of Hamas at any given time is 
influenced by its political, social and militant activity. During the period of interest, Hamas 
has made a political transition from being a militant resistance movement boycotting the 
national elections, to participate in, and winning both local and national elections. The fact 
that Hamas decided to make it a political goal to have their avowed members placed in 
governmental offices, and won the elections, makes it possible to classify the movement as a 
political party (Harmel 1985:406, 407). It is also in the nature of Hamas, through its main 
goals, to seek political influence from the first day it was established. Hamas was thus an 
important participant in West Bank politics early on, especially in university student council 
elections, which is a major indicator of political leverage in Palestine. 
 
In sum, I will thus define Hamas as an Islamist political party, a militant organization, and a 
social actor. I will consider the social work of Hamas as an important source of its grassroots 
political support, but this support is more a matter of the credibility of Hamas, not pressure to 
support Hamas in return for receiving social welfare assistance. As these three fields of 
activity are intertwined in the case of Hamas, this three-part divide will constitute the platform 
from which I will discuss the political position of Hamas in the West Bank.    
Research Question 
My starting point for this research question is the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, the 
aforementioned current marginalization of Hamas in the West Bank, and the lacuna in the 
academic literature regarding the political position of Hamas in the West Bank between 1987 
and 2007. To be able to explore, and not exclude, all relevant aspects of Hamas in the West 
Bank, this research question must be formulated widely:   
 
• What has been the political position of Hamas in the West Bank between 1987 
and 2007?  
 
As noted above, this thesis is based on a three-part dividing of Hamas`s activities. Hamas has 
worked to gain political influence in the West Bank throughout the period of interest. I will 
argue that the social and militant activities of the movement are variables which also effect on 
the political position of Hamas. The militant activities are aimed specifically at raising the 
political influence of the movement, by pressuring Israel to end the occupation. The social 
activities are thus somewhat different. It gives the movement much needed political support, 
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but Hamas does not engage in social work only to gain votes and political influence. Still, 
these three fields of activity have an effect on each other, and ultimately on the political 
position of Hamas on the West Bank.  
 
The research question does also imply other actors and contenders involved in West Bank 
politics. The major Palestinian faction in the West Bank in the period of interest was the 
secular and nationalist Fatah party. Fatah has also been the dominant faction in the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in this period, which, since 1974 have seen itself as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians (Gunning 2008:29). The role and interests of 
Israel will also be elaborated, as it is the main enemy and opponent for Hamas. The political 
position of Hamas in the West Bank must thus be seen in relation to the position and political 
interests of Fatah, the PLO and Israel.  
Key issues 
The political position of Hamas is also a result of other factors. First of all, the research 
question and the three-part dividing of the activity of Hamas lead to two important questions: 
 
• How did Hamas develop its organization in the West Bank in the period of interest?  
• What have been the main activities of Hamas in the West Bank in the same period? 
 
To fully answer these questions, other underlying key issues must be explored as part of the 
thesis.  
• The Muslim Brotherhood connection: The connection between the Palestinian 
Brotherhood and Hamas is a key factor to understand the development of Hamas.  
• Political context: A presentation of the political system and modern history of 
Palestine will be necessary, to set the context in which Hamas exercise political 
influence. The continued Israeli/IDF presence in the West Bank (Israeli settlement 
expansion), and the establishment of the PA and its security forces, have been decisive 
factors for the operational freedom of Hamas on the West Bank.   
• Internal factors: The political position of Hamas on the West Bank is influenced by 
internal matters in the movement, such as the way it is organized. Hence, internal 
structures of the movement will be analyzed.  
• West Bank V.S Gaza Strip: The current geographical separation and social and 
political differentiations between Gaza and the West Bank, have historical roots. 
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These differences will be highlighted when relevant, to broaden the understanding of 
how Hamas developed and operates in the West Bank.  
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Chapter 2 
Methodology and limitations of the study 
How to approach a study of Hamas on the West Bank 
Terms and concepts 
There are many considerations to be made when conducting a study of Hamas in the West 
Bank. First of all, Hamas is an Islamist movement operating in a completely different political 
context than what exists in Norway. It has thus been important for me to be aware of my own 
point of view, especially since my perspective is from the outside. Furthermore, any study on 
Islamist movements must be aware of the terms and expressions used in media coverage and 
the academic literature on Islamic movements. These are politically charged, and they are at 
times used uncritically. Terms such as “Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism and political 
Islam”, has been thoroughly debated by scholars such as John Obert Voll, Franqois Burgat, 
Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy.6
 
 The mixed use of such terms may be confusing, and it could 
exclude important distinctions between movements such as Hamas, and other more moderate 
movements. In the academic discourse, the term “Islamism” replaced the term 
“fundamentalism” during the 1980s. The term “Islamism” conforms to the Arabic reference to 
the Islamic movement (al-harak al-Islamiyya) and its adherents as Islamists (Islamiyyun) 
(Knudsen 2003:3). However, both Kepel and Burgat call for caution when using this term. 
The breadth and diversity in Islamic movements must be considered before using this term to 
generalize (Burgat 2003:8, 9, Kepel 2004:62). A discussion of the diversity in Islamic 
movements is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as I will mainly use the terms 
“Islamism” and “Islamist movement” in this thesis, a brief definition of this term, and 
categories within the term, is useful to understand how the term applies to Hamas.  
Bjørn Olav Utvik and Truls Hallberg Tønnesen states that Islamism could be understood to; 
indicate an ideological tendency (or rather a family of tendencies) seeing the religion Islam 
as not only regulating the relationship between the individual believer and God, but 
containing as well divine directions which should govern social, judicial and political affairs 
in a Muslim society (Tønnesen & Utvik 2008:7). In addition to this definition, it is important 
to note that the Islamist movement (in its widest sense) can be delimited by three traits. First 
of all they refer to themselves as the Islamic movement, secondly they call for an Islamic state 
ruled in accordance with Sharia, and finally they organize themselves for the purpose of 
                                                          
6 For full references see literature list. 
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achieving these goals (Knudsen 2003:3, Utvik 1993:201). The above definition thus makes a 
separation between Islamic movements which gives priority to political activism, and on the 
other hand movements that eschew political activism, focusing primarily on religious 
preaching to revive the Islamic faith in their communities7 (ICG 2005:3). It is thus possible to 
narrow the scope, and place Hamas in a category of movements seeking political power. A 
central dividing line within this category is whether a movement is inclined to use violence as 
a means to achieve its goals. Most Islamist movements in this category seek political power 
without the use of violence, and can thus be labeled as moderate.8 Hamas on the other hand, 
has worked in peaceful terms to achieve political power, but as it is operating under 
occupation, also taken the stand to engage in violent resistance (militant Jihad) (ICG 2005:3). 
Hamas is thus in the borderline between what is termed moderate and militant Islamist 
movements. Because of Hamas’s violent tactics, several countries and organizations have 
taken a strong stand against Hamas, and it is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU,9 
Israel,10 the UK11 and the US.12
The structure of the thesis 
 Still, it is separable from other categories of militant Jihadist 
movements, such as the so-called Jihadi-Salafiyya current, which is launching militant Jihad 
to defend areas which historically has been under Muslim rule (ICG 2005:4).    
A historical study of Hamas can be structured in different ways. One approach is the 
chronological approach, in which key issues are discussed in chronological order. Another 
approach is thematic, in which key issues are sorted and discussed according to their 
importance. I have decided to combine these two approaches in my thesis. Hence, from 
chapter three forward, each chapter is chronological, but also sorted thematically. As 
indicated in chapter one, I approached Hamas in the West Bank based on the assumption that 
their activity can be divided in three main categories, political, social and militant activities. 
These three parts are thus discussed in separate chapters, focusing on key issues in 
chronological order.    
 
                                                          
7 Examples are the Salafiyya movement and the Tablighi movement (ICG 2005:4). 
8 Examples are the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the PJD in Morocco (ICG 2005:3).   
9 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf  
10 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism-%20obstacle%20to%20peace/hamas%20war%20against%20israel/   
11 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribed-
groups?view=Binary  
12 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm  
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Limitations on the study 
Time period            
A major challenge to this study has been to define a relevant time period suitable to discuss 
my research question. The history of Hamas begins in 1987, and continues today. However, 
the strong historical roots to the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood are the key to 
understand the development of Hamas on the West Bank. Chapter three therefore provides an 
historical background to Hamas, as a part of the Muslim Brotherhood network. The main part 
of this thesis covers the period between 1987 and 2007. In my exploration of the history of 
Hamas, I found no logical breaking-points until the aforementioned military takeover of Gaza 
in 2007. Ending the study of Hamas at an earlier period would exclude important political 
developments, such as the recent Palestinian elections. The political events after June 15th 
2007 are thus beyond the scope of this thesis. The time-period covered is comprehensive. 
However, it is my claim that the development and activity of Hamas in the West Bank has 
been somewhat consistent during the period under study. I have thus explored the political 
context and history of the West Bank, to indentify the most important elements of Hamas`s 
position. This led me to key moments and key activity of Hamas, which I have emphasized. It 
has thus been possible to cover a twenty-year period, but without referring to every political 
incident.   
Sources and field work 
This thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources. The main secondary sources have 
been academic books, articles and reports, which are elaborated below. My primary sources 
are interviews conducted during my fieldwork in Ramallah in the West Bank, in October 
2010. In Ramallah I was based at Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of 
Democracy, as part of their research cooperation with CMI. However, fieldtrips to Hebron, 
Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv were also necessary, both to gain firsthand impressions of 
the area, and to conduct interviews.13 Especially a field trip to Hebron by invitation from 
TIPH, served to broaden my understanding of the political history of the West Bank. I also 
draw on my experience as trainee at the Norwegian embassy in Tel Aviv during fall of 2009, 
which gave me useful perspectives on the political context. During my fieldwork it was my 
intention to conduct personal interviews with Hamas members, students, activists and leaders 
on the West Bank. However, the reality on the West Bank as of 201014
                                                          
13 A list of interviewees can be found in the Appendix 
 made this difficult. 
Before, during and after my stay, both Israeli and PA security forces arrested Hamas 
14 Hamas attacked Israeli settlers in August 2010 - http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6803OX20100901  
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members. I was told that if Palestinians on the West Bank publicly displayed support for 
Hamas, they risked being arrested. People I met were thus reluctant to use their contacts to 
organize meetings for me with Hamas members. Arranging such meetings could get them 
imprisoned. Interviews with ordinary Hamas members, and Hamas-affiliated students were 
thus not possible. The only possible way for me to meet Hamas members, were thus to 
contact official Hamas representatives, in other words the elected PLC members from 2006. 
This was, however, also problematic. Several PLC members were in Israeli or PA prisons or 
detention centers. Others refused to meet me, claiming the security situation did not allow 
them to discuss issues regarding Hamas openly.  
 
A few Hamas PLC members were however available for interviews in Ramallah. Evicted 
from their official PLC offices in 2007, these members had now gathered in new offices. Two 
of them, Mahmoud Musleh and Mahmoud al-Ramahi,15
                                                          
15 Mahmoud al-Ramahi was arrested by Israel a month after my interview with him 
(
 was willing to give interviews. 
Another Hamas PLC member, Mohammad Totah, was available for interviews in Jerusalem. 
During June 2010, the Israeli government seized his Jerusalem ID-card, and evicted him from 
the city. Together with two other Hamas PLC members, Totah now lives in the Red Cross 
facilities in Sheikh Jarrah, Jerusalem, were he frequently meets foreign journalists and 
researchers. I conducted these three interviews as semi-structured and qualitative interviews. I 
had prepared an interview guide, which I used selectively, to be able to ask relevant follow-up 
questions to their answers. I was able to ask questions concerning the political and social 
work of Hamas, but I had been advised beforehand to avoid questions on its military activity. 
Questions regarding its military activity would probably been dismissed, but it is also 
considered a security risk to possess such information. The interview with al-Ramahi and 
Totah were held in English, while a professional interpreter was needed for the interview with 
Musleh. The translation of this interview has later been controlled by an Arabic-speaking 
Norwegian in Bergen. The interview with al-Ramahi was conducted without using a tape-
recorder, while both Totah and Musleh agreed to be recorded. This created somewhat 
different interview situations. Al-Ramahi spoke quite freely off-tape, while I took notes. It is 
impossible for me to know if the tape-recorder put any restraints on Musleh and Totah. 
Quotes from these interviews are thus based on my personal notes, tape recordings and 
Musleh`s words translated by the interpreter. It is my decision to use the full name of these 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/idf-arrests-hamas-lawmaker-from-the-west-bank-in-pre-
dawn-raid-1.323987).  
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three interviewees from Hamas. They are officially elected Hamas representatives, and as 
such, does not risk any harm by being linked to Hamas in this thesis. In addition, I also met 
several senior political analysts from different research institutions and Birzeit University. 
The names of some of these analysts must remain anonymous, by their personal request. 
These interviews were also held in English, some of them on tape, with selective use of the 
interview guide.  
 
Two examples from my fieldwork can serve to illustrate the challenges I faced during my 
fieldwork. First of all, Hamas is not a straight forward-topic to discuss even with Hamas 
politicians. When asked how Hamas is organized on the West Bank, Mohammad Totah 
answered: “Hamas is a secret movement. We (Jerusalem branch) do not know how they 
arrange things inside the movement” (Mohammad Totah in interview with author). A similar 
answer was also given by Mahmoud al-Ramahi, who initially refused to discuss topics related 
to Hamas. This can be interpreted in two ways. They actually do not know how Hamas is 
organized, or they do not want to discuss this topic in detail. However, all three Hamas PLC 
members willingly discussed “Change and Reform”, the Hamas-bloc winning the 2006 
elections. Second, Mahmoud Musleh gave an interesting perspective when asked “Do you 
think foreign journalists and researchers make mistakes in the way they approach Hamas?” 
Musleh answered: “Of course all journalists and researchers are not the same. So I will 
categorize them into three categories: 1. Truth seekers. They might make mistakes – but these 
are pardonable. 2. Intelligence officials. We are aware of them – and their objectives and 
purposes. They want to have sensitive or classified information from us. But we do not have 
this information. We give them information – although we know they are ill-intentioned. This 
information is not dangerous. 3. Those who come to us with pre-judgements – ask questions 
as if they try to prove that we are terrorists and extremists. We exert maximum effort to this 
group to try to convince them the opposite. We try to make a change. But we deal with all 
these categories”. He did not elaborate on which category I belonged to. 
State of the current research on Hamas 
The literature on Hamas is extensive. I have relied on academic books, articles and reports on 
Hamas, written by several different researchers or research institutions. In general, books and 
articles from Beverly Milton-Edwards, Khaled Hroub, Jeroen Gunning, Azzam Tamimi, Zaki 
Chehab, and Mishal & Sela are considered to be influential on Hamas.16
                                                          
16 For full references see the literature list. 
 In addition, articles 
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and reports from research institutes and think-tanks have been used, such as the International 
Crisis Group and Carnegie Endowment. However, I will divide my discussion of the current 
literature on Hamas according to the chapters of this thesis. In chapter three, I relied on books 
and articles from Ziad Abu Amr, Khaled Hroub, Beverly Milton-Edwards and Mohammed K. 
Shadid. These books and articles enhanced my knowledge of the Palestinian Brotherhood, and 
the formative period of Hamas. I will emphasize one book named “Political Parties in the 
West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967”, edited by Amnon Cohen. The book is a 
compilation of Jordanian intelligence reports, found in Jordanian archives by the Israeli forces 
as they entered Jerusalem in 1967. From 1968 Amnon Cohen, an Israeli professor, gathered 
his students and gave them a bunch of files each. The result was Israeli researchers writing 
history based on the Jordanian intelligence service perspective (Anonymous political analyst 
in interview with author). Chapter four in Cohen`s book deals with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
including its history, structure and membership. According to one political analyst, areas in 
the West Bank with Brotherhood branches mentioned in this book, is almost certain to have 
an Hamas branch today (Anonymous political analyst in interview with author).  
Chapter four relied on the aforementioned influential books and articles on Hamas, as did 
chapter five, although discussions with informants from my fieldwork were important in the 
latter. In chapter six on the social and religious work of Hamas, reports from the International 
Crisis Group (2003), Emanuel Schäublin (CCDP Geneva) and Jacob Høigilt (FAFO) 
contributed with detailed accounts from the West Bank. Secondary sources such as Hroub 
(2000), Mishal & Sela (2006) and Gunning (2008) was also valuable, and interviews from my 
fieldwork complemented the chapter. In chapter seven I was not able to make use of my own 
interviews, hence used only secondary sources. Tamimi, Chehab, B.M-Edwards (1996, 2010), 
Hroub (2000, 2006), ICG reports and Gunning gives detailed accounts the militant activity of 
Hamas. Chapter eight on political activity relied more on my own fieldwork, but here B.M-
Edwards (2010), Kristianasen (1997), Gunning (2008), Hroub (2000), Mishal (2003 and 
personal interview), Tamimi, ICG reports and Mishal & Sela (2006) was invaluable 
secondary sources. In addition to these sources I have also relied on information from two 
books written by researchers from the field of terrorism studies. This field of research has 
grown rapidly after 9/11 2001, and researchers such as Matthew Levitt and Jonathan Schanzer 
have written on the Israeli-Palestine conflict. However, books and reports from the field of 
terrorism studies are often based on secondary sources, not personal fieldworks (Gunning 
2008:5). These secondary sources are also often classified, such as intelligence reports, 
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making it impossible for outsiders to verify their claims. In addition, such books tend to be 
politically biased (linked to governments), and demonizing on the other part (Gunning 
2008:5). In the case of Hamas, this category of research makes hard claims on the connection 
between the social work of Hamas and terrorism. Accordingly, all social welfare work of 
Hamas is perceived as breeding terrorism, and it rejects the notion that Hamas can be seen as 
a movement with separate social or military wings and goals. I have thus been critical and 
selective in my reading of these sources, and primarily used them to complement on incidents 
mentioned elsewhere. 
Lacuna of literature on Hamas in the West Bank 
There is, in my opinion, considerably less information available from open sources regarding 
the development of Hamas in the West Bank than Gaza during the period under study. The 
noticeable trend in both media coverage and academic literature on Hamas has been the focus 
given to its activities in Gaza. Information on its development and activities in the West Bank 
appears more randomly, and it is often not the main focus in the article/book were it is found. 
Furthermore, no books or articles (to my knowledge) have attempted a study solely on Hamas 
in the West Bank. Although this study is preoccupied with Hamas in the West Bank, it is the 
result of an extensive reading of sources which analyze the movement as a whole.   
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Chapter 3 
Historical Background: The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 
Introduction 
Hamas has its ideological roots in the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
movement. To fully understand the development of Hamas, it is necessary to introduce its 
origins. This chapter will explain the historical link between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Hamas, by taking a closer look at the historical development of the Palestinian Muslim 
Brotherhood. I will focus on how it unfolded in Palestine, as well as its organization and 
activities. It is the goal of this chapter to analyze how the Brotherhood has developed 
differently in Gaza and the West Bank. This chapter is chronological, and it will also discuss 
the political context in the period under study.  
The origins of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt and Palestine   
The Muslim Brotherhood (Jam`iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) is an Islamic mass movement 
established in the Egyptian city of Ismailiya in 1928. The founder of the movement, and later 
its first General Guide, was the charismatic school teacher and political reformer Hassan al-
Banna. The Brotherhood started out as a small Islamic association aiming to promote personal 
piety and engage in charitable activity. In its first years, the movement focused on 
membership recruitment, private discussions of religion and moral reform, and the building of 
a social service organization. The activities during the formative years was motivated by the 
unwanted domination of foreign powers in Egypt, the poverty of the Egyptian people, and the 
overall declining morality in Egyptian society (Ziad Munson 2001:488-9).  
Organization            
The movement grew rapidly and spread out to many parts of the country, obtaining premises 
and funding, and drawing members from almost every segment in Egyptian society. The 
Brotherhood also acquired a political dimension, calling for Islamic reform of society and the 
government. The immediate catalyst for this political tone in its activities was the Arab 
general strike in Palestine in 1936 , as both the leadership and members in Egypt identified 
the Palestine issue as the single most inspirational source for political activity in the 
movement (Mitchell 1969:31; Ziad Munson 2001:488). Establishing connections abroad, and 
later local branches, was a natural consequence of the Brotherhood ideology and organization. 
The Brotherhood established the “Section for Liaison with the Islamic World” as a part of 
their organization, which aimed to establish contacts with other Islamic associations (Mitchell 
1969:172,173). The spread of the Islamic mission (da`wa) was therefore not confined to 
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Egypt, but to be spread throughout the Islamic world. The Brotherhood recruited, and still 
recruits, its members from all layers of society, but mainly from the educated middle class and 
lower classes. Members are recruited from local networks like mosques, charitable 
organizations, student unions and professional associations. Membership is regulated with 
strict criterions. The Brotherhood`s organizational structure was established already in the 
1940s. The foremost position in the Brotherhood is that of the General Guide (al-murshid al-
`amm) (Mitchell 1969:165). The General Guide is the head of the society`s two major 
governing bodies, the General Guidance Council, and the Consultative Council. These 
councils are centralized, and based at the Headquarters in Cairo. Members of the Brotherhood 
pledge allegiance to their local branches, which lies at the bottom of the Brotherhood 
hierarchy. Members register and pay membership dues to their local branch, which may be 
described as miniature headquarters (Mitchell 1969:177, 179). The Egyptian Brotherhood is 
today the largest political opposition group in Egypt, and widely considered as the mother 
organization of many modern Islamist movements.  
Ideology           
The Brotherhood ideology is based on their idea and definition of Islam, which was developed 
in the late 1930s. Islam is defined as a total, complete system, with the Quran and Sunnah as 
the sole reference points for structuring the life of the Muslim family, individual, community, 
and state (Mitchell 1969:14). Richard P. Mitchell refers to how al-Banna defined the scope of 
the Brotherhood for its members, within the abovementioned framework of Islam: “as a 
Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a 
cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea” (Mitchell 1969:14). 
The main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was thus to offer an alternative to the 
westernization, secularization, and materialism that threatened Muslim societies (Knudsen 
2005:1375). The society created by Prophet Muhammad and his companions served as the 
main source of inspiration, and inspired by this the Brotherhood worked to transform the 
Egyptian society, advocating the establishment of an Islamic state without distinction between 
religion and government (Abu Amr 1993:6). 
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Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood, the pre - 1948 period    
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood began establishing connections abroad from 1935 (Lia 
1998:154). The Palestine area was a natural place to begin, considering the geographical 
proximity to Egypt and the unresolved situation in the British Mandate area (Mitchell 
1969:55). In the 1930s, the unresolved Palestine issue sparked Arab protests and uprisings all 
over Palestine, directed against the British rule and Jewish mass immigration. The conflict 
between Arab and Jewish interests was met by a number of responses from the Palestinian 
Muslim community.17
 
 The most successful response was the emergence of a radical 
modernist Islamic movement in Palestine. This movement was directed by the Islamic leader 
and preacher Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1882-1935), a charismatic personality who 
managed to influence the masses. The Sheikh has later been credited with introducing the idea 
of armed struggle to modern Palestinian politics (Edwards 1996:12). The Sheikh`s political 
and military organization particularly influenced Palestinian peasants and workers, and 
introduced political ideas and principles based on Islam, thus familiar among the Palestinians. 
The influence of his ideas and activities prepared the ground for the message of the Muslim 
Brotherhood only a few years later. Hassan al-Banna therefore sent his brother, Abd al-
Rahman al-Banna, to Palestine in 1935 to establish contacts. He met with Hajj Amin al-
Huseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and chairman of the Muslim Council, to discuss the 
expansion of the movement (Mitchell 1969:55). In the years following 1935, the Brotherhood 
became more directly involved in Palestinian affairs. During the Arab general strikes in 1936-
37 the Brotherhood dispatched volunteers, supplies and equipment to Palestine, and organized 
public supportive demonstrations in Egypt (Mitchell 1969:55). The exact time for the 
establishment of the first Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine is however disputed. Some 
claim the first branch was inaugurated in Jerusalem on October 26, 1945 (Abu Amr 1994:3, 
Mishal & Sela 2006:16), while others refer to the establishment of the first branch in 
Jerusalem in 1946 (Cohen 1982:144, Shadid 1988:659). 
It is however clear that in the course of 1946 the Brotherhood opened branches in Jaffa, 
Lydda, Haifa, Nablus and Tulkarem (Cohen 1982:144), all under the command of the 
leadership in Cairo (Abu Amr 1994:3). The local branches were at this point only charged 
with disseminating the ideology of the Brotherhood as widely as possible (Edwards 1996:35). 
The number of new branches in Palestine reached twenty-five by the year 1947, and the total 
                                                          
17 One response was the secular Palestinian – Arab nationalism, which demanded territorial rights and self 
determination. This response never achieved a large mass following (Edwards 1996:10). 
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membership somewhere between 12.000 and 20.000 (Abu Amr 1994:3). Al-Hajj Amin al-
Husseini, served as the local Brotherhood leader for the Palestinian branches, and his name 
and contacts helped spread its influence in the area (Abu Amr 1994:3). 
In the aftermath of the UN Partitions Plan for Palestine in 1947, Hassan al-Banna ordered the 
branches of the Brotherhood to prepare for Jihad in Palestine (Mitchell 1969:56). 
Representatives was sent to Palestine to assist in the military training of Palestinian scouts, 
and in April 1948 three trained Brotherhood battalions were dispatched to assist in case 
fighting became necessary. Armed Egyptian Brotherhood volunteers also emerged in the 
border areas close to Gaza, ready to fight against the British and Jewish presence in Palestine.  
The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, 1948 – 1967       
The establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 was met with a declaration of war by the 
neighboring Arab countries. When the first Arab-Israeli war broke out, Brotherhood 
volunteers were fighting alongside regular Arab armies. The Brotherhood is later said to have 
played a visible, but not decisive role in the war (Shadid 1988:659). The war ended in defeat 
for the Arab countries at the hands of Israel. The conclusion of separate armistice agreements 
between Israel and Jordan,  Syria,  Egypt, and Lebanon were finished in 1949 (Elaraby 
1968:104).18 As a result of the war, at least 700.00019 Palestinians fled their homes,20
 
 some 
with Arab countries as their next destination, and others ending up as internally displaced 
persons (Edwards 1996:36). Understandably, taking the negative outcome of the 1948 war 
into consideration, many Palestinians perceived the war effort from the neighboring Arab 
states as incompetent, and therefore felt betrayed. The active resistance of the Brotherhood 
fighters, however, made a strong impression among Palestinians. As a result, many joined the 
Brotherhood ranks and became “new Brothers” in the newly established branches. 
The cease-fire lines agreed upon after the war, better known as “the Green Line”, put Israel in 
control of almost 78% of the geographical entity then known as Palestine (Falah 2004:956). 
The remaining 22% consisted of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the latter under 
Egyptian military administration, and the former annexed by the Jordanian government in 
1950 (Edwards 1996:36). Islamic institutions such as the Waqf administration, the Muslim 
Councils, and the custodianship of the Muslim Holy places in Jerusalem were placed under 
the authority of the Jordanian and the Egyptian state (Edwards 1996:37). Importantly, the 
                                                          
18 For the armistice agreements: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp  
19Estimates on Palestinian refugees varies, 711.000 refugees are noted by the UN - 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/93037e3b939746de8525610200567883  
20 This incident is also referred to as the Palestinian exodus, or al-Nakbah (Tamimi 2007:53). 
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Egyptian and Jordanian states were often in competition with each other during the 1950s 
(Edwards 1996:36). The rule of president Gamal Abd al-Nasser`s over Egypt and Gaza gave 
rise to Arab nationalism and Nasserism,21
The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank        
 which in turn led to oppression of Islamist 
movements such as the Brotherhood (Edwards 1996:36). The Jordanian King Hussein, on the 
other hand, made the Brotherhood an ally in the fight against local political forces, such as 
Communism, Arab nationalists and pro-Nasser elements (Abu Amr 1994:5). As a result, the 
Palestinian cause was subjugated by Arab nationalism and inter-Arab state competition for 
hegemony (Edwards 1996:36). The Palestinian Brotherhood branches in Gaza and the West 
Bank therefore followed distinct paths of development, and it is thus sensible to separate their 
respective histories in this chapter. 
The Muslim Brotherhood established branches also in Jordan from 1945, focusing on 
education and gradual reform of the Islamic society through da`wa work (Roald 2008:89). In 
the aftermath of the 1948 war, several Brotherhood members who had been fighting for the 
Egyptian army established new local branches in the West Bank, e.g., in Hebron, Jenin, 
Qalqiliya, `Anabta, Dura, Surif, Sur Bahir, Tubas, Kafr Burqa, Jericho and in several refugee 
camps (Abu Amr 1994:3,4). Both the Hebron branch and a branch in Bethlehem were 
established toward the end of 1949, which gave the Brotherhood a firm foothold in the south 
of the West Bank (Cohen 1982:145). With the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 
1950, the Brotherhood’s West Bank and Jordanian branches merged.22
                                                          
21 Nasserism is an Arab nationalist political ideology, based on the thinking of Nasser (Esposito 1998:133). 
 Importantly, and in 
contrast to the situation in Gaza and Egypt, the Brotherhood supported the King, at least as 
long as he took decisions in support of Islam. When Jordan oriented itself toward the West, 
however, or when the development deviated from what the Brotherhood deemed as “ethical 
values of Islam” (e.g., the consumption of alcohol), the Brotherhood criticized the King 
(Cohen 1982:148). Despite this at times tensions relationship between the King and the 
Brotherhood, the Jordanian regime allowed the Brotherhood to operate openly as an officially 
recognized group (Abu Amr 1994:5), whereas other political parties were outlawed. The King 
still kept strict control with the Brotherhood`s activities, including arrests and surveillance, 
but used the Brotherhood as a buffer against other political forces in the country (Edwards 
1996:57). The Jordanian Brotherhood could therefore turn to politics. Its political activity 
filled a vacuum in the Palestinian community after the 1948 war (Edwards 1996:58), and the 
22 As a result of the annexation of the West Bank, its inhabitants also became Jordanian citizens (Abu Amr 
1994:4). 
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Brotherhood was able to enter every parliamentary election from 1951 as long as their 
political program avoided issues deemed too controversial. Their performances in different 
elections and their public support was however limited, due to their support of the King. 
Branches from both sides of the river Jordan still managed to obtain seats in the parliament 
and gain political experience (Abu Amr 1994:5). The Brotherhood in Jordan/West Bank can 
thus be seen as a political party in this period (Cohen 1982:152). 
Organization, membership and activity of the West Bank branch    
In the first few years after the 1948 war, existing local branches under the Jordanian 
Brotherhood saw a temporary growth in both activity and membership.23 According to 
Beverly Milton Edwards, there were sixteen branches in the West Bank in the beginning of 
the 1950s.24 The merging of the West Bank branches into the Jordanian Brotherhood altered 
the Brotherhood organizational structure. The headquarters in Amman were responsible for 
general guidelines, and the post of the spiritual guide also rested in Jordanian hands.25
 
 
However, in the period between 1948 and 1967, the local branches in Jordan and the West 
Bank were quite autonomous in terms of local decision-making (Cohen 1982:157, Edwards 
1996:60). The temporary growth in activity and membership ended in 1954, when the 
Egyptian president Nasser turned against the Brotherhood organization in Egypt and Gaza. 
This crackdown also influenced the Jordanian branches, and the Egyptian headquarters even 
moved temporarily to Jerusalem during 1954 (Abu Amr 1994:4). However, the influence 
from the mother movement in Egypt was still significant, and Hassan al-Banna`s political 
thinking and ideology was also visible in Jordan.  
However, the Jordanian/West Bank Brotherhood differed from the Egyptian movement in 
terms of its activities. Compared to the Egyptian branch, the Jordanian Brotherhood did not 
organize and support activities for sectors such as students, workers or professionals. Other 
communal activities such as in Mosques, hospitals and schools were also largely absent 
(Cohen 1982:158). Still, the Brotherhood appears to have drawn its membership from all 
sectors of the society, although urban self-employed merchants and property owners 
predominated (Cohen 1982:165). The most important distinction in the activity and agenda of 
                                                          
23 Membership records were never properly maintained from the period, but files compiled by the Jordanian 
intelligence Service reflects a low membership – never reaching more than 700 (Edwards 1996:61).   
24 Among these was Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqiliya, Jericho, Anabta, Dura, Surif, Sur Bahir, 
Aqabat Jaber camp and Tulkaram (Edwards 1996:60). 
25 Abd al-Latif Abu Qara served as its spiritual guide in the first years. Between 1948-67 two Jordanian leaders, 
Abd al-Rahman al-Khalifa and Dr. Yousef al-Athm, directed the Brotherhood (Edwards 1996:59). 
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the Jordanian Brotherhood in the period, however, was its lack of focus on the liberation of 
Islamic lands from foreign domination. The Jordanian branch and the local branches in the 
West Bank had put the question of national liberation temporarily aside, and focused on 
internal politics and implications of the foreign policy of the Jordanian government. The main 
focus of the activities thus centered on local East and West Bank issues, not the Palestine 
cause (Edwards 1996:60). In contrast to the branches in Gaza and Egypt, the Brothers in 
Jordan never took up arms across the border against the Israeli occupation (Edwards 
1996:62). The Jordanian Brotherhood also limited their participation in internal political 
demonstrations, and avoided political violence, and therefore never organized secret 
paramilitary cells, as the Brotherhood organization did both in Gaza and in Egypt (Cohen 
1982:153). This can partly be explained by looking at the Jordanian society at the time, which 
was considerably more traditional and conservative than the Egyptian society. The process of 
modernization and westernization against which the Egyptian Brotherhood was fighting, was 
much slower in the Jordanian society. Because of this, the harsh measures taken by the 
Egyptian government against the Brotherhood in 1948, 1954 (also in Gaza) and in 1966 never 
was considered necessary in Jordan or the West Bank.  
The Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza     
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, over 200.000 Palestinian refugees entered the Egyptian- 
ruled Gaza Strip, and joined the 60-80.000 people already living there (Edwards 1996:42).  
The history of the Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip in this period can roughly be divided in two. 
First, in the period between 1948 and 1954, the Brotherhood enjoyed support from the 
Egyptian regime and the movement grew steadily, partly because Egyptian Brotherhood 
members had established a foundation for a future network in Gaza from its presence in the 
Egyptian army and as volunteers in the 1948 war. The second period, from 1954 onwards, the 
Egyptian government led by Nasser banned the Egyptian Brotherhood and persecuted 
members in both Egypt and Gaza. From that time, the Brotherhood`s fortune was entirely 
dependent on the politics formulated by Nasser, and it had to continue its activity in secret 
(Edwards 1996:46). This development strongly influenced the Brotherhood in Gaza, where its 
leaders and members were gradually arrested or put under surveillance.26
                                                          
26 One of the member arrested was Ahmad Yasin (Abu Amr 1994:9). 
 Later in the period a 
number of other political organizations emerged in the strip, and started to compete for 
popular support. Among these were the Communist party, pan-Arab nationalist parties, the 
Ba`th party, the Arab Nationalist movement, and later also the Fatah movement (Abu Amr 
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1994:9, 10). Some of these parties and organizations at times enjoyed support from the 
Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip (Abu Amr 1994:9).   
Organization, membership and activity of the Gaza branch     
The Brotherhood`s popularity in Gaza peaked after the 1948 war. Many young Palestinians 
joined Brotherhood groups, often recruited by Egyptian soldiers, who were members of the 
Brotherhood (Abu Amr 1994:7). After the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the Egyptian 
headquarters sent official religious missions to the Strip, with leading members acting as 
liaison officers. The Gaza branches were headed by a few traditional leaders, who also 
continued to represent the Brotherhood when the organization went underground (Abu Amr 
1994:9). Many of these leaders worked as teachers in the refugee camps. The Brotherhood 
branches were after a while divided into smaller units, referred to as families (usra) (Edwards 
1996:45). The ban on the movement from 1954, and the secretive underground operations 
which followed, put the members under serious pressure. After a few years, members started 
to escape to the Gulf countries or Saudi Arabia, reducing the size of the organization (Abu 
Amr 1994:9).  
 
This poor relationship between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian administration continued 
until the 1967 war. The first relatively calm years in the period gave the Brotherhood time to 
recruit new members and plan activities. Ziad Abu Amr notes that the Brotherhood in Gaza 
had over 1000 members spread across eleven branches in 1954 (Abu Amr 1994:8). This made 
the Brotherhood one of the largest organizations in the area. Membership was spread among 
various segments of the population. The Brotherhood was present in every refugee camp in 
the strip through its religious and social work. Here they especially recruited young students, 
even from the UNRWA run schools (Abu Amr 1994:8). In addition to social work, the 
activity of the movement was centered round two main themes: religious study and 
paramilitary training. The leaders of the different Gaza branches often held small reading 
sessions in their homes, and focused on religious education. They arranged several religious 
festivals, often connected to Islamic religious events (Edwards 1996:44). But the Brotherhood 
in Gaza also focused on the liberation of Palestine (Jihad) in their activities and training of 
their members. This included basic military training, in weapons use and guerilla warfare. It 
also included rhetoric on liberation, which was meant to prepare the Brothers for a future war 
against Israel (Edwards 1996:44). By these activities they were markedly different from their 
Brothers in the West Bank. The opportunity to fight Israel came already in 1956, when Israel 
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occupied the Gaza Strip as a part of their invasion of the Suez Canal. The occupation set off 
cross-border attacks from local Brotherhood activists, against Israeli soldiers (ICG 2004:4). 
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 1957 emboldened the militant activists of the 
Brotherhood. Some of them proposed to establish a guerilla force to continue the attacks 
against Israel, but the leadership refused27
 
 (ICG 2004:4). The increasingly militant attitude of 
the Brotherhood in Gaza provoked further crackdowns from the Egyptian government. By the 
midt-1960s the Brotherhood had almost ceased to exist, as a result, though the growing appeal 
of other political groups from the late 1950s also played its part (Shadid 1988:660). The 
Brotherhood was thus left politically powerless and insignificant as an organization.  
It is important to note the differences between Egyptian and Jordanian policies toward the 
Muslim Brotherhood between 1948 and 1967. Two distinctly different political cultures 
developed in the two Palestinian territories. The Gaza branch developed a more secretive and 
militant Islamism, as a response to the crackdowns by Nasser. Members in Gaza thus had 
more experience in building clandestine and decentralized organizations, which was 
unnecessary for the West Bank/Jordanian Brotherhood because of their lawful status 
(Wiktorowicz 2004:120). This status also allowed the Jordanian Brotherhood to gain political 
experience. The Jordanian Brotherhood also avoided violence across the Israeli border, as 
opposed to the Gaza branch. These differences partly explain the disparate state of affairs for 
the Brotherhood in Gaza and the West Bank after the Israeli occupation in 1967. 
The Palestinian Brotherhood, 1967-77  
The Six Day War of 196728 resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the Sinai Peninsula, after the armies of Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria had been defeated by Israel. This outcome of the war ended the inspiration 
that Nasserism had had on regional politics. Among the Arab countries in the Middle East, it 
led to a phase of political soul-searching, and an identity crisis (Edwards 1996:73). The war 
also had a profound effect on the general Islamic movement in the Middle East. Islamic 
movements emerged and rose steadily during the 1970s, termed as the “Islamic revival”, or 
the (re)emergence of “political Islam” (Hroub 2000:32).29
                                                          
27 Among these activists was Khalil al-Wazir, a future co-founder of Fatah (ICG 2004:4). 
 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
played a key role in this revival, and their strong position influenced other movements in the 
region. Moreover, these movements regarded the outcome of the war as a defeat for secular, 
28 The war took place between June 5th and June 10th1967 (Edwards 2010:38).  
29 These terms refers to an Islamic reaction to the perceived challenge and hegemony from the West (Abu Amr 
1994:12). 
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nationalist and socialist thinking in the region (Abu Amr 1994:11). The Islamists explained 
the Israeli war victory by highlighting the strong focus on religion among the Jews, while 
claiming this focus on Islam was absent in the Arab societies (Abu Amr 1994:11). 
A new focal point thus emerged among Islamists during the 1970s and 80s, aimed to increase 
the focus on traditional Islamic values, and to restore the Islamic character in society. 
However, at the Palestinian level, this “Islamic revival” was not as imminent as in Egypt. The 
secular PLO was restructured after 1967, and gained popular support for their focus on 
liberation through armed struggle (Edwards 1996:74). New ideas of self reliance and the 
pursuit of liberation strategies were also introduced to replace the dependence on Arab armies 
(Hroub 2000:29). Nationalism, led by PLO, became the strong force behind the Palestinian 
resistance movement in the first decade of the occupation. As a result, the Islamic revival 
emerged later in Palestine. I will explain this development by dividing the time period in two 
decades, (1967-77 and 1977-87), focusing on the political context and the organizational 
development of the Palestinian Brotherhood.  
Occupation and reorganization, 1967-1977       
During the first decade of Israeli occupation, the Palestinian Brotherhood regrouped and 
reasserted itself as a religious organization dedicated to the program of social reform and 
da`wa work. In contrast to the PLO-led Palestinian resistance movement, the Palestinian 
Brotherhood did not engage in violent resistance against the occupation. The Brotherhood was 
not prepared or willing, ideologically, politically or militarily to undertake direct and 
organized military action against Israel (Abu Amr 1994:10).  
 
For the West Bank Brotherhood, the occupation first of all severed the physical link with the 
Jordanian Brotherhood. The new border limitations caused the Jordanian Brotherhood leaders 
to shut down the daily contact between the branches in the West and East Bank. Some local 
West Bank leaders even closed down the activity temporarily in their branches, while others 
escaped to Jordan in fear of being arrested by Israel (Edwards 1996:85). The decision to 
reduce the level of activity was also affected by the political climate. The dominance of 
secularism and nationalism in the West Bank left little room for the Brotherhood`s message. 
The West Bank Brotherhood also had a generation gap in their organization in this period. In 
contrast to the Gaza branch, the leadership was growing old, passive and out of touch with the 
bedrock of the society. They had problems attracting and recruiting new and young members 
with their ideology (Edwards 1996:85, 86).  
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In Gaza, the Brotherhood organization was close to non-existent the first few years after the 
war. Its ideas were still valued, but just as in the West Bank it was impossible for the 
Brotherhood to compete against the Palestinian national liberation movement. The Gaza 
branches thus also had problems recruiting new members, and focused on gradually 
establishing a low profile network of Muslim believers, with a shared Islamic background and 
vision (Edwards 1996:101). In 1971, an Israeli military campaign in Gaza altered the political 
climate. The campaign aimed to halt the four years of armed Fedayeen30
The Islamic Center in Gaza (al-Mujamma` al-Islami)       
 struggle for national 
liberation against Israel (Edwards 1996:97). In addition to the forceful removal of suspected 
fighters, the Israeli campaign also obstructed the institution building of the nationalists, and 
hindered them in providing services for the local community. The Israeli campaign thus left a 
political vacuum in the Gaza Strip, a vacuum the Islamic movement began to fill in 1973 
(Edwards 1996:98).  
The first signs of the re-emergence of the Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories began in 
Gaza in 1973. The process was led by the late leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, 
together with a number of other future Hamas leaders such as Dr. `Abd-al-`Aziz al-Rantisi 
and Dr. Mahmud al-Zahar (Abu Amr 1994:16). Yassin was a charismatic personality, and 
central to the future role of Islamic politics in Gaza. Yassin had no formal religious training, 
but had established a reputation as a religious reformer through his work with charity, 
teaching and religious preaching in the mosque (Edwards 1996:99). Under his guidance, the 
Brotherhood established new organizations and institutions across the Gaza Strip to spread its 
ideas and influence. The majority of these institutions were put under the authority of “the 
Islamic Center” and its leadership based in Gaza city. The Islamic Center (al-Mujamma) was 
primarily established as a mosque, but attached to it was also a medical clinic, a youth sports 
club, a nursing school, an Islamic festival hall, a Zakat committee, and a center for women 
activities (Abu Amr 1994:16). This institutional concept spread across the Strip, and it rapidly 
extended its influence over new mosques. Each Mujamma was administered by a committee 
controlled by the Brotherhood (Shadid 1988:674). The Mujamma project focused on re-
shaping the Muslim community by founding of a network of schools and Qur`anic classes to 
preach and teach the message of Islam (Mishal 2003:575). There are contradicting reports 
                                                          
30 The term “Fedayeen” refers to Palestinians fighting for national liberation, not Mujaheedin militias which fight 
for a religious cause (Esposito 1998:233). 
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among scholars whether the Mujamma and the Brotherhood are really the same organization. 
It is clear that there were disagreements concerning the scale of the Mujamma (Mishal & Sela 
2006:20). Regardless, the Mujamma took over and expanded the mainstream activities of the 
Brotherhood in Gaza, functioning as an extension or front. In fact, the focus of the Mujamma 
on developing a civil society in Gaza by forming voluntary associations did not clash with the 
established structure of the Brotherhood, which continued to exist separately (Mishal & Sela 
2006:21, Edwards 1996:123). As the nationalist factions were unable to provide proper social 
services to the Palestinian people, the basic services offered by the Islamic Center, such as 
dentists, doctors, kindergartens and Quranic teachings, made the Mujamma an important 
institution in the Gaza society. During the mid-1970s, the Brotherhood leadership in Jordan, 
the West Bank and Gaza was loosely reorganized. They reunited, and formed one 
organization called “the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine” (Abu Amr 
1994:10).31
The re-emergence of the Brotherhood, 1977 - 1987 
 The branch in the Gaza Strip could thus resume contact with the West Bank 
branch, and simultaneously distance itself from the mother organization in Egypt. In practice, 
the branches in Palestine could exchange visits, ideas and publications without considering 
the former border restrictions between them. Brotherhood members even claim monthly 
meetings were held from the early 1970s, between Hebron, Nablus and Gaza representatives 
(Edwards 1996:93). 
The Brotherhood continued to focus on its educational, social and religious activities 
throughout the 1970s and 80s. As will be elaborated, Israel operated with a policy that 
targeted the PLO, not the Brotherhood. Compared to the PLO factions, the Brotherhood could 
thus build its organizational structure, and reach out to the masses without Israeli intervention 
(Abu Amr 1994:14). As a result, the power-balance between the PLO and the general Islamic 
movement changed in the 1970s. The PLO gradually lost the support of the masses, after 
failing to deliver on its declared objectives.32
                                                          
31 However, Mohammed K. Shadid contradicts this reunion (Shadid 1988:664).  
 The PLO also suffered internal splits when it 
opened the door for political and diplomatic solutions with Israel after the 1973 Yom Kippur 
war. Accordingly, PLO began considering accepting the two-state solution along the 1967 
borders (Abu Amr 1994:13). Local and regional political factors also contributed to the 
weakening of the PLO. The ousting from Jordan in 1970-1 and Lebanon in 1982 generated an 
ideological and structural crisis inside the organization, with accusations of corruption and 
32 The strategy of the PLO is liberation of all of Palestine through armed struggle (Fedayeen forces), and the 
creation of a Palestinian state in which Jews, Muslims and Christians would co-exists (Edwards 1996:74). 
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inefficiency deepening the crisis (Mishal & Sela 2006:14). The Islamic movement perceived 
the new strategy of the PLO as giving up the goal of complete liberation of Palestinian soil. 
By presenting an alternative strategy to the PLO, the Palestinian Brotherhood could capitalize 
on the emerging political weakness of the PLO factions (Abu Amr 1994:13).  
 
In the late 1970s, a number of incidents worked to strengthen the “Islamic Revival”: The oil 
boom enhanced the influence of the oil producing states in the Arab world, and wealthy 
countries such as Saudi Arabia became active supporters of different Islamic movements, and 
the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran provided other Islamist movements with a model to 
emulate (Abu Amr 1994:12). It is also important to emphasize the impact of the continued 
Israeli occupation and the rise of the rightwing elements in Israeli politics in the 1970s. The 
establishment of the Gush Emunim movement in 1974 initiated the national-religious 
settlement project in the West Bank (ICG 2009:3), which increased after the electoral victory 
of the rightwing Likud party in 1977. The religious framing of the settler-movement bolstered 
the existing Islamist tendencies in the Palestinian territories and beyond (Wiktorowicz 
2004:119). 
The West Bank Brotherhood  
The West Bank branch had struggled in the first decade after the occupation with aging 
leaders, an age gap among members in many branches, and problems with recruiting new 
members. Starting from 1977 the situation improved. The local branches were now able to 
attract new and younger members, many of which had grown up under the occupation. The 
first areas where the Brotherhood re-established their activities were Nablus, Ramallah, 
Hebron and Jerusalem (Edwards 1996:130, 131). However, the influence of Palestinian 
nationalism and the leftist parties were stronger in the West Bank society than in Gaza. This 
was evident with an ongoing secularization apparent at every level of the society, including in 
the establishment of new “national institutions” such as hospitals, newspapers, research 
centers and universities (Edwards 1996:131). The secularization was part of an intellectual 
trend in the West Bank, particularly influential in the cities. In rural areas and in conservative 
cities like Hebron, people were less receptive to secularization and Palestinian nationalism 
(Edwards 1996:131). As indicated above, the success of the nationalists gradually broke down 
during the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s the PLO managed to partially recover and 
restore some of their political power, but the Muslim Brotherhood still steadily increased its 
influence. From the early 1980s, the Brotherhood branches in the West Bank and Gaza was 
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under the command of a council of elected representatives drawn from the Gaza Strip, and 
from the central, northern and southern regions of the West Bank (Tamimi 2007:54,55). 
Educational and religious institutions in the West Bank 
The growing university sector in the West Bank became an important political arena from the 
end of the 1970s, when the Israeli Likud party banned Palestinian municipal elections. The 
Brotherhood entered this arena to raise its profile in relation to other political factions, and to 
compete in the annual student council elections (Edwards 1996:132), organizing student 
groups which offered Islamic alternatives on campus and Islamic activities (Mahmoud 
Musleh in interview with author). The main focus for the Islamists on the universities was 
often not to protest against the occupation, but to compete for influence among its co-
students. From the beginning of the 1980s, the Brotherhood ideology seemed to increasingly 
appeal to students, especially those from lower classes and/or from conservative areas 
(Gunning 2008:33) At the al-Najah University in Nablus, the rise of an Islamic bloc (MB and 
Islamic Jihad) was apparent already from 1981, and in the five years before the closure of the 
university in 1987, the Islamic bloc won a majority in all annual student elections33
 
 (Edwards 
1996:135). 
Hamas member and former Birzeit student Mahmoud Musleh emphasized that the 
Brotherhood set out actively to conquer the nationalist influence in Birzeit from late 1970s: 
“The major problem that faced them (Brotherhood student blocs) at that time was that the 
society was dominantly affected by the secular and atheist groups. This was a big problem. So 
they started to focus their seminars, work, symposiums, and speeches on how to turn people 
from atheism into faith” (Mahmoud Musleh in interview with author).  
Traditionally Birzeit is regarded as a secular and liberal University, but the Islamists managed 
to win on average a third of the student votes there during the 1980s (Edwards 1996:137). 
Student leaders of the Islamic bloc in Birzeit later also became leading figures in the nation-
wide Islamic movement (Edwards 1996:127). At the Hebron University the Brotherhood was 
part of the Islamic bloc, and dominated student politics during the 1980s. However, the 
tension between the nationalists and the Islamists found elsewhere in the West Bank and Gaza 
were not present in Hebron. Here the local Fatah representatives had more religious leanings, 
                                                          
33 In line with its policy of targeting nationalists in this period, the Israeli authorities arrested 100 Fatah youth 
members before the elections in 1986/87, and thus contributed to a 5 % increase in the Islamic bloc vote 
(Edwards 1996:135).  
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and the leftwing forces were all but absent, probably preventing Palestinian infighting 
(Edwards 1996:138).   
 
The many West Bank mosques constituted the other major arena for the Brotherhood`s 
activity in this period. While the mosques primarily function as places of worship, they were 
also used for political work. And, because they are defined as religious sanctuaries Israel did 
not impose the same restrictions on them as on other political institutions during the 1970s 
and 80s (Abu Amr 1994:15). This made it possible to keep religious functions operative, and 
made mosques a good place for the Brotherhood to recruit new members and expand its 
influence. The total number of mosques on the West Bank also increased from 400 in 1967, to 
750 in 1987 (Abu Amr 1994:15). This was a result of many factors, but it is important to note 
that the Islamists understood the power of the mosques for the spreading and consolidation of 
political influence, vis-â-vis the secular and national forces. The mosques in the West Bank 
were often connected to Waqf institutions. The Waqf institutions employed many Palestinians, 
among them Brotherhood members or sympathizers. The Brotherhood thus got privileged 
access to the masses through their influence in these institutions, and it got unofficial credit 
for the services rendered34
 
 (Abu Amr 1994:15).  
In other areas of activity, the Brotherhood in the West Bank was less successful. The welfare 
and education structure established by the nationalists was weak, but solid enough to restrict 
the Brotherhood`s influence. In addition, the Brotherhood was not able to influence other 
associations such as professional associations, trade union groups or NGOs (Edwards 
1996:139). The Brotherhood was thus not able to establish a strong extended organization, 
such as the Mujamma, in the West Bank. 
The Islamic Center increases its influence in Gaza   
The Brotherhood`s activity in the Gaza Strip between 1977 and 1987 revolved around the 
Islamic Centre. The Centre had developed into two parallel organizations. The formal and 
registered organization had offices in Gaza city, and focused on charity and welfare work. But 
another informal part of the organization operated from the home of Yassin and a nearby 
mosque (Edwards 1996:125). This part of the Center was responsible for political activities. 
Led by Yassin, this component of the Centre gradually became more involved in the political 
                                                          
34 In 1988, Jordan disengaged from the West Bank with the exception of the Jerusalem branch of the Ministry of 
Awqaf. In 1994–95, Jordan handed most of the Jerusalem branch of its Awqaf Ministry over to the PA. It kept 
control of the waqf and zakat of the city of East Jerusalem (Schäublin 2009:35). 
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sphere during the 1980s; trying to curb the secularization of the Gaza society and compete 
with nationalism for popular support. Mujamma leaders also kept in contact with other 
Islamic leaders outside of Gaza, and in particular through Brotherhood leaders in Jordan, the 
Mujamma was able to receive economic support from abroad (Mishal & Sela 2006:21). This 
financial aid in turn enabled the Mujamma to send their future leaders for education in Saudi 
Arabia or the West. The Gaza Strip also saw a major rise in the number of mosques between 
1967 and 1987. Here the increase was even greater than in the West Bank, from 200 – to 600 
mosques (Abu Amr 1994:15). The strong organization and leadership of the Mujamma, and 
its influence and importance in Gaza did not have a parallel in the West Bank. 
Israeli policies 
In their struggle for influence in Gaza, the Center found unexpected support in the Israeli 
state. Throughout the 1980s, Israel feared the strong popular support of the PLO in Gaza, and 
therefore continued its policy of targeting them. The Mujamma activities, on the other hand, 
were often left undisturbed, enabling the movement to organize and mobilize a strong 
institutional basis without interruptions (Edwards 1996:105, Gunning 2008:34). ). In fact, 
Israel even sponsored a number of Mujamma`s activities (Edwards 1996:128, 129). This 
political space provided by Israel to the Mujamma throughout the 1980s was critical for the 
development of the Islamist movement in Palestine. The Mujamma`s level of influence in 
Gaza is perhaps best described by the Israeli adviser on Palestinian religious affairs in the 
1980s and 1990s, Avner Cohen. He was already in June 1984 worried about reports on how 
Mujamma used the Mosques to store weapons, train fighters and incite against the Jews 
(Edwards 2010:60). According to Beverly Milton Edwards & Stephen Farrell, Cohen sent a 
letter to the head of the Israeli Civil Administration and security forces, where he concluded 
that “if Israel keeps covering its eyes toward Mujamma`s activities, it will go against Israel in 
the future” (Edwards 2010:60).  
Sources from my fieldwork emphasized the significance of the differences in Israeli policies 
towards Gaza and the West Bank. My sources partly explained the difference by referring to 
the structure and organization of the Israeli Civil Administration, the security forces, and the 
IDF, in which field commanders often have wide powers when it comes to decision making. 
In this case, the Israeli field-commander responsible for the Gaza Strip believed that 
oppressing PLO and leaving the Mujamma alone would benefit Israel, while the West Bank 
commander did not. As a result, the West Bank Brotherhood was under the same Israeli 
restrictions as the PLO, while the Mujamma in Gaza were left free to operate and build its 
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organization (Interview with anonymous political analyst). In 1978 Israel even granted the 
Mujamma a legal license to operate, and Gaza field commanders donated funds to build 
mosques which were controlled by the Mujamma (Edwards 2010:44, Edwards 1996:128). 
This difference is a significant “piece of the puzzle” to understand how the Mujamma was 
able to grow into a large organization in Gaza, while Brethren in the West Bank struggled.35
Mujamma`s activities  
 
However, in 1984 the political leaders of the Mujamma, including Yassin, were arrested by 
the Israelis for the first time, charged with illegal possession of arms. The weapons were to be 
used by a newly established military wing, the Mujahideen Filastine (Chehab 2007:21). After 
a year in prison, Yassin was released as part of a prisoner exchange, but was not allowed to 
return to his former duties as the leader of the Mujamma. Instead he appointed Dr. Rantisi and 
Dr. Ibrahim Yazouri as formal leaders (Edwards 1996:115). The arrest was the first hint of the 
coming - and more militant leaning of the Mujamma. The leaders of the organization had 
clearly initiated a new stage, which involved more structural planning of the future, 
willingness to use violence, and the development of military capabilities (Mishal & Sela 
2006:23). 
In the early 1980s the Mujamma enjoyed extensive popularity in Gaza. The organization used 
links it had established with the grassroots of the Gaza society, mainly through its charitable 
and mosque activities. Interpersonal networks and informal interactions based on friendship, 
reputation and trust were more important than their hierarchical structure, also when it came 
to expanding the organization and building more public support (Mishal & Sela 2006:153). 
This can be observed in the popularity of the Mujamma`s conciliation committee, established 
to offer its services in mediation and conflict resolution between local clans involved in 
feuds.36
                                                          
35 The appointment of Ariel Sharon as defense minister in Israel in 1981 led to the removal of pro-PLO mayors 
on the West Bank, replaced by Israeli officers. Israeli officers held these positions until 1987 (Mishal 1994:21).   
 (Mishal & Sela 2006:21). The Mujamma continued its policy of Islamizing the 
society in the years leading up to the Intifada. The main focus was on da`wa work from 
below, not resistance. However, a famous incident took place in 1979, when the Mujamma 
attended and lost an election for the administrative committee in the Palestinian Red Crescent 
in Gaza City, controlled by the nationalists. A few months later, Mujamma members initiated 
a violent campaign to revenge the loss, burning down the Red Cross offices, and attacking 
cafes, video shops and liquor stores (Edwards 1996:107). This campaign demonstrates that 
36 Given the social prestige involved in mediating feuds, and the tendency of customary Palestinian law to favor 
the strongest part in such feuds, it enabled the Mujamma to eject greater equity into the process of mediation 
(Mishal & Sela 2006:21). 
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the Mujamma was well organized already in 1980, and that its strategies became more 
violent. But the real institutional base for the Mujamma in Gaza was to become the Islamic 
university. Here they gradually infiltrated the administration from the early 1980s, and later 
won elections for student associations. But they also took control over the university by 
violent means. The university soon became an arena for fights and struggles between 
nationalists and the Islamists – in line with the strategic interest of Israel (Edwards 1996:109 - 
112). By controlling the university, the Mujamma could influence the society, give valuable 
training to its members, and shape the minds of the youth (Edwards 1996:114).  
Later the Mujamma contested elections to professional associations, to broaden the influence 
on the civil society. Members with higher education were encouraged to join such 
associations, in an attempt to influence the public sphere. Furthermore, to increase the 
influence on the public agenda, the Mujamma initiated strikes in important sectors of the 
society from 1980 (Mishal & Sela 2006:23). They also ignited unrest in the mosques from 
1982, and initiated mass demonstrations against Israel in 1985/86 (Hroub 2000:38). Starting 
from 1985, a more intensive Islamic pressure was observed in the Gaza Strip. Shops selling 
alcohol was closed, along with cinemas and casinos. When shop-owners protested, they found 
their shops vandalized. The tendency was that things deemed inconsistent with Islamic 
tradition, were closed down or even attacked (Edwards 1996:115). This process was more 
intensive in the Gaza Strip than the West Bank.  
Socio- political differences between Gaza and the West Bank  
There are several historical, political and socio-economic differences between the West Bank 
and Gaza. There are also significant such differences inside the West Bank. In these lie the 
key to understand why the Brotherhood, and later Hamas, has enjoyed stronger influence in 
Gaza than the West Bank, but also why it has been stronger in certain areas of the West Bank. 
During my fieldwork in Ramallah I asked several key informants about these differences. 
Researcher and former Palestinian minister of foreign affairs Ziad Abu Amr stated that the 
society in Gaza has historically been more socially conservative and less susceptible to 
outside influences than the society in the West Bank (Ziad Abu Amr in interview with 
author). Mahmoud Musleh emphasized that the Gaza society has been poorer, overcrowded 
and more traditional in terms of the importance of tribes and families. According to Musleh, 
the Egyptian Brotherhood has always been a powerful force in Gaza, which has made it easier 
for the Islamic movement in Gaza to recruit new members. In the West Bank on the other 
hand; “You need a bigger effort to convince the people to become Islamic affiliates. When 
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these people have joined the Islamic movement in the West Bank – they will stay Islamic 
affiliates” (Musleh in interview with author). The literature on the Brotherhood and Hamas 
also supports this notion. The harsh economic conditions in Gaza, and the importance of 
traditional social relationships, have provided a climate for the Islamists to gain influence and 
trust in the society (Abu Amr 1994: 20, 21). The West Bank inhabitants on their side have 
been more mobile than the Gaza inhabitants (who often travelled to Egypt), and thus more 
exposed to outside influences. Mishal & Sela also points out that the West Bank Brotherhood 
always have enjoyed support from members with a higher socio-economic profile, including 
landowners, merchants and middle-class officials and professionals (Mishal & Sela 2006:25, 
Gunning 2008:34). In addition, the PLO and has had a much stronger presence in the West 
Bank than Gaza, and Israeli settlements and later restrictions on movement have also affected 
the West Bank more than Gaza.  
 
However, such differences between Gaza and the West Bank are also present within the West 
Bank. Geographically, the Brotherhood (and later Hamas) support in the West Bank has been 
concentrated in northern and southern towns, which are predominantly conservative. Central 
parts of the West Bank on the other hand, include a sizeable Christian minority, and the 
influence from foreign visitors. Central areas, especially Ramallah, have also been the center 
for Arab nationalist and communist influence (Amr 1994:21). In interviews with author, 
Mahmoud Musleh, Mohammad Totah and Mahmoud al-Ramahi all pointed to Hebron and 
Nablus when asked if Hamas has been stronger in certain areas of the West Bank. When 
asked why Hamas was stronger in these areas, Ziad Abu Amr responded that certain areas in 
the West Bank, such as Hebron and Nablus have always been more traditional and 
conservative (Ziad Abu Amr in interview with author). Mahmoud Musleh added to the list of 
differences between Gaza and the West Bank, when asked the same questions above. He 
stated that the overcrowded areas in Gaza have given people there a more explosive temper, 
which easy leads them into trouble. He cited an example from an Israeli prison in the Negev 
desert, were West Bank and Gaza prisoners established themselves in to different camps. The 
West Bank camp was united and calm, while the Gaza camp was often creating trouble. “It is 
easy to make a Gaza man an angry man” (Musleh in interview with author). It is difficult to 
evaluate this statement by Musleh, but it was among the issues he chose to emphasize when 
asked about differences between the West Bank and Gaza.     
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The issue of clans37
Conclusive remarks           
 and politics are also influential in Palestinian politics. According to Glenn 
E. Robinson, Palestinian clans act on the principle of “amoral familialism”. That is, members 
of the clan will act to advance the interests of the clan over all other social ties. Furthermore, 
he states that clans are not social organizations generally receptive to radical Islamism or 
jihadism. Indeed, they are forces for conservative, status-quo oriented social norms (Robinson 
2008:1-10). The clans of Palestine have thus been known to focus on what is best for the clan. 
It has not been possible for this thesis to determine how clan politics in the West Bank affects 
the political situation of Hamas. However, clans are known to be stronger in Gaza than in the 
West Bank, and clans are known to be stronger in certain areas of the West Bank such as 
Hebron and Nablus. In addition, Robinson notes that clan and clan leaders have considerable 
local power, but not national power. However, clans can become politically important in two 
ways: First, clans may act in concert if they feel threatened collectively, and second, when 
elections are structured by districts, clans can become centrally important in electing 
representatives in any one district (Robinson 2008:3). It is thus possible to imagine that clans 
supportive of Hamas, will give Hamas a political boost in areas where clans are strong. 
However, from my fieldwork, it is my impression that strong support for Hamas in certain 
areas is more related to conservatism and traditionalism, than clan-politics. Even in Gaza, 
Hamas has had severe trouble handling initiatives from clans (Robinson 2008:1-10).  
There are strong ties between the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Palestinian Brotherhood and 
Hamas. The period between 1948 and 1967 is important in the development of the 
Brotherhood. The West Bank Brothers belonged to the Jordanian branch, while the Gaza 
Brothers belonged to the Egyptian branch. The two branches thus developed within two 
distinct political climates. The West Bank Brotherhood participated peacefully in politics, 
while the Gaza Brothers built a clandestine organization and engaged in violent attacks 
against the occupiers. After 1967 the Brotherhood re-emerged faster and stronger in Gaza 
than in the West Bank. This development was influenced by socio-economic, ideological and 
political factors (Gunnning 2008:31). In terms of socio-economic factors, Gaza offered a 
much more conducive combination of urbanization, entrenched poverty, an emerging lower 
middle class, and conservative culture, which helped the Brotherhood`s activist approach to 
flourish (Gunning 2008:31). The ideological aspect was clear in the sense that other political 
competitors, mainly secular nationalists, were stronger in the West Bank than in Gaza 
                                                          
37 A clan will consist of at least several extended families claiming a shared ancestry, linked through the father’s 
male line (Robinson 2008:2).  
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(Gunning 2008:31). As stated by Ziad Abu Amr, “the Brotherhood ideology did not have the 
same fertile conditions in the West Bank as in Gaza” (Abu Amr in interview with author). In 
political terms, the most important factor was the direct and indirect support given by Israel to 
the Mujamma in Gaza. The Brotherhood in the West Bank did not have the same leeway to 
operate and build its organization, but were faced with many of the same restrictions as the 
PLO. Another important political factor was the emerging Israeli settlement focus from 1974. 
Israeli strategic and religious interests were mainly focused on the West Bank. In sum, the 
influence and scale of the Mujamma network thus far exceeded the Brotherhood network in 
the West Bank. The West Bank Brotherhood did neither have the charismatic leaders, nor the 
conditions to create and control public institutions as the Mujamma. The Palestinian 
Brotherhood thus entered the Intifada period with its gravity in the Gaza Strip. 
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Chapter 4 
The formative period of Hamas in the West Bank, 1987 - 1993 
Introduction 
The first Palestinian Intifada (1987 – 1993) formed the context in which Hamas emerged as a 
major political force. Public support for the organization increased steadily in Gaza and the 
West Bank during this period. However, Hamas had a more solid network to build on in Gaza, 
and it faced stronger competition in the West Bank from secular nationalist forces. In this 
chapter the main focus is the establishment and early development of Hamas. As the 
Brotherhood developed differently in Gaza and the West Bank prior to the Intifada, an 
interesting question arises: Did the two Hamas branches also develop differently during the 
first Intifada? I will discuss the formative period in four phases, and round off the chapter by 
introducing the new political context which developed in the West Bank in the wake of the 
Intifada. 
The first Palestinian Intifada 1987-1993 
The first Intifada was triggered by the deaths of four Palestinian workers the 9th of December 
1987. The workers from the Jabaliyah refugee camp in Gaza, died when a Israeli truck hit 
their car as they returned from a day`s work in Israel (Aronson 1987:323). In the following 
days, disturbances and violent disruptions spread from the Jabaliyah camp, throughout the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Jerusalem (Aronson 1987:323). The spontaneous and 
uncoordinated local riots had suddenly spread to the whole OPT. It was essentially the hard 
living conditions for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, created by the Israeli occupation, which 
suddenly reached an unprecedented and unacceptable state. But still, the uprising took the 
Israelis by surprise. The Palestinian demonstrators burned tires, threw stones and Molotov 
cocktails, and built barricades against Israeli soldiers. After a while, the intifada also included 
full commercial strikes, and drew support from the broad range of the entire Palestinian 
community. Thousands of Palestinians took to the streets, and as Beverly Milton-Edwards 
notes, “It appeared as if one mighty force was uniting the Palestinians, their desire to bring 
the Israeli occupation to an end through an unprecedented campaign of mass rebellion and 
civil disobedience” (Edwards 2010:53). 
 
The IDF reacted immediately with full crowd control measures, including tear gas, water 
cannons and live ammunition (Aronson 1987:324). The Israeli defense minister Yitzhak 
Rabin, implemented his “Iron Fist” policy, which included the use of force and might to 
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restore order. Rabin stated at the time, that Israel had to protect its military rule in the West 
Bank and Gaza, with all means at its disposal (Edwards 2010:54). During the intifada this 
included curfews, closures, deportations, administrative detention, and even legislation 
permitting soldiers to fire live ammunition at rioters (Edwards 2010:54). The Israeli Civil 
Administration38
The Muslim Brotherhood establish the “Islamic Resistance Movement: Hamas” 
 also contacted local Palestinian village leaders to end the violence. But the 
old generation was now challenged by a new generation of leaders. Young, educated and 
militant Palestinians were determined to end the status quo (Aronson 1987:324). The PLO 
leadership was still confined to exile in Tunis when the intifada erupted. The leaders were 
thus initially taken by surprise, but quickly agreed to support the creation of a PLO-led 
“United National Leadership of the Uprising” (UNLU). Throughout the intifada, the UNLU 
was an important factor in mobilizing grassroots support, and emerged as the main contender 
for the Islamists. Hamas on the other hand, refused to bring their organization under the 
command of the PLO throughout the Intifada. The first Intifada developed in several 
recognizable phases (Edwards 1996:147).  
The specific date for the establishment of Hamas is contested. According to the International 
Crisis Group, Hamas itself use the 8 of December 1987 as the date of origin (ICG 2004:6). 
This is a strategic choice, to indicate that Hamas was established the day before the eruption 
of the Intifada. However, from sources other than Hamas, it seems as if the organization was 
established after the eruption of the Intifada (Usher 1999:176, Hroub 2006:12, Abu Amr 
1993:10). What is more relevant for this thesis is the fact that it was the top leaders of the 
Palestinian Brotherhood and the Mujamma, localized in Gaza, who took the initiative to 
establish Hamas.39
 
 It is essential to note that the Hamas branch in the West Bank was 
established later.   
As described in chapter three, there were several local, socio-economical, ideological and 
political factors which influenced and facilitated the immediate evolution of Hamas in Gaza. 
As the new organization took over Brotherhood leaders and its institutions, the leaders of 
Hamas could focus less on organizational matters. In interview with author, Ziad Abu Amr 
stressed that the conservative cultural and religious orientation in the Gaza society was an 
                                                          
38 The Israeli governing body responsible for running all non-military actions of the Israeli government in the 
West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza (until the disengagement in 2005) - 
http://www.cogat.idf.il/english/Pages/default.aspx  
39 The founding leaders of Hamas were Ahmad Yassin, `Abd al-`Aziz al-Rantisi, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Salah 
Shihada, `Issa al-Nashshar, Muhammad Sham`a and `Abd-al-Fattah Dukhan (Amr 1994:63).   
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advantage for Hamas. He also emphasized that Mujamma institutions did not exist in the West 
Bank. Brotherhood ideology did not have the same favorable conditions as in Gaza, but 
instead had to compete with secular and nationalist ideas (Abu Amr in interview with author).  
Ideological shift 
The creation of Hamas marked a significant ideological shift from the established 
Brotherhood ideology. The Brotherhood and the Mujamma had until the Intifada erupted, held 
on to the policy of Islamizing the society from below, without violent means (Hroub 
2006:13). The decision to involve their organizations in the violent struggle for Palestinian 
national liberation was thus dependant of a change in this “no deadline process”. The 
establishment of the new organization was a response to a number of pressing factors, but the 
decision was not clear-cut (Abu Amr 1993:11). The Mujamma in Gaza and the Brotherhood 
in the West Bank had experienced tensions within their organizations before the Intifada 
erupted. Young members pressed to participate in violent operations against Israel, while 
older members and leaders held on to the traditional policy (Gunning 2008:37, Ziad Abu Amr 
in interview with author). The immediate extensiveness of the Intifada, and the fact that 
competing PLO factions took part, made it impossible for Yassin to hold the organization on 
the sidelines. Two dilemmas then presented itself to Sheikh Yassin and the Mujamma leaders. 
The first dilemma was ideological, and alludes to the fact that if Yassin was to depart from the 
established policy of non-violence, he would have to declare Jihad. As mentioned, this was in 
line with the demands made by young Brotherhood/Mujamma members. Yassin on the other 
hand, argued that the time for Jihad was yet to come, because the process of Islamizing the 
society was not complete (Ziad Abu Amr interview with author). The second dilemma is 
connected to the first one, but deal with the future implications of turning the Mujamma into a 
violent Jihad organization. This would change the focus of the Mujamma from Islamizing the 
Palestinian society, towards being an armed militant group hostile to Israel. The Mujamma 
leaders then had to weigh these options against expected Israeli repercussions, including the 
probable end of Israeli support. It has thus been suggested that Hamas was established as a 
separate organization, to protect the Mujamma and the Brotherhood from the potential fallout 
if the initiative failed or the Intifada came to an early end (ICG 2004:6, Abu Amr 1993:11). 
Nonetheless, the new Hamas organization represented a shift of emphasis in the 
Brotherhood`s strategy, from reformist and communal to political, and from the spiritual life 
of the individual to national action (Mishal 2003:575). But with the creation of Hamas, the 
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Brotherhood practically overstepped the basis of their ideology – to complete the Islamizing 
of the society, before turning to Jihad.  
Phase 1, the early Intifada period and the expansion to the West Bank 
One of the most important events in the early Intifada period for Hamas was the expansion of 
the movement to the West Bank. The evolution of the Intifada during 1988 pushed Hamas 
leaders in Gaza to expand the movement. Popular support for Hamas continued to grow both 
in Gaza and the West Bank in this period. However, here I will emphasize that the literature 
on Hamas regarding this period, contains considerably less information on the development of 
Hamas in the West Bank than Gaza. Interviews and discussions from my fieldwork have thus 
been a major factor to increase my understanding of this early phase. In January 1988, Sheikh 
Yassin and his colleagues contacted Sheikh Jamil Hamami from the West Bank, and gave him 
the mission of establishing new Hamas branches there. Hamami, in the capacity of being a 
prominent Brotherhood member in the West Bank, a preacher in the al-Aqsa mosque, and a 
teacher, enjoyed huge popularity at the grassroots level in the area (Chehab 2007:28). In this 
formative period, local leaders were organized informally, both in Gaza and the West Bank, 
based on ties of solidarity and traditional attachments (Mishal 2003:581). Friendship, 
reputation, trust, common background (Brotherhood) and solidarity were thus more important 
than the hierarchical chain of command (Shaul Mishal in interview with author). Hamas`s 
political activity in the formative period was focused on spreading the Islamic message to 
Palestinians. This was primarily done by distributing Hamas communiqués, but also by 
sponsoring political gatherings, tours to religious sites, forums, celebrations of Islamic events 
and the organization of demonstrations (Ziad Abu Amr 1993:15). In the beginning, many of 
these communiqués on the West Bank was written by Mahmoud Musleh. The communiqués 
were then spread through an underground network of people, and distributed once a month 
across the West Bank (Edwards 2010:56). Sheikh Hamami also functioned as the liaison 
between the Hamas leadership in Gaza, and the Brotherhood`s leadership in Jordan because of 
his extensive network of contacts (Muslih 1999:16). Hamas activists in Jordan were at the 
time involved in raising funds (Chehab 2007:28). Sheikh Hamami was also given the task to 
bridge the increasing gap between Hamas and Fatah in the West Bank. He made several drafts 
for an agreement, but was arrested by Israel in June 1988 accused of working for Hamas. He 
served eighteen months in prison, and was later sidelined by younger hardliners in the 
leadership http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Hamas-Text/intro.htm.  
Hamas gradually inherited Brotherhood institutions in the West Bank, although in a smaller 
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scale than the Mujamma network in Gaza. Such institutions were kindergartens, social and 
sports clubs and educational institutions. From 1991, Hamas also turned their attention to 
West Bank Zakat committees. As will be elaborated in chapter six, some Zakat committees 
were established in part by Brotherhood and Hamas members. Then from 1991, Hamas 
increased its focus on integrating people from the political section, into other existing 
committees (Schâublin 2009:54). Activity in the network of West Bank mosques were also 
increasing, as the mosques were considered a useful tool in recruiting new members, and in 
the spreading of Hamas` ideas and influence (Ziad Abu Amr 1994:14). However, as is clear 
from the organizational outline of Hamas (chapter five), it was the founding fathers in the 
Gaza leadership who dominated official decision-making during these first years. Funding of 
Hamas was also controlled from Gaza, which thus was the main base for the organization.   
 
To understand how the Hamas branch in the West Bank developed, one must focus on the 
larger context. The first intifada was characterized by the spreading of leaflets, Palestinian 
general strikes and demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank. These were tactics developed 
by the UNLU, who already had attracted a huge popular support. UNLU leaflets contained 
information on specific actions and goals in their Intifada campaign (Edwards 1996:148). 
Thus, when Hamas entered the arena on the West Bank, the first challenge was to catch up 
with the leaflet distribution. Hamas did so with their own twist, by trying to strengthen the 
Islamic nature of the Intifada. In the first six months, Hamas shadowed the initiatives of the 
UNLU by making similar appeals, calls and demands through leaflets (Edwards 1996:149). 
Palestinian general strikes were the other defining feature of the first Intifada. The UNLU 
initiated and organized strikes, held as an act of protest against Israeli actions, or as a 
symbolic action to show solidarity in the community (Edwards 1996:150). The strikes 
involved withdrawal of labor from Israel, closing of shops, schools and offices. General 
strikes were an initiative every Palestinian could support, and it could last for months. Hamas 
leaders also immediately recognized the political significance of the strikes, and sought to 
impose their own strikes in competition with the UNLU. These strikes were initiated in the 
Gaza areas first, through leaflets (Edwards 1996:150). As the Intifada continued into the 
summer of 1988, Hamas also organized its first independent strike on the West Bank the 21st 
of August.40
                                                          
40 Middle East Journal Vol. 43 No.1, Chronology 16th July – 15th October 1988.   
 Nationalists perceived this step as devastating for the future of the Intifada, and 
urged Hamas to place national interest above their factional concerns (Edwards 1996:150). 
40 
 
But Hamas refused to restrain their actions, and clashes between Hamas and nationalists took 
place in Ramallah. Hamas members also violently enforced the call to hold strikes, attacked 
shops which stayed open during Hamas strikes, and beat up car drivers (Edwards 2010:57). 
The disagreement between Hamas and the nationalists escalated during 1988. The PLO 
released their “Declaration of Palestinian independence” in November, where they accepted 
UN resolutions 181, 242 and 338. Hamas leaders strongly disagreed, attacked PLO in their 
leaflets, and increased its attempts to undermine PLO`s credibility as the representative of the 
Palestinian people (Edwards 1996:151). During this early period of the Intifada Hamas also 
developed its first organizational framework as explained in chapter five. Accordingly, the 
writing and publication of leaflets were the responsibility of the political wing, while the 
intelligence wing (MAJD) chased Palestinian collaborators in Gaza. The Brotherhood and the 
Mujamma continued to exist separately for a while, and they were responsible for the social 
work in the formative years. Hamas also laid foundations for the network of foreign based 
financial contributors, as Hamas members in Jordan travelled the Gulf region and raised 
millions of dollars in support. Supporters in Europe and America arranged fund-raisers and 
spread the political message of Hamas (Edwards 1993:149).  
1988: The Hamas charter 
Hamas released its charter on the 18th of august 1988, to rival the charter of the PLO 
(Edwards 2010:56). The charter spelled out Hamas` philosophy, rationale and positions on 
important issues, such as the Palestine question, Jihad and resistance, social welfare, the role 
of women, other Islamic movements, their view on nationalist movements and the PLO, other 
Arab countries and more (Abu Amr 1993:12). It was only when Hamas released this charter 
that the connection to the Palestinian Brotherhood was publicized. According to Helga 
Baumgarten, the charter is firmly rooted in the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
abandoned the sophisticated politico-philosophical argumentation of Hassan al-Banna and the 
Islamic thinker Sayyed Qutb (Baumgarten 2005:38). Instead, the main tenets of Brotherhood 
were projected into a populist style and applied to the problem at hand: the Israeli occupation 
(Baumgarten 2005:38). In practice the charter states that Palestine is an Islamic Waqf, which 
cannot be given up in initiatives such as peace negotiations. The solution is to increase the 
focus on Jihad, remove the Israeli state, and establish in its place an Islamic state ranging 
between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea (Abu Amr 1993:12). Some of the core 
goals of the Brotherhood was thus downplayed, such as transforming the society from the 
bottom up through da`wa. After the Hamas charter was released in August 1988, both 
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nationalists and Israeli authorities became more suspicious toward the new movement. Israeli 
authorities imposed mass arrests of Palestinians as a measure to quell the Intifada, and 
thousands of prisoners were placed in Israeli prisons or temporary desert detention camps 
(Edwards 2010:56). In these prisons the Palestinians already started to organize themselves in 
groups reflecting their political orientations outside of prison (Edwards 2010:56).  
Phase 2, the relationship between Israel and Hamas  
The strategic relationship between Israel and Mujamma continued with Hamas. Israeli 
authorities perceived Hamas as a non-violent, social reform movement, a continuation of the 
Brotherhood, which could be used strategically to keep Palestinians away from secular 
nationalist groups. However, the relationship was controversial in many ways. In terms of 
funding, Israel turned a blind eye when foreign funding of Hamas` Intifada activities reached 
Gaza, while at the same time stopping all funds collected for the PLO (Edwards 1996:151). 
Moreover, Hamas leaders and members were left relatively free to operate, compared to 
different nationalist groups (Edwards 2010:56). The Israelis even let Hamas operate their 
printing presses, and hold their offices open. The organizational structure of Hamas was also 
left undisturbed, and Hamas continued to grow as an organization. PLO and Fatah naturally 
perceived the Hamas – Israel link as disturbing. The relationship between Hamas and Israel 
was at its strongest during 1989. Israel awarded Hamas with legitimacy and the status as 
“partner in discussions”, through many high-level meetings between Hamas leaders in Gaza 
and Israeli government officials.  
 
However, it is important to note that West Bank leaders were not part of this cooperation. 
Israel had strategic and religious interests in the West Bank, and the West Bank branch had to 
operate in a more secretive level from the outset. The Gaza leaders publicly claimed it had 
nothing but contempt for Israel, although the cooperation was favorable for the Gaza branch. 
But in mid-1989, the relationship changed when Hamas members kidnapped and later 
murdered two Israeli soldiers.41
                                                          
41 The two Israeli soldiers were Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa`don (Edwards 2010:61). 
 This incident turned the relationship for a number of reasons: 
the incident was planned and calculated, it was the first Hamas attack on Israeli military 
targets, and it was the first violent attack directly linked to Hamas (Edwards 1996:152). The 
Israeli response was harsh. Within a month of the killings, Israel arrested three hundred 
Hamas activists in Gaza and the West Bank, including Sheikh Yassin and Mahmoud al-Zahar 
(Edwards 1996:152). Later in 1989 Israel announced that further official contact with Hamas 
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leaders was suspended, and by December the organization was prohibited and membership in 
it declared a punishable offence (Edwards 1996:153). Still, as the first year of the Intifada 
ended, popular support for Hamas had increased both in Gaza and the West Bank (Edwards 
1996:151). As elaborated in chapter seven, cells from the militant wing of Hamas, the al-
Qassam brigades also spread to the West Bank during 1990. 
Phase 3, Gulf crisis 
The next discernible phase in the Intifada period is the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in August 
1990. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the following deployment of Western troops in Saudi 
Arabia, created a situation where Hamas and PLO issued statements on the situation through 
communiqués. Hamas expressed a balanced view, careful not to provoke its Gulf funders or 
its supporters. Hamas thus condemned the presence of Western forces in Saudi Arabia and 
demanded the Iraqi withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait (Edwards 1996:154). The PLO 
response on the other hand, supported Saddam Hussein. The differences in opinion among the 
Palestinian leaders triggered clashes between Hamas and Fatah supporters in Tulkaram and 
Jenin in the West Bank, and in Gaza during September and October 1990. The last stages of 
the Gulf crisis progressed without further political activity from Hamas or the PLO, as Israel 
placed the whole OPT under a blanket curfew. The PLO backing of Saddam Hussein led 
wealthy Gulf funders to withdraw their financial support to the PLO. Instead money was sent 
to Hamas, through the branch in Gaza (Edwards 1996:155). Large national institutions 
throughout the OPT thus announced massive budget cuts in 1991 and 1992, while Hamas 
increased its funding to the growing welfare network in Gaza and the West Bank. With this 
new situation Hamas could extend financial support to needy Palestinian families, formerly 
supported by the PLO. Hamas leaders thus earned a reputation as being honest, and it turned 
the popular support of the Palestinians in favor of Hamas (Edwards 1996:155).  
Phase 4, deportations, peace talks and early political participation 
The last phase of the Intifada is probably also the most discussed and best documented. It 
began with the proposals of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians during summer of 
1991. The process of peace talks had significant side effects for Hamas. Hamas opposed any 
negotiations with Israel, based on their perception of Palestine as Islamic land, a subject not 
open for discussion. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1991, Islamists and nationalists 
had ongoing disputes over the issue of peace talks. Hamas initiated general strikes and even 
issued a fatwa in response to the Madrid conference in 1991 (Edwards 1996:156). From 
October 1991 to August 1993, Israel and the Palestinians engaged in eleven sessions of 
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negotiations. However, the Madrid process stumbled into a number of devastating problems.42
http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Hamas-Text/intro.htm
 
Hamas as the rejectionists could thus capitalize. During 1992, Hamas stepped up the activity 
of the al-Qassam brigades in attacks against Fatah, and gained popular support for attacking 
Israeli settlers and soldiers (Edwards 1996:156). Clashes between Fatah and Hamas increased 
in this period. In 1992 Israel elected a new Labor government, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, 
which was more committed to peace. Hamas on their side continued to attack Israeli civil and 
military targets, and they attacked Palestinian who collaborated with Israel (Edwards 
1996:157). In December 1992 Israel responded to a number of Hamas attacks by deporting 
415 individual Islamists into the Lebanese mountains (Edwards 1996:158). Israel deported not 
only the top leaders of the different Islamic movements, but also the second and third ranking 
officials . This was 
significant for the West Bank, which had a smaller “pool” of potential new leaders than Gaza. 
As will be elaborated in chapter eight, early attempts at obtaining political influence through 
political channels were also observed in this period. This included attending student council 
elections and professional associations.   
The creation of a new political context in Gaza and the West Bank 
Hamas is today operating in a complex political context, which comprises two physically 
separate areas, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A major part of this political context was 
created in 1993, with the Oslo process and the signing of the DOP by the PLO and Israel.43 
The DOP provided for a transitional period of Palestinian interim self-government in Gaza 
and the West Bank, not exceeding five years from 1994 (Hroub 2006:48). Palestinian 
prisoners from Israeli jails were released, the PLO leadership returned to Gaza, the new 
Palestinian police and security forces were put in action,44
                                                          
42 In short: Continued Israeli settlement building, an intransigent Israeli prime minister, internal dissension 
within the Palestinian community over the peace process (Edwards 1996:156).  
 and the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
initiated administering of the agreed-upon areas from 1994 (Edwards 2010:74). The 
institutional development of the PA was however influenced by the fact that PLO and Fatah 
leaders were interchangeable with the PA from the outset. In practice they dominated the PA, 
by occupying senior administrative and political positions, as well as controlling the security 
services. Many of these leaders had been in exile for years with little experience in running a 
government (Edwards 2010:76). The DOP included a transfer of certain powers and 
43 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Edwards 2010:10). 
44 As agreed in the Oslo accords, Yassir Arafat disbanded Fatah militias such as the Fatah Hawks, Black 
Panthers and Red Eagles. But he also rewarded their members with new jobs in the PA security forces (PSS), 
along with 7000 members of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) from their bases in Jordan, Sudan and 
Yemen (Edwards 2010:75).   
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responsibilities in both security and civil affairs from Israel to the PA. All areas of civil 
governance over Palestinians were to be assigned to the PA, while Israel retained 
responsibility during the transitional period for external security and public order in Israeli 
settlements (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16918). The 
OPT were further divided into administrative areas. The West Bank were split into areas A, B, 
C, where the PA had responsibility for internal security in area A, Israel and the PA had joint 
responsibility in area B, while Israel had sole responsibility in area C.45
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16918
 However, dividing 
this responsibility was a slow process. The PA did not reach most of its towns until December 
1995, and arrived in Hebron as late as 1997. Most rural areas with Area A status was not 
under PA control until 1998-1999 (ICG 2004:7). The PA also consolidated its security forces 
in the middle of the 1990s, which was the only ones permitted to carry arms. The Oslo 
process created a discourse on state formation, and how to implement democracy. Elections 
for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the PA presidency were scheduled for 1996. 
The PLC is the legislative component of the PA. It is limited by the fact that its legal standing 
is derived from negotiations with Israel, not from a constitution. Per agreements with Israel 
the PLC does not have any authority over borders and defense policy 
( ). On the local 
level, Palestine was divided into 16 administrative divisions also serving as electoral 
divisions. 331 municipal councils were established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These 
local authorities are today relatively decentralized in terms of fiscal policy, and they are 
independent to develop their own budgets. These budgets are primarily allocated towards 
infrastructure and development projects, in which foreign aid is a key contributor. Local 
elections were not held between 1976 and 2004/2005 (NDI report 2nd round 2005:9).  
Conclusive remarks 
Hamas was first established in Gaza, where it built on the existing network of Mujamma 
institutions. The West Bank branch was established later, and developed at a slower pace. 
Although the public support for Hamas was on the rise in the West Bank, most West Bankers 
supported the secular and nationalist Fatah party, the peace negotiations and later the Oslo 
accords during the first Intifada. People in the West Bank were not as receptive to the Hamas 
ideology as people in Gaza. The West Bank branch initially focused on the uprising and 
resistance activities, including the establishment of the first al-Qassam cells in 1990. 
Furthermore, the West Bank branch gradually took over Brotherhood social welfare 
                                                          
45 For a map on these changes see Appendix 
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institutions, increased its activity in West Bank mosques, and from 1991 focused on 
integrating members from the political section into existing Zakat committees. Hamas also 
began using the available political channels to obtain more political influence from 
1992/1993, including attending student council elections. The deportations of 415 Islamists in 
1992 hit the West Bank harder than Gaza, as the Gaza branch had a larger pool of potential 
new leaders. Israeli pressure also hit harder in the West Bank. Israeli strategic interests 
focused on its West Bank settlements, while being more lax against the branch in Gaza. The 
Gaza branch was thus both the “brain and the bank” of Hamas in the formative period. Gaza 
leaders was the fundament in the organization, its leaders controlled the finances, made the 
communiqués, initiated the first Hamas-led strike and held talks with Israeli representatives. 
In comparison, the West Bank branch played “second-fiddle” behind the Gaza branch in this 
period.  
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Chapter 5 
The internal organization of Hamas: the role of the West Bank 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the unclear and complex internal organization of Hamas. As Hamas 
is a secretive organization which refuses to give full information on its internal workings and 
organizational outline, researchers are left with speculations and assumptions. Still, it is 
possible to discern certain organizational traits by studying historical decisions and events, 
and by leaning on established literature, as well as findings from my own fieldwork. As the 
internal structure is a result of continuing processes, I will begin with a historical perspective, 
and cover the period up until 2007. It is the goal of this chapter to analyze and indicate the 
internal influence of the West Bank branch, compared to other central elements in the 
organization. I will thus reflect on an underlying question related to my thesis: Does the 
organizational structure of Hamas influence on the political position of the West Bank 
branch? It is important to have a clear understanding of the internal organization of the 
movement, before I turn to social, militant and political activity. 
Early organization and leadership 
As established in chapter three and four, Hamas inherited leaders and institutions from the 
Brotherhood in a gradual process in the formative period. The blurry connection between 
Hamas, the Palestinian Brotherhood and the Mujamma was upheld as a strategic decision. 
After all, Hamas could be discontinued if the Intifada failed. In the first period, Hamas was 
divided into three functional wings, either new or pre-existing from the Brotherhood (Hroub 
2000:40). This was the political, intelligence (MAJD), and the military wing, all three based 
in Gaza which constituted the main area of attention. The political wing was staffed by Yassin 
and his closest Mujamma associates. They assumed the responsibility of political matters, 
recruitment, fund-raising and writing leaflets (Edwards 1996:148). The political wing also 
worked to organize Hamas control in the Gaza mosques, initiate Quran classes and political 
meetings in the mosques. The structure of the intelligence wing was more secretive from the 
beginning. MAJD were given a policing role in Gaza, and part of this role was to identify 
Palestinian collaborators, and attack Israeli targets (Edwards 1996:148). The early military 
wing was originally the smallest part of the organization. In the first years it was based on the 
Mujahideen Filastine, and later MAJD (Tamimi 2007:63). In 1990 the al-Qassam brigades 
were established as the military wing of Hamas. To adapt to the changing political context 
during the Intifada, Hamas also established functional groups responsible for 
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communications, youth, the Intifada campaign, and the growing number of prisoners (Chehab 
2007:30). The West Bank branch developed in a slower pace than the Gaza branch. There are 
no reports on early intelligence and military wings in the West Bank, although the first al-
Qassam cell was established in 1990 (Edwards 2010:117). In the first few years of the 
formative period, the original structure of Hamas in Gaza was recognizable for the Israeli 
military administration, after the last decade of cooperation. It was thus easy for Israel to harm 
the organization by arresting the top leaders. This tactic was used increasingly after 1989, 
when Israel decided to end the cooperation with Mujamma.  
The concept of Shura 
In a discussion of the internal organization of Hamas, it is important to emphasize the concept 
of Shura (consultation). Decision-making in Hamas is always based upon the principle of 
Shura, or rule through consultation and deliberation (Mahmoud Musleh in interview with 
author). This is an important Islamic tenet, also common in the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement (Mishal & Sela 2006:xix). Jeroen Gunning explains that the concepts of Shura 
(consultation) and ijma (consensus), are rooted in Qur`anic injunctions, where either the 
Prophet exhorts his followers to consult, or God exhorts the Prophet to consult his 
companions (Gunning 2008:59). In terms of a future Islamic state in Palestine (a stated Hamas 
goal), the legislative power will rest with a Majlis al-Shura council. This council is expected 
to consult the population before taking decisions, as is also the leader of the state. The concept 
of Shura has been emphasized by Hamas as the Islamic equivalent of western style 
democracy, and Hamas also proposes a number of checks and balances to ensure that 
legislators in this council will remain accountable to the electorate (Gunning 2008:57-59).46
                                                          
46 E.g. separation of power between executive, legislative and judicial branches, and moral codes based on Islam 
(Gunning 2008:57-63). 
 
However, one must look at the existing local, regional and national Shura councils to 
understand this practice. These councils meet to discuss a certain issue which needs to be 
solved. Depending on the level of the council, they will consult with members from 
underlying branches, before they aim to reach a consensus. The top level in the Hamas 
organization is the national Shura council based abroad, while the regional Shura councils in 
the West Bank and Gaza represent the top level inside the OPT. Names of members in these 
councils are secret, to avoid arrests.  
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Re-structuring the organization 
The development of the current organizational structure of Hamas was initiated in 1989. This 
was as a strategic response to Israeli arrests of large numbers of Hamas leaders.47 These 
Israeli purges were meant to destabilize Hamas, because of its dependency on its top 
leadership. One Hamas leader based abroad was given the task of restructuring the movement. 
Musa Abu Marzook developed new mechanisms and re-organized the leadership structure 
(Tamimi 2007:60). This structure has changed several times, and new bodies have emerged 
when needed. The new structure can be described as both secretive and collective. It is 
secretive in the sense that distinctions between different wings and branches are not 
completely clear, and names of leaders are often not published. The collective characteristic 
comes from the fact that the movement relies on elected consultative councils (Shura) on 
different levels, rather than one leader at the top.48
 
 The first step in the process of re-
structuring the organization was done by separating the political, social (da`wa) and resistance 
work (Gunning 2008:40). Furthermore, as the pressure on Hamas increased during the 1990s, 
new leadership wings and committees was established to handle political matters, security, 
military operations and the media (Amr 1993:13). Note that the important structures of the 
movement were in Gaza. Annual Israeli campaigns against Hamas, and especially the 
deportation of 415 Islamist leaders by Israel in 1992, served to hasten the re-organizing 
process. Figure 1 below indicates the first structures established by Marzook:  
Figure 1: Hamas organizational structure in the early 1990s49
 
 
Source: Mishal 2003:582.  
 
As will become clear, political activities are the responsibility of the political bureau. The 
internal security branch (MAJD) was gradually integrated in the al-Qassam brigades.50
                                                          
47 Brotherhood leaders were arrested from January 1988, as Israel tried to uncover who was responsible for the 
Intifada. 1500 members and leaders were arrested in May 1989 (Tamimi 2007:55).  
 The 
role of the Da`wa unit was to Islamize the community, by means of social mobilization and 
48 However, Sheikh Yassin was seen by many as the top leader of Hamas until 2004, as is Khaled Mishal today 
(http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=15728).  
49 The black color indicates the unclear connection between al-Qassam and the rest of the movement. 
50 Hamas has at times maintained an internal security branch in Gaza, such as the El-Tanfithya (Executive Force) 
established in Gaza in 2007 (Edwards 2010:664). 
Internal security (MAJD) Military activities (al-Qassam) 
Political activities (Polit. Bureau) Social activities (Da`wa)
Hamas
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religious preaching (Mishal 2003:582). The Da`wa unit also includes social welfare and 
religious institutions, offering education, sports and health-services as elaborated in chapter 
six. The military wing, the al-Qassam brigades, was a product of the Intifada. It was 
established with decision-making capabilities and infrastructure of their own, to enable 
Hamas to continue attacking Israel despite IDF crackdowns on its leaders (Chehab 2007:53). 
The al-Qassam brigades are known to operate in small cells, with a secretive51 and unclear 
connection to Hamas. This connection deliberately turned even more unclear during the 
1990s, to direct the blame for terrorist attacks away from Hamas` top leaders.52 By 
1991/1992, Musa Abu Marzook established a new Hamas branch in Amman, Jordan, and an 
office in USA. The Amman branch was given overall control of the movement, to ensure 
continuity in the leadership as the Israeli arrest campaigns continued. Another important task 
was to raise financial support (Tamimi 2007:60). The leadership of the Amman branch also 
kept in close contact with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In practice, this introduced the 
separation of the internal and external leadership of Hamas.53 The top internal leaders have 
continued to work from their base in Gaza, while the leaders of the West Bank branch never 
have held such influential positions. The external leadership had their permanent base in 
Amman until they were expelled in 1999.54
The organizational structure since the 1990s 
 The expulsion forced the external leadership to 
move to Damascus in Syria and other neighboring countries, where they have continued to 
operate largely out of Israeli reach. 
An organizational outline is helpful to understand how Hamas has been organized since the 
early 1990s, how it operates, and to understand the role of the West Bank branch in the larger 
movement (Figure 2 below). However, making an organogram of Hamas is not an easy task.55
                                                          
51 The al-Qassam brigades operate with face masks in public, unlike internal security forces such as the EF 
(Edwards 2010:665). 
 
The constant pressure on the movement from Israel, and lately the Palestinian security forces, 
leads Hamas to be secretive about their internal organization (Mohammad Totah, and 
Mahmoud al-Ramahi refused to discuss this topic in interviews with author). Organizational 
outlines and discussions on the current structure of Hamas must thus be considered as 
indications, rather than absolute facts. What is known is that the rapid growth of the 
52 Some counter-terrorist experts do not agree that Hamas have separable wings (Levitt 2006:2, 3). 
53 Although an external group connected to Hamas already existed, until 1989 responsible for funding, logistic 
and advise (Tamimi 2007:60). 
54 The external leaders were deported from Jordan as a result of the Wye river agreement brokered by Jordan and 
international pressure upon Jordan (Tamimi 2007:119-130). 
55 Several political analysts I met during my fieldwork faced the same problem.  
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movement in the early years, strained the underdeveloped bureaucracy, and pushed Hamas 
into developing a more advanced bureaucracy (Amr 1993:13, 14). The separation of the 
internal and external leadership is thus important. Today a rough depiction of the movement 
shows that the internal part of Hamas consists of the Gaza branch, the West Bank branch and 
a prisoners committee.56
Grassroots level 
 On a larger scale, the major institutions of Hamas are considered to 
be the internal institutions, the external institutions and the al-Qassam brigades. I will first 
discuss the basic level of the organization, and use examples from the West Bank.  
Starting at the bottom of the current Hamas hierarchy, one will find local cells (Usra) 
consisting of a cell leader and cell members (Gunning 2008:98). This is the grassroots level, 
the backbone of Hamas, which carry out political decisions on the ground. It is important to 
highlight that Hamas has maintained a large grassroots support in the West Bank from the 
early 1990s. There can be several such local cells inside one larger area, depending on the 
area. In areas where Hamas enjoy strong support (such as Hebron) there will be several 
grassroots cells, spread in different villages. In other areas where Hamas has less support 
(such as Jericho) there will probably be fewer local cells. Mohammad Totah from Jerusalem 
indicated that the Jerusalem branch has developed differently than other areas, as the branch is 
inside the territory Israel considers its own. In practice, the Jerusalem branch has never built 
up a network of institutions comparable to e.g. the Hebron branch, and the branch was never 
allowed to compete for political influence by the Israeli government (Mohammad Totah in 
interview with author).  
 
As indicated in figure 2, every local cell answers to their area branch in the West Bank. In 
turn this area branch answers to the West Bank Shura council. This council consists of an 
unknown number of elected leaders, which convene to take decisions, based on feedback from 
the area branches. Initially Hamas established five area branches in the West Bank, but has 
later adapted its organization according to Palestinian administrative developments.57
                                                          
56 Prisoners held inside Israeli jails (ICG 2004:11). 
 Today 
Hamas has area branches in every governorate, although very different in size. Smaller 
governorates might periodically be united to one area branch when necessary. It is unclear if 
every area branch has its own Shura council, although this is perceived as likely by several 
senior political analysts I interviewed. The same structure exists in Gaza. Hamas originally 
57 The West Bank is today geographically split into eleven governorates, as noted in chapter four. 
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established seven area branches there, but at least until the Gaza takeover in 2007, it was 
divided into five area branches following the five administrative governorates.58
 
  
Figure 2: An indication on the structure of the West Bank branch59
 
 
The Internal leadership         
The West Bank and Gaza Shura councils constitute the internal (inside OPT) leadership of 
Hamas. Leaders from the “inside” have always been promoted by internal elections (Hroub 
2006:117).60
                                                          
58 Anonymous political analyst in interview with author. 
 The West Bank and Gaza Shura councils thus consist of a unknown number of 
representatives elected for a two year period, by Hamas members from within the particular 
area branches (Mishal & Sela 2006:158). These Shura Councils are consulted in political 
decisions by the outside leadership. They are also required to consult their respective local 
branches, to get feedback when decisions are to be made. The Gaza branch and its leaders are 
regarded as a key element in the overall decision-making process of Hamas (ICG 2004:11, 
Hroub 2006:118, supported by several sources during my fieldwork). This is due to their 
59 I created and discussed this organizational outline with several political analysts during my fieldwork. 
60 The practice of members electing its leaders is also well established in other Islamist movements with a 
Brotherhood background (Hroub 2006:117). 
West Bank 
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influential position in the movement, from the outset (Ziad Abu Amr in interview with 
author). The Gaza branch has also been known to operate autonomously in certain matters 
regarding the OPT,61
The role of the West Bank branch 
 and is allowed to do so because of its status. In general terms, the 
internal leadership controls the human resources of the movement, while the external leaders 
control financial resources and external contacts (Hroub 2006:118). In the period after Sheikh 
Yassin was released from a lengthy imprisonment in 1997, the Gaza branch gained substantial 
organizational influence in Hamas. In the period prior to 1997, an alliance between the 
external leaders and al-Qassam commanders dominated, which was more inclined toward 
using violent means. With the Gaza branch gaining influence from 1997, the behavior of 
Hamas gradually changed, toward a more pragmatic and participatory strategy (Løvlie 
2008:9). The Gaza Strip branch was led by Yassin until his death in 2004, and is now led by 
Ismail Haniyya. Other leading members are and have been former Brotherhood and Mujamma 
members, such as Abd-al-Aziz Rantisi, Mahmud Zahhar, and Ismail Abu Shanab (ICG 
2004:11).  
The West Bank branch has always been more fractured and less influential than the Gaza 
branch (ICG 2004:11). This is due to Israeli arrests and killings, PA crackdowns, Israeli 
settlements splitting the territory, Israeli restrictions on movement, and the strong PLO 
position in the West Bank. Compared to the influential Gaza leadership, the West Bank 
branch has a more secretive leadership structure. The West Bank branch has also relied more 
on the concept of the Shura council, and decisions made by the many. This is due to the 
security situation, which has made it more logical to make decisions in plural than to 
emphasize the influence of one specific leader, which would quickly lead to his arrest (Ziad 
Abu Amr and Bazem Ezbidi in interviews with author). There are thus several reasons 
explaining why the West Bank leaders have been less influential in the overall decision-
making in the movement. The Gaza branch had a special role from the beginning, and its 
leaders have enjoyed strong influence. Islamist ideology has also had less popular support in 
the West Bank in general, and Ramallah also became the temporary Palestinian capital with 
the Oslo accords. Combined and withstanding heavy pressure against Hamas in the West 
Bank has also forced its leaders to go underground,62
                                                          
61 Gaza leaders represented Hamas in an inter-factional dialogue with the PA in 1995 (Kristianasen 1999:25). 
 and its institutions to hold a low profile. 
This has severed communication lines with the rest of the movement. Among the most 
62 In 1996, there was not even a centralized West Bank leadership (Kristianasen 1999:28). 
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influential West Bank leaders have been Jamil Hamami,63
The prisoners committee 
 Husain Abu Kuwik, Fadil Salih, 
Aziz Dweik, Jamal Mansur, Jamal Salim and Mahmoud Musleh. Jamal Mansur is believed to 
have been the West Bank leader during most of the 1990s, until he was killed by Israel in 
2001 (ICG 2007:25). From 2001 the West Bank branch has been led by Sheikh Hassan 
Yousef, although he has been imprisoned for long periods. His longest period in prison, from 
2002, took the air out of the movement (Abu Amr in interview with author). The well known 
Islamist Bassam Jarrar has also been connected to the Hamas leadership (Abu Amr 1993:14).  
It is also important to note that each prison containing Hamas members appears to have 
organized an equivalent of a Shura council (Gunning 2008:99). The prisoners committee 
enjoys a strong position in the movement,64
The external leadership 
 although both Israel and the PA aim to limit this 
influence by isolating the prisoners. Despite being isolated, these prisoners take political 
initiatives, and at times work closely with “colleagues” from Fatah and Islamic Jihad too 
solve internal Palestinian political disputes (ICG 2004:11). One example is the “Prisoners 
document” from 2006. Their status inside the movement is so strong it is unlikely that any 
political initiative would succeed without the consent of the prisoners committee (ICG 
2004:11). This is why they are considered one of the pillars in Hamas, on the same level as 
Gaza, and the West Bank in the organizational outline below. Their status is partly caused by 
the expectation that they will return to their former positions outside of prison, when released. 
Membership in the prisoners committee is thus considered temporary. 
The combination of a political bureau (Maktab al-Siyasi) and a National Shura council 
(Majlis al-Shura) constitutes the external leadership, and thus the top level leadership of 
Hamas. The best way to understand the roles of these bodies is to compare them to 
respectively a (secretive) executive and legislative body at the state level (Gunning 2008:99, 
supported by Ziad Abu Amr in interview by author). In practice, the national Shura council 
(the legislative body) has final authority over formal policy decisions, and determines the 
strategy and the political aims of the organization. The Shura council bases its decisions on 
consultation within the organization, policy-notes prepared by the Political bureau, and 
different expert committees. These expert committees have their competence in fields such as 
social welfare, media relations, political activities or Islamic preaching (Gunning 2008:99, 
                                                          
63 Hamami withdrew from Hamas in 1999 (Musleh 1999:25). 
64 Their imprisonment gives them a high level of sympathy and legitimacy within the movement (ICG 2004:11).  
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100). They consist of members from every level in the hierarchy, to ensure that policy is also 
made from “below” (Gunning 2008:100). The Shura council met regularly in Qatar until at 
least 2004 (ICG 2004:10). The council is made up of unknown representatives from the 
internal leadership, but also representatives from outside of Palestine, most probably 
representatives from other national Muslim Brotherhood branches (Mishal & Sela 2006:161, 
McGeough 2009:112). These representatives are elected to the council by members from 
different area branches. The total number of members is unknown, but estimates vary between 
twelve and twenty four (Mishal & Sela 2006:161,223), sixty plus (McGeough 2009:112) and 
between 70-90 members according to the Arabic daily newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat.65
 
 Shaul 
Mishal emphasized in interview that for Israel, a worst case scenario in terms of a security 
threat, would be a Shura member with Israeli citizenship (Shaul Mishal in interview with 
author). The newspaper article above also suggests that the Shura council has turned into a 
symbolic leadership, with the political bureau as the real force. The same newspaper also 
claims that the West Bank has a significant smaller representation than the Gaza Strip in the 
council. This claim was also supported by several sources during my field work, and it is a 
strong indicator that the West Bank branch is less influential. Figure 3 below indicate the 
overall structure of Hamas. However, the power relation between the Shura council and the 
Political bureau is somewhat unclear, due to strategic vagueness by Hamas (Interviews with 
Ziad Abu Amr and Basem Ezbidi by author). 
Figure 3: Overall structure of Hamas 
 
(Source: Mishal & Sela 2006:173, Løvlie 2008:73 and interviews with political analysts).  
                                                          
65 http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=15728 
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Members of the national Shura council also appoints members to the Political bureau, which 
assumes the responsibility for foreign affairs, finances, propaganda, internal security, and 
military affairs (Mishal & Sela 2006:xix). According to Gunning, the bureau is equivalent of 
the executive at state level, and is responsible for the day to day implementation of the Shura 
council`s strategy (Gunning 2008:100). The Political bureau is limited in the sense that it 
can`t control every area branch in the OPT in detail. It gives commands, advice, policy 
recommendations, and it creates propaganda campaigns to the local branches. Still, local 
branches are allowed to make their own decisions as long as they don`t contravene general 
instructions from the bureau. As is the case with the Majlis al-Shura, total number of 
members and their identity is not clear. International Crisis Group claimed the Bureau had 
between twelve and fourteen members in 2004, based outside of Palestine, primarily in Syria, 
Lebanon, Iran and Qatar (ICG 2004:10). According to Khaled Hroub, the number is between 
10 and 20 (Hroub 2006:118). The bureau takes decisions based on consultations with different 
levels of the organization, including the National Shura council, the prisoners Shura council 
and the internal branches (Gaza and the West Bank) (ICG 2004:11). Mishal & Sela emphasize 
that the Political bureau has got a stricter internal structure than the Majlis al-Shura, and that 
members usually are people of a higher education (Mishal & Sela 2006:161, 162). The 
political bureau keeps close contact with other Islamic movements, and financial providers. It 
is well documented today that the Political bureau works from Damascus in Syria (Gunning 
2008:100, Tamimi 2007:7). Musa Abu Marzook led the bureau until he was deported from 
Jordan in 1995 and later arrested in USA (Mishal & Sela 2006:162). Khalid Mishal took over 
the leading position in the Political bureau in 1995, and is also its current leader.  
Historical perspective: Damascus or Gaza in power? 
It is worth noting that political power inside Hamas has never been centered round the West 
Bank branch. In a historical perspective, the external leaders dominated Hamas de facto from 
the early 1990s, until they were deported from Amman in 1999. In this same period the 
military leaders from the al-Qassam brigades also held a strong position within the movement. 
As the external leader reside outside of the OPT, they are protected from the effects and 
consequences deriving from Hamas actions. The external leadership has thus tended to be 
more hard-line than the inside leadership, which has been the moderating part (Hroub 
2000:59). The political bureau relied on three elements to retain the domination of Hamas: 
controlling the finances, controlling the da`wa work, and the internal affairs (Mishal & Sela 
2006:162). By controlling the finances it could make a strong alliance with al-Qassam 
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commanders in need of weapons. To carry out daily activities and ensure control, it utilized 
two coordinating elements. One of these elements is an Administrative Unit, responsible for 
coordinating the da`wa activities, security and events, coordination with other units, and 
recruitment. The other element is a liaison unit between the political bureau, and the West 
Bank and Gaza branches (Mishal & Sela 2006:162). From 1998 the Jordanian government 
cracked down on Hamas offices in Amman,66 ultimately leading to their deportation in 1999. 
This helped the Gaza leaders to balance the domination of the external leaders. In 1999 
Sheikh Yassin even took personal initiatives on behalf of Hamas, which the Political bureau 
opposed.67 This internal factional struggle for the domination of the leadership has at times 
influenced political decisions made by the movement, especially regarding electoral 
participation.68 However, the external faction still dominates political, media and military 
decisions.69
 
 Several political analysts I met during my fieldwork also stated that the West 
Bank branch has only had marginal influence on every major decision taken by Hamas. 
Figure 4 below indicate the historical power balance between the major branches of Hamas 
since the establishment:    
Figure 4: Hamas leadership and internal organizational power 
Branch West Bank Gaza Amman/Damascus Al-Qassam 
Time period     
1987 - 91/92 Weak Influence In power Not established Not established 
1992 – 96/97 Weak Influence Leaders in jail In power Strong 
influence 
1997 – 2004 
2004 - 2007 
Weak Influence 
Weak Influence 
Shared power 
Decreasing 
Shared power 
Increasing 
Influence 
Decreasing 
 
Decision-making           
It is important to remember that decision-making is a secretive process. Decisions are 
generally made according to the principle of consultation (Shura). The organizational outline 
mapped out above, indicate four sectors which are consulted before decisions are made 
(except local decisions taken by local leaders, in line with policy from the Political bureau). 
This is Gaza, the West Bank, the Prisoners and the external leaders. When all these sectors are 
                                                          
66 As a response to Hamas`s opposition to the Jordanian brokered Wye agreements (Tamimi 2007:119-121). 
67 Yassin agreed to attend a meeting of the PLO Central Committee on behalf of Hamas (Tamimi 2007:196). 
68 For a detailed study on Hamas` electoral participation, see Løvlie 2008. 
69 http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=15728 
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consulted, the political bureau will take the decisions.70 This chain in the decision-making of 
Hamas reveals one of its weaknesses. Israeli restrictions on movement inside the OPT, and 
the fact that top-leaders reside all over the Middle East, restricts the movement from taking 
quick decisions. The external bodies are the most influential and powerful parts of the 
movement. According to a newspaper interview with a member of the political bureau, Rafat 
Nasif, each of the four mentioned sectors will take an independent decision, without 
consulting any of the other sectors.71
Conclusive remarks 
 As mentioned above, the Gaza and the West Bank sector 
convene their Shura councils, and takes decisions based on consultation within their area 
branches. The prisoners also convene in their Shura councils, but they obviously do not have 
a separate constituency. The Political bureau is then informed about the decision made 
locally, and based upon this information, will make a final decision. Note also that the opinion 
of the Gaza branch has been more important when it comes to overall decision-making than 
the opinion of the West Bank branch. Decision-making in the military wing of Hamas is even 
more secretive. However, one plausible scenario is that the leaders in the political bureau (and 
possibly the Majlis al-Shura) at times give general strategic long term directions to al-Qassam 
commanders. Accordingly, when it is in the political interest of Hamas to carry out militant 
attacks, al-Qassam commanders will be given free rein for an unspecified period of time. This 
period of operational leeway can also be cut off, if it is the strategic interest of the movement 
to halt attacks (Anonymous political analyst).  
The first structures of Hamas were based upon the forms of organization found in the 
Mujamma and the Brotherhood. These institutions were stronger in Gaza than the West Bank, 
which created an imbalance in terms of power and influence from the outset. Continued 
Israeli crackdowns on Hamas have influenced the way the organization is structured. The 
West Bank leaders had to keep a low profile, rely on decisions taken in plural, and depending 
on other parts of the movement for finances. It is clear that the West Bank branch is the 
marginal branch in terms of power and influence. The Gaza branch enjoys a stronger 
legitimacy as representing the core area of Hamas, it has stronger representation in the 
National Shura council, it has stronger links to al-Qassam commanders, and a stronger 
financial position. In addition, the external pressure has been harder on the West Bank branch, 
in terms of Israeli restrictions, and political competition from the PLO. As internal matters of 
                                                          
70 According to Gunning, consultation with the whole movement serves to register popular sentiment, but the 
Political bureau is still in charge of making the final decision (Gunning 2008:109).  
71 http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=15728 
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Hamas are secretive, it is only possible to speculate why power inside Hamas never has been 
centered in the West Bank. It could be a strategic consideration, as the external pressure 
against Hamas would have been insurmountable. On the other hand, Hamas has established 
several strong bases inside the West Bank, such as Hebron and Nablus, later also Ramallah, 
Jenin and Qalqilya. In these cities Hamas has built a large grassroots support, as the following 
chapter will show, partly from engaging in social welfare activities.   
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Chapter 6 
Social activities in the West bank between 1993 and 2007. The 
source of political influence? 
Introduction 
As described in chapter four, the activities of Hamas during the first Intifada was focused on 
resistance, building the organization, and spreading the Islamic message to Palestinians. 
Furthermore, Hamas gradually inherited social welfare institutions from the Mujamma in 
Gaza and the Brotherhood in the West Bank. The focus on social and religious work quickly 
turned into the backbone of the organization, as Hamas received massive grassroots support 
from people depending on their social work. This support was invaluable for its later electoral 
success. In this chapter I aim to analyze the social activities of Hamas in the West Bank. I will 
argue that the social activity of Hamas in the West Bank has been directed more through what 
I have termed “external institutions”, than in their own directly Hamas-run institutions. I will 
also discuss controversies regarding these activities, before analyzing the impact of the 
external pressure upon these institutions. It is the aim of this chapter to show how Hamas 
conduct its social activities in the West Bank, and how this work has affected the political 
position of the movement in the West Bank.    
How to approach the social and religious work of Hamas? 
Hamas expert Khaled Hroub describes the social work of Hamas as providing structured 
educational, health and welfare services and help to the poor (Hroub 2006:70). These services 
are provided through extensive networks of charities, mosques, unions and sports clubs, 
which are recognized as honest and transparent institutions in contrast to Fatah and 
governmental institutions (Hroub 2006:70). In the Palestinian context, social and religious 
work often goes hand in hand. Religious work will thus be treated as part of the social activity 
of Hamas. In general, the recipients of emergency assistance or regular programs provided by 
these welfare institutions are low-income households, orphans, disabled, families headed by 
divorced women and widows,72
                                                          
72 Financial assistance is also provided to families consisting of the surviving relatives of any Palestinian who 
meets his death as a result of the conflict with Israel, including relatives of suicide bombers (ICG 2003:23). 
 households where the husband is chronically ill, disabled or 
imprisoned, and children in need of moral or psychological support (ICG 2003:6, 7). In this 
chapter I will make a distinction between institutions established and operated only by 
Hamas, and institutions separate or external to Hamas, in which Hamas are influential. 
Moreover, I will argue that directly Hamas-run institutions have flourished more openly in 
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Gaza than the West Bank, where they have faced more favorable conditions. In the West 
Bank, directly Hamas-run institutions has been more exposed for restrictions. Hamas has thus 
worked more actively through external institutions in the West Bank, particularly Zakat 
committees and mosques, which will be elaborated.   
 
According to an International Crisis Group report from 2003, Islamic welfare organizations 
fall into two broad categories: Charitable institutions and Service organizations. Charitable 
institutions provide alms in form of financial subsidies, food and shelter, while service 
organizations provide benefits such as education and medical relief (ICG 2003:7). However, 
these categories are problematic as the institutions discussed in this chapter typically are 
involved in both fields of work. In the case of Hamas in the West Bank, it still makes more 
sense to discuss charitable institutions, as the Zakat committees fall within this category. 
When discussing Hamas social activities, it is important to emphasize that Hamas engage in 
both legitimate (humanitarian) and illegitimate (terrorist) activities. The context is thus 
important, as Hamas operate under conditions of foreign occupation, and in an environment in 
which the recognized public sector (PA) often does not function (ICG 2003:2). When the PA 
was operative from 1994, NGO`s provided 60% of the health care in Palestine and 30% of the 
educational institutions (Jensen 2009:26). UNRWA was among the most important 
institutions, although it focused mainly on refugees in Gaza, not the West Bank. The PA has 
never been the sole provider of health care in the OPT, and the PA still relies on UNRWA and 
private actors to cover all welfare needs.  
 
There is great controversy connected to the social and religious work of Hamas. In the 
aftermath of 11th September 2001, there has been raised great concern on state levels 
regarding the relationship between the social work of Hamas – and terrorism. According to 
research in the growing field of counter-terrorism studies, Hamas conceals its terrorist activity 
behind charitable, social and political fronts (Levitt 2006:1-7). According to Matthew Levitt, 
Hamas uses its social institutions to indoctrinate and recruit terrorists, and fund and facilitate 
terrorist cells (Levitt 2006:23, 79). Levitt makes no distinctions between internal and external 
institutions, and the social welfare activity of Hamas, such as in Zakat committees, is 
discussed in general as Da`wa activity (Levitt 2006:23-25). Literature from the field of 
counter-terrorism studies is however problematic. It leans mainly on disclosed intelligence 
sources, which often are biased, connected to government activity, and sometimes based on 
information extracted from detainees under interrogation (Schâublin 2009:13). I will however 
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argue that this literature should not be rejected completely. Read critically it can constitute a 
background for research, as in this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter rely on the academic 
literature on Hamas, as well as interviews from my fieldwork. 
 
Researchers from other fields may agree with Levitt that Zakat committees and mosques stand 
out as the most important institutions for Hamas, especially in terms of activity and grassroots 
support. But they strongly disagree on the depiction of how these institutions function, their 
roles, and their links to Hamas (Schâublin 2009:11-14). In accordance with findings from my 
fieldwork, I will assume the position taken by Emaunel Schâublin and Jeroen Gunning 
regarding the role of West Bank Zakat committees. Accordingly, Zakat committees in the 
West Bank are viewed as institutions that also functions independently of Hamas, thus not an 
integral part of the Hamas organization (Schâublin 2009:11-14, Gunning 2008:115). 
Moreover, I will follow Gunning`s position that Hamas has worked to be represented in, but 
not controlling the decision-making completely in these institutions (Gunning 2008:115). This 
position was also supported by several senior political analysts during my fieldwork. There is 
considerably less disagreement between researchers on the fact that the social and religious 
work of Hamas has benefited the movement when it comes to political mobilization. As 
Khaled Hroub notes, “Hamas`s social thought and its political views and practices are 
intertwined” (Hroub 2000:233). 
Early social and religious activity 
As discussed in chapter three, the Brotherhood prioritized social and educational issues before 
politics and resistance until the late 1980s. Social development from below was seen as a 
necessary step in the path of political change (Hroub 2000:234). In the 1970s and 80s this 
project created a network of schools and social institutions, where religious preaching and 
education could take place (Mishal & Sela 2006:19, 20). This program was most successful in 
Gaza, were the Mujamma developed, administered, and controlled social, religious and 
educational Islamic institutions. An important factor in this success was the combination of 
religious and social work, by using the mosque as more than just a place of worship 
(Wiktorowicz 2004:127). Hamas then implemented the Brotherhood notion of building a 
coherent Islamic society from below, but combined this focus with the liberation of Palestine. 
Hamas inherited social institutions from the Brotherhood in a gradual process, and continued 
to build new ones (Hroub 2000:235). These institutions provided poor Palestinians in villages 
and refugee camps with food, medical services, clothing, books, schooling, orphanages, 
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kindergartens, summer camps and other social services (Edwards 2010:5). This growing 
network of institutions enabled Hamas to keep in touch with the concerns of the poor and 
working classes, and to influence their religious conduct and political choices (Hroub 
2000:235). Part of this work was focused on Zakat committees. Some Zakat committees were 
partly established by Brotherhood and Hamas members, and from 1991 Hamas increased its 
focus on integrating its people from the political section, into existing committees in the West 
Bank (Schâublin 2009:54). However, the extent of the early social and religious activity in 
Gaza and the West Bank was not comparable. Gaza was the core area for Hamas, Israel 
allowed Islamic institutions to operate there, and the Gaza branch inherited a larger network 
of institutions (Ziad Abu Amr in interview with author). In addition, the Brotherhood mindset 
did not have the same influence in the West Bank, which also had a higher socio-economical 
profile than the Gaza strip, thus in need of less welfare assistance (Mishal & Sela 2006:25).  
Hamas-run institutions in the West Bank  
In 2003 it was estimated that Hamas operated between 70 – 100 social welfare institutions for 
the poor in the OPT (ICG 2003:11). Although there is no doubt Hamas has established and 
run its own institutions in the West Bank in the period under study, it is impossible to analyze 
such institutions in detail. The matter of affiliation is too unclear. A number of institutions in 
Gaza, such as the Islamic University, al-Mujamma, the Scientific Medical Association, the 
sports clubs Nâdi al-Jami`iyya al-Islâmiyya and the social organization al-Jam`iyya al-
Islâmiyya are known to be controlled by Hamas (Jensen 2009:61-76). Other institutions can 
often be linked to political factions by their founders, their funding or their staffing (ICG 
2003:11). According to political analysts I interviewed, Hamas in the West Bank needs to 
keep such information secret as a security measure, to avoid external pressure from Israel and 
the PA (Political analysts in interview with author). Findings in a FAFO report from 2010, 
does also indicate that schools and kindergartens run directly by Hamas are found more often 
in Gaza than the West Bank. The report specifically mentions the Dar al-Arqam schools and 
the al-Salah schools in Gaza (Høigilt 2010:31-33). Moreover, the FAFO study points out that 
there is reason to be careful when linking Islamic schools in the OPT directly to Hamas. 
Islamic schools might be run directly by Hamas, have loose ties to Hamas, no ties to Hamas, 
or be schools run by opposing Islamic movements, such as Salafi groups (Høigilt 2010:31, 
32). The Young Men`s Muslim Association in Hebron may serve as an example of this 
complexity. The association was founded in 1985 by Talal al-Ayoubi Sidr, one of the 
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founders of Hamas in Hebron.73 Today the charity is one of the largest in Hebron, and it 
provides a number of services, including the education of 1500 students (Høigilt 2010:56). 
However, a perceived link to Hamas made the Israeli military close down the association 
temporarily in 2005, as part of the campaign against “the terrorist infrastructure” of Hamas.74
West Bank Institutions, external to Hamas  
 
References to Israeli and PA raids in the West Bank, often found in the literature of counter-
terrorism studies, are unfortunately the most publicly available information regarding Hamas-
run institutions. However, according to the FAFO study, most of the Islamic schools in the 
OPT are charitable. This means they belong to a Zakat committee or another charitable 
association whose board has the financial and administrative responsibility for the school 
(Høigilt 2010:33). It is also worth noting that Hamas has a more positive image among 
Palestinians than the PA in delivering social services, as it is more efficient and not involved 
in corruption (ICG 2003:25). 
It is interesting to observe that Hamas in the West Bank has been more active in external 
institutions. According to a political analyst on the West Bank, Hamas have prioritized to get 
members from its political section, elected or represented into different external social or 
religious committees or institutions in the West Bank society. Accordingly, this approach is 
safer for Hamas, as the risk is smaller for these institutions to be shut down by Israel or the 
PA, as they are not part of the Hamas organization (Anonymous political analyst in interview 
with author). An example is hospital governance, which is independent from Hamas in the 
West Bank. By installing a member in the governing body of the hospital, Hamas can exert 
indirect influence on governance and the finances of the hospital (Hilsenrath & Singh 
2007:4). The Zakat committees and the mosques have however been the most important 
institutions. These are above all Islamic, traditional institutions with communal ownership, 
thus not integral parts of the Hamas infrastructure.  
West Bank Zakat committees 
The payment of Zakat, or almsgiving, is one of the five pillars of Islam and thus obligatory 
upon practising Muslims75
                                                          
73 
 (ICG 2003:3). For centuries, Palestinian mosques have been 
running informal voluntary committees charged with the collection and distribution of 
donations. Zakat committees received alms donations from individual Muslims, 
http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/personalities/alpha_s.htm 
74 http://palpress.ps/english/index.php?maa=ReadStory&ChannelID=1747  
75 Zakat is not a formal tax in Palestinian law, and it is not collected by the PA. Muslim Palestinians are thus free 
to determine how much, when and to whom they will pay Zakat (ICG 2003:8).  
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organizations, corporations, governments and foreign Zakat funds, and in the case of the West 
Bank (until 2007) mostly from the Gulf-countries, Europe and the US (ICG 2003:8, Schâublin 
2009:8). These incoming donations were then distributed to charitable projects. However, 
before I continue this discussion, it is important to note that the 2007 Hamas takeover of 
Gaza, led to radical reforms for the system of Zakat committees. The influential position 
Hamas had enjoyed in these committees, caused the PA emergency cabinet led by Salam 
Fayyad to dissolve Zakat committees in ninety-two West Bank towns and villages in 2007, 
and appoint eleven new central committees, one for each West Bank governorate (Schâublin 
2009:9). By implementing this radical reform, the PA wanted to marginalize the political 
position of Hamas in the West Bank, by removing one of its fundamental components. It is 
thus worth having a closer look at how Hamas worked in these committees before 2007.    
 
In the period up until 2007, Zakat committees were perceived as formally independent 
entities, and their political affiliations were therefore not immediately apparent. However, 
many existing committees were established or co-founded by Brotherhood members and other 
politico-religious movements, and some were co-founded by religious Fatah members 
(Schâublin 2009:61). By 2003, it was generally held that Hamas was far more influential 
within the social welfare sector than any other Palestinian political faction (ICG 2003:11). 
According to a 2009 report from the Centre on conflict, Development and Peacebuilding in 
Geneva (CCDP), by Emanuel Schäublin, a number of Zakat committee members claimed that 
sometimes, it was easier to access funds if the committee had a political leaning towards 
Hamas (Schâublin 2009:55). Historically, the Jordanian Ministry of religious affairs (Awqaf) 
started the formal registering of such committees in the West Bank from 197776
                                                          
76 In 1977-1979 the Zakat committees of Nablus, Ramallah and Qalqilyah were registered. The Jenin committee 
were registered in 1984, the Hebron committee in 1987, and the Tubas committee in 1988 (Schâublin 2008:16). 
 (ICG 
2003:8). According to Schâublin, West Bank Zakat committees were for the first time under 
official Palestinian control in 1994/1995, when the PA took control of the administering, from 
the Israeli Ministry of Health. Furthermore, in 1997, all Zakat committees were officially 
registered by the PA (Schâublin 2009:34-39). Until 2007, membership in Zakat boards was 
reserved for the most respected men in the society, such as business men, entrepreneurs, 
imams, and some of the best educated and literate men (Schâublin 2009:8). Until 2007 
candidates were proposed and appointed locally, but with the approval of the PA. Zakat 
committees often met in mosques, and they initiated charitable projects in their local 
communities (ICG 2003:8). By 1996, the PA had registered forty-seven Zakat committees in 
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the West Bank, and only three in Gaza77
Hamas in Zakat committees: Altruistic work or a foundation for terrorism? 
 (Schâublin 2009:17). Committees were found all 
over the West Bank, several of them Hamas-affiliated.  
My fieldwork in Ramallah presented me with two contradicting points of view regarding the 
nature of the social work of Hamas. First of all, on one side were the perspectives of 
Mahmoud Musleh and Mahmoud al-Ramahi, who both are, or have been members in the 
Ramallah and al-Bireh Zakat committees. During my interview with al-Ramahi, he proudly 
announced that he had been working in his medical clinic earlier that day, an institution 
connected to the Ramallah and al-Bireh Zakat committee (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview 
with author). Mahmoud Musleh stated that he had been the director of the al-Bireh committee 
between 1993 and 2004, and that the committee used to run 20 centers for the memorization 
of the Quran, 10 kindergartens, several schools for mutes, and secondary schools for females 
and men (Musleh in interview with author). Furthermore, Musleh also proudly described the 
success of the schools run by the Ramallah and al-Bireh Zakat committee. Accordingly, these 
schools always enjoyed great success, and he claimed the top five Palestinian students always 
came from one of these schools. Moreover, he claimed that as the PA took control of these 
schools (he did not mention when) they fired experienced teachers and changed the successful 
formula of the schools, something which the people did not like (Mahmoud Musleh in 
interview with author). When asked which social activities were most important for Hamas, 
Musleh emphasized that the most important thing for Hamas was to be able to offer Islamic 
alternatives to Palestinians: “For example in wedding parties – singing and drinking – is not 
accepted by Islam. Instead of forbidding it – and saying it is taboo (which people will not 
accept – they want to celebrate) – we give Islamic alternatives – Islamic songs, music and 
singers. In Germany – people go to nudist beaches – this is not accepted by the Islamic 
society – so we give alternatives – we take people to see villages which have been demolished 
by the occupation – we take people to archeological areas, or to mosques which were made 
into bars” (Mahmoud Musleh in interview with author). Hamas sympathizers are known to be 
working in all levels of the institutions run by Zakat committees. Some are teachers in 
schools, some play music in weddings, some have administrative positions, and some are 
directors of the charity. According to al-Ramahi, these people work with charity to help 
others. He also rejected what he termed the “western” view, that Hamas only engage in social 
                                                          
77 The low number in Gaza was caused partly by the fact that the UNRWA focused its aid work on Gaza 
Schâublin 2009:17).  
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work to facilitate suicide attacks and other militant attacks (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview 
with author).  
 
The other and contradicting perspective regarding the social and religious work of Hamas is 
found in the aforementioned field of counter-terrorism research. In his book “Hamas: Politics, 
Charity and Terrorism in the service of Jihad”, Matthew Levitt claims that: “the battery of 
mosques, schools, orphanages, summer-camps and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas, are 
integral parts of an overarching apparatus of terror” (Levitt 2006:5). Furthermore, Levitt 
claims Hamas uses Zakat committees to channel money to the West Bank to use for political 
and military activities. Hamas activists working in the Zakat-run institutions thus have tactical 
functions such as gathering intelligence before suicide attacks, leading bombers to their 
targets and covering their identity (Levitt 2006:80). The network of charitable institutions 
affiliated with Hamas, thus fulfil three primary functions according to Levitt: recruiting, 
employing, and providing a cover of legitimacy for terrorists (Levitt 2006:81). Levitt also 
claims to possess documents seized by Israel in the offices of the Ramallah and al-Bireh Zakat 
committee after the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. According to these 
documents,78
 
 the Ramallah and al-Bireh charity is but a branch of a larger charity, namely the 
al-Islah Charitable Society. Moreover, Levitt claims that the al-Islah charity spent their 
finances on three things: 1: Aid to families of Hamas “martyrs”, prisoners, and wounded 
operatives, 2: Administrative costs tied to running the Hamas charity`s office and similar 
expenses, and 3: Social welfare support to Hamas social service organizations (Levitt 
2006:57). It is thus a major discrepancy between the statements from al-Ramahi and Musleh 
during my interviews, and the accounts made by Levitt. It is my impression that Musleh and 
al-Ramahi are obliged, as Hamas members, to make positive and innocent statements 
concerning their social work. Al-Ramahi thus stated on his own initiative, that Hamas is 
active in social work to help people, not facilitate suicide attacks. On the other hand, 
statements from Levitt appears to be somewhat exaggerated, as he claims the whole social 
welfare sector of Hamas is dedicated to terrorism. This statement fails to account for the 
altruistic motive most likely present in the Zakat committees (Schâublin 2009:13).  
                                                          
78 The documents can be read from the homepage of an Israeli NGO – “The Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center” - http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/eng/sib/12_04/interpal_app_a.htm.    
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From yet other sources, it is possible to get a more nuanced image of how the social work of 
Hamas works. The aforementioned CCDP report on Zakat committees is based on fieldwork 
and case studies in six committees: Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, Qalqilyah, Jenin, and Tubas 
(Schâublin 2009:10). According to the findings in this report, it is possible to identify at least 
eight major fields of activity common to such committees. Projects are run in orphan 
sponsorship, regular financial aid to poor families, direct aid for families in a situation of 
urgent need, in-kind aid, provision of sacrificial animals and distribution of their meat and 
other food items, medical services, education and job creation projects (Schâublin 2009:23-
26).  Educational work is one of the most elementary parts of Hamas`s social and religious 
reform program. According to Jeroen Gunning, “Hamas proposes to educate society into 
willing an Islamic state through civic participation, consultation exercises and education” 
(Gunning 2008:265). The importance of educational work in West Bank Zakat institutions is 
also underscored by the FAFO report mentioned above, as most Islamic private schools in the 
OPT are run by Zakat committees Høigilt 2010:19). Moreover, Jacob Høigilt of FAFO 
studied a number of these educational institutions in the West Bank, and he found no evidence 
that these schools seek to further Hamas`s political ideology or methods, but at the same time 
it is no surprise that several activists in all levels of these institutions are sympathetic to 
Hamas (Høigilt 2010:50). In the history of Hamas, there is however no doubt that Hamas has 
recruited suicide bombers and members for the armed cells of the al-Qassam brigades in the 
West Bank, from institutions run directly by Hamas, or by the aforementioned Zakat 
committees (Edwards 2010:140).  
Controversial funding  
The contradicting perspectives mentioned above are closely connected to the funding of 
Hamas`s social work. The welfare network connected to Hamas has been accused of diverting 
money to terrorism activities, facilitating recruitment and propaganda for Hamas terrorist 
activities, and helping maintain and strengthen Hamas`s political role in the OPT (ICG 
2003:18). However, this controversy is mostly based upon sources such as intelligence 
sources and bank-prints published online, which it is impossible to verify in this thesis. The 
funding of institutions run directly by Hamas, or indirectly through external institutions, is 
collected from both local Palestinians, and external financial contributors. In general, Hamas 
receives funding from several sources outside of Palestine, such as individual Palestinian, 
Arab or Muslim supporters, and foreign organizations. Iran is the only country accused of 
funding Hamas (Hroub 2006:137). Individual local Palestinians are also known to donate 
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money for Hamas activities, often when coming to the local mosques (Hroub 2006:138). 
Money used in the directly Hamas-run institutions thus probably comes from general financial 
contributions. External institutions such as the West Bank Zakat committees are funded 
independently of Hamas. Alms are often donated as cash, but the Zakat committees also own 
Waqf-property. Waqf property is pieces of land donated to the Zakat committee for ever, 
which use the land for charitable purposes79
The importance of West Bank Mosques 
 (Schâublin 2009:26). However, the core of this 
controversy is that Hamas continues to play a central role in directing money to selected 
institutions. Despite possible altruistic aims of these institutions, it has been documented that 
Hamas help generate support for the movement and its political program – including the 
violent resistance (ICG 2003:25). Hamas has thus been able to influence how money are spent 
by Zakat committees, and the most controversial example concerns the families of martyrs, 
which are made eligible to receive financial support (Hroub 2006:71).  
Mosques are important institutions for Hamas in the West Bank. Not only are they a place for 
worship, but they have an added social value as a meeting point where it is possible to discuss 
matters related to religion and politics (Gunning 2008:123). Furthermore, many Hamas 
leaders have traditionally been general prayer leaders or the holder of the important Friday 
prayer, which is an important role in the Palestinian society (Gunning 2008:123). Several 
Zakat committees are also tied to mosques, and perform their work in or from mosques. 
Hamas are also known to recruit candidates for their military wing, the al-Qassam brigades 
from mosques (Edwards 2010:140). In 1996, as part of a crackdown against Hamas, the PA 
assumed formal supervision of all mosques in Palestine. Still, Hamas managed to influence 
PA appointed imams, which during heightened confrontation with Israel delivered extremist 
sermons (ICG 2003:22). Hamas thus still exploited any possibility to use mosques for 
sermons and other activities. The PA thus lacked control of the mosques, or turned a blind eye 
to this activity. This phenomenon is a matter of general knowledge in the OPT, and people 
knows which mosques that are lenient towards Hamas (ICG 2003:11). The use of mosques in 
political ways has at times enhanced the political position of Hamas in the West Bank. People 
attending mosque sermons are a receptive audience to the Islamic message of Hamas, and by 
using mosques politically - Hamas are actually drawing more people into the political process 
and enlarging the political space in the society (Gunning 2008:173). Furthermore, mosques 
                                                          
79 This could mean renting the land for educational institutions on preferential conditions, or to normal 
commercial tenants. The income deriving from these properties is used for charitable projects (Schâublin 
2009:26). 
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were central in the early parts of Hamas`s 2006 election campaigns. Election campaigns in 
mosques reinforced the message that Hamas were inspired by Islam, and that its leaders were 
“true Muslims”. However, the success of this campaign threatened Fatah and the PA, and 
Hamas were forced to sign a code of conduct in January 2006, banning electioneering from 
mosques (Gunning 2008:161).    
External pressure: Out of sight out of mind?  
External pressure against social and religious Hamas-affiliated institutions is closely 
connected to the militant activity of Hamas, and its political influence in the West Bank. As 
will be elaborated in chapter seven, a series of suicide bombs launched by the al-Qassam 
brigades against Israeli targets in 1996 provoked a coordinated action against Hamas, by the 
PA and Israel. This was the first major campaign against the whole infrastructure of Hamas in 
both Gaza and the West Bank. The designated targets were militant cells, political leaders, 
and the source for Hamas support among the Palestinians; the social welfare network.  
 
More than 1200 Hamas members were arrested in the 1996 campaign. A number of Hamas 
institutions were raided and closed down, including kindergartens, educational institutions 
and charities (ICG 2003:6). The perhaps most devastating blow for Hamas was that several 
hundreds of mosques, where Hamas had enjoyed a free rein, were suddenly placed under the 
direct authority of the PA (Jensen 2009:24). The PA also appointed new imams, and deprived 
Hamas of the opportunity to use mosques as a forum to convey political messages (ICG 
2003:8). Furthermore, the pressure against Hamas-linked institutions continued throughout 
the rest of the 1990s, as the PA worked to consolidate its security forces and assert full 
authority over opposition groups (Hroub 2000:107). As will be elaborated in chapter eight, 
international peace summits in Sharm al-Sheikh, Hebron and Wye River between 1996 and 
1998 had resulted in a “green light” for Israel and the PA to fight terrorism, which they both 
took full advantage of (Hroub 2000:109). Financial support for Hamas institutions was 
blocked and further restrictions were placed on Zakat committees and mosques (Hroub 
2000:108). However, the PA knew that totally crushing the social welfare sector of Hamas 
would lead to protests from the population, due to the importance of this network in providing 
social services. The PA thus simultaneously sustained a quiet dialogue with the political 
leadership of Hamas, and left its social welfare infrastructure largely intact (ICG 2003:6). An 
International Crisis Group report from 2003 indicates a pattern of further crackdowns against 
Hamas-affiliated institutions in Gaza and the West Bank during the second Intifada 
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(elaborated in chapter eight). According to the report, every large-scale attack by Hamas on 
Israeli cities was followed by PA measures against Hamas institutions. The PA and Israel thus 
partly cooperated in targeting Hamas, although the PA never used its full force to wipe out all 
elements of Hamas. Hamas-affiliated institutions were frequently raided and sealed down. 
Between September 2000 and January 2002, the PA sealed the premises of 50 Hamas-
affiliated social welfare institutions, froze the assets of 25 institutions, and imposed external 
supervision on their governing bodies (ICG 2003:16). Furthermore, the report claims that no 
certain allegations were made against these institutions, and the closure orders were often 
lifted after a short while. It was thus more a matter for the PA to show strength against Hamas 
and to alleviate foreign pressure, as Israel and the international donor society feared the 
financing of these institutions indirectly went to militant operations (ICG 2003:17).  
 
The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank during spring of 2002, in “Operation Defensive 
Shield”, is however and particularly interesting case. The operation followed one of the most 
violent months of the second Intifada.80 Hamas was largely responsible for the latest attacks, 
but Israel blamed Arafat and the PA for not maintaining security (Edwards 2010:103). Israeli 
forces thus smashed PA ministries and offices, and detained numerous Hamas leaders and 
supporters (Edwards 2010:103).81
                                                          
80 88 Israel killed 40 Palestinians in Gaza 8th of March, Hamas`s suicide bombers killed eleven Israelis the 9th of 
March, another 30 Israelis on the 27th of March, and 3 Jewish settlers were shot the 28th of March (Edwards 
2010:100-102). 
 The operation led to the break-down of PA`s social health-
care institutions, and thus an even greater need for social services provided by Hamas-
affiliated institutions (Edwards 2010:105). As part of the operation, Israel persuaded the PA to 
freeze bank accounts belonging to Hamas charities in both Gaza and the West Bank. 
However, the network of Hamas-affiliated social welfare institutions continued to provide 
emergency assistance throughout the West Bank during the whole period of Israeli lockdown 
(Edwards 2010:105). The breakdown of PA health-care institutions came in addition to severe 
Israeli closures of the OPT, and restrictions on movement during the whole second Intifada. 
Demands for food and health-care were thus increasing, especially in refugee camps and West 
Bank villages. In numbers, Zakat committees in Gaza and the West Bank assisted 450 
families with cash before the second Intifada, which increased to 7000 families in 2003. 
Furthermore, the four largest Islamic welfare organization in the OPT provided food 
assistance to 145,450 households in 2003, while a quarter of all food and other assistance in 
81 Israel`s first target was Arafat`s compound in Ramallah, the Muqata, where Arafat was isolated until his death 
in 2004 (Edwards 2010:103). 
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the West Bank in 2003 came from Islamic welfare organizations (ICG 2003:15, 16). Effects 
of the Intifada, such as check-points hindering Palestinian in accessing official welfare 
providers, and later the re-occupation of the West Bank, thus partly served to increase the 
importance of Hamas as a social welfare provider in the West Bank. Furthermore, the public 
support for Hamas increased, as a result of its social welfare efforts. It is important to 
emphasize that the welfare apparatus of Hamas is noted for its efficiency, integrity and 
professionalism, in contrast to cronyism and corruption associated with the PA (ICG 2003:5).     
 
The pressure on Hamas continued during 2003/2004. In this period the PA again yielded to 
Israeli/US pressure and took harsh measures against charities, including freezing the bank 
accounts of twelve charities in the West Bank and thirty-eight in Gaza (Hroub 2006:73). 
However, an International Crisis Group report from 2010 states that both the PA and Israel 
had, until recently, its main focus on armed Islamist resistance, not the Islamists` social 
institutions and informal networks (ICG 2010:28). This was visible during the Operation 
Defensive Shield, when the IDF and Palestinians from all factions engaged in hard battles 
inside Jenin and Nablus. The IDF targeted areas known to bring up suicide bombers, 
demolished their families homes, detained suspected Hamas and Islamic Jihad members and 
confiscated weapons (Edwards 2010:100-105). The goal was to deter future Palestinian 
terrorists. For the IDF, this focus changed in 2005. An intelligence unit initiated a 
comprehensive program to survey Islamist activism and map out its welfare institutions (ICG 
2010:28).82 Between May and August of 2006, in the aftermath of the Hamas PLC victory, 
the IDF itself thus targeted Islamic charitable institutions in the West Bank. According to an 
OCHA report from 2006,83
 
 the IDF in this period attacked, raided or closed down 37 Islamic 
institutions, suspected of being used as a front for military attacks against Israeli targets.  
As will be elaborated in chapter eight, Hamas won the local elections in 2005, and thus 
entered local municipalities as the official social service providers in the West Bank. It is 
important to note the ability of Hamas-affiliated social welfare institutions to continue their 
work despite heavy pressure from both Israel and the PA. Continuous attempts to shut them 
down have not been effective, and they remained functioning throughout the period under 
study, serving hundreds of thousands of poor Palestinians, and continuing its attacks against 
                                                          
82 Accordingly, information was passed along to the PA after Hamas had seized control of Gaza in 2007. This 
information has then been used to map out the networks and activities of West Bank Islamists and to close down 
187 organizations in the West Bank after 2007 (ICG 2010:28). 
83 http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_Special_focus_8_Nov_2006_Eng.pdf  
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Israeli targets (Hroub 2006:72). Moreover, as is clear from the Palestinian elections in 2006, 
efforts to close them down did not reduce its popularity among the West Bank population. 
This was also emphasized by Mahmoud Musleh during my interview with him:  
“For example they established projects for orphans, each orphan were given a guardian. 
Human aid projects, private education and schools. All these things enabled the movement to 
have large support from the people in the society. But some people think this support only 
comes because Hamas gives them welfare, – no it is not right – the people support us because 
our hearts are with them. But the PA has closed down our institutions in the West Bank. Does 
this mean that the people no longer support Hamas? No – we are against the proverb saying 
“out of sight out of mind”. We are out of sight – but not out of mind (Mahmoud Musleh in 
interview with author).  
Conclusive remarks 
The social and religious work of Hamas has grown substantially during the period under 
study. Hamas reach out to numerous Palestinians all over the West Bank with much needed 
social welfare assistance. The recipients of this work constitute the backbone of Hamas, in 
terms of popular support for the movement. In the period between 1993 and 2007, Zakat 
committees were among the most important external institutions for Hamas. By placing 
members in the Zakat committees, and having activists working in institutions driven by the 
committee, Hamas has been far more influential within these institutions than any other 
faction. The heavy Israeli/PA pressure upon Hamas in the West Bank throughout the period, 
also made it more logical for Hamas to be active in external institutions than create their own 
institutions. It is essential to be aware of the controversies surrounding the social and religious 
work of Hamas. It is thus worth noting the mixed-roles of Mahmoud Musleh and Mahmoud 
al-Ramahi. They were both serving as Hamas PLC members from 2006, and they were both 
important members of the Ramallah and al-Bireh Zakat committees. It is impossible to 
conclude on the allegations regarding Hamas institutions and their connection to terrorism. It 
is however my impression that Hamas leaders paint an over-glamorous picture of the welfare 
work, while counter-terrorism experts are exaggerating in their statements.  
The external pressure on Hamas-run and external institutions has been massive and 
withstanding since at least 1996. The PA and Israel has partly coordinated crackdowns, 
including arresting members, freezing financial assets and closing down institutions. 
However, the PA has not been willing to close down these social institutions completely, as it 
is relying on Hamas to provide such services. The humanitarian situation in the West Bank 
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worsened during the Second Intifada. Israeli military operations in the West Bank, especially 
operation “Defensive Shield”, paralyzed the PA and its ability to provide social services. In 
this context, Hamas emerged as one of the most important providers of social services in both 
Gaza and the West Bank. Although impossible to measure, this important role as welfare 
provider – with credibility compared to the PA - has given the movement large popular 
support in the West Bank. It is worth noting that several Hamas Zakat committee members 
from the West Bank ran for the Hamas-led Change and Reform bloc, which won the local and 
national elections in 2005/2006. It is thus my impression that the social work of Hamas gave 
the movement a solid grassroots support, which it could take advantage of in its political 
work. On the other hand, the popular support Hamas received from its social work in the West 
Bank pushed the PA and Israel to increase its pressure on Hamas in the political arena.  
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Chapter 7 
In search of political influence; militant activity in the West Bank 
Introduction: 
This chapter will discuss the militant activity of Hamas in the West Bank between 1993 and 
2007. In this period, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades spread from Gaza and established 
cells in the West Bank. Violent attacks against Israeli targets and Palestinian collaborators, 
later including suicide attacks, became important strategic supplements to Hamas’s ongoing 
social and political work. However, these violent attacks were met with harsh retaliation from 
Israel, at times with support from PA security services. The severity of these repercussions 
also affected Hamas’s social and political work, and undermined the overall influence of the 
West Bank branch, both in absolute terms as well as vis-á-vis the other branches of Hamas. 
This chapter will first give a historical description of the militant activity conducted by the al-
Qassam Brigades in or from the West Bank. I will then analyze the impact this activity has 
had on the position of Hamas in the West Bank between 1993 and 2007. As noted in chapter 
two, this chapter relies mostly on the academic literature on Hamas, but it is also informed by 
information from counter-terrorism research.  
How to approach the militant activity of Hamas in the West Bank? 
Unsurprisingly, as Hamas initially was established as an armed militia to violently resist the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine, the group has carried out numerous suicide attacks, shootings, 
and other violent acts since 1987. Violence was therefore originally the most important tool 
for Hamas to reach their stated aim of total liberation of Palestine – “from the River Jordan to 
the Mediterranean Sea” (Hroub 2006:21). As the decision to turn to violence against the 
Israeli occupation was the chief factor behind the establishment of Hamas itself, its leaders 
have consistently argued that violent resistance is a legitimate Palestinian right (ICG 
2004:16). Article 13 in Hamas 1988 Charter, for example, states that peaceful initiatives, such 
as international conferences, to resolve the Palestinian problem is contrary to the ideology of 
Hamas. It also states that Jihad is obligatory for the liberation of Palestine, which in this 
context means the use of violence (Hroub 2000:274). As many of Hamas’s activities are of a 
clandestine nature – and in particular its military operations – the exact chain of command 
between the different wings and branches in Hamas remains shrouded in secrecy (Hroub 
2006:118). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish new facts regarding this issue. 
However, as established in chapter five, it is assumed that the political leadership decides on 
the general policy, signaling to the al-Qassam commanders when the latter are free to plan 
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and execute an operation, and when they should refrain from doing so. In this way, the 
political leadership remains isolated from militant operations carried out by al-Qassam 
Brigades, while at the same time keeping somewhat in control. When approaching the militant 
activity of Hamas, it is also important to note how physical separations and restrictions on 
movement have influenced violent attacks. Restrictions on movement came already in the 
mid-1990s for the people in Gaza, when Israel built the fence surrounding the Strip. Although 
Israel`s strategic interests and settlement activity is focused mainly in the West Bank,84
Early militant West Bank activity  
 the 
border between Israel and the West Bank was more or less open until 2003. Thus while 
militant activists from the West Bank for a long time had open access to Israel, activists from 
Gaza had to re-focus on Israeli targets inside the Gaza Strip.  
As noted in chapter five, the al-Qassam Brigades were established in 1990. Note, however, 
that the Brigades were a continuation of a process initiated by the Mujamma in the early 
1980s, when the Brotherhood in Gaza began to build their own military infrastructure. The 
first of these militant groups was the Mujahideen Filastine, established in 1984. It was cells 
from this group that killed the Israeli soldier Avi Sasportas in 1989, leading the Israelis to 
arrest Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and to end the relationship with Hamas. In 1990, Hamas 
established more militant cells, first in Rafah, Gaza, and later throughout Gaza (Edwards 
2010:117). These cells were initially targeting collaborators, until seventeen Palestinians were 
killed by Israeli police in Jerusalem in 1990. This incident made Hamas wage Jihad against 
all Israeli targets with all means available (ICG 2004:7).85
 
 
In 1991, Hamas activists restarted their militant activities under a new organization, partly in 
an attempt to isolate its military activities from its social and political work, and partly to 
avoid being compromised by fellow Hamas members already in Israeli custody. The first 
leader of the new al-Qassam brigades was Sheikh Salah Shehadeh, a former Mujamma and 
Mujahideen Filastine member from Gaza. Despite being small in size and numbers, the 
Qassam brigades quickly established itself as one of the most active and effective Palestinian 
fighting factions (Edwards 2010:112, 117). The al-Qassam brigades also spread to the West 
                                                          
84 Israeli researcher Idith Zertal and journalist Akiva Eldar refers to Jewish settlement blocs around Jerusalem, 
the eastern and western slopes and hilltops of the Samarian hills, settlements in the Jordan Valley, settlements in 
the heart of Hebron, and Jewish suburbs touching Nablus and Ramallah (Eldar & Zertal 2007:xiv, xv).  
85 Hamas no longer limited its attacks to the military and symbols of the occupation, but it began to strike at 
every available target, including civilians, also within the occupied territories. Between November 1990 and 
February 1991, more than ten Israelis were killed (ICG 2004:7). 
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Bank in the early 1990s. One of the founders there, Sheikh Saleh al-Arouri from a village near 
Ramallah, was arrested by Israel in October 1992, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison 
(Edwards 2010:120). Quoted in Beverly-Milton Edwards, al-Arouri states that the first West 
Bank cell was established in Hebron in 1990 by current Hamas PLC-member (Jerusalem list) 
Mohammad Abu-Teir, and that members were recruited from Hebron, Jerusalem and 
Ramallah. This early al-Qassam network in the West Bank proved particularly attractive to 
students, especially students from Gaza. However, the al-Qassam Brigades on the West Bank 
suffered serious setbacks early on, as many of the new members were arrested by Israel 
(Edwards 2010:120-121, 212). Note also that the first al-Qassam cells in the West Bank were 
under the command of the outside headquarters (Mishal & Sela 2006:65). 
 
Figure 5: logo of the al-Qassam brigades86
 
 
 
The militant activities of Hamas became a serious political factor as the peace negotiations 
between Israel and the PLO ran into difficulties in 1992. Hamas gained support among hard-
line Palestinians by stepping up militant attacks against Israeli civilians, soldiers and settlers, 
and condemning the nascent peace process. At this point, al-Qassam cells attacked solely with 
knives and small arms, as they did not have access to rockets, and the tactic of suicide attacks 
were not yet introduced to the conflict. The frequency of attacks by al-Qassam activists 
against both collaborators and Israeli targets increased in the course of 1992, culminating with 
the abduction and murder of an Israeli border policeman in December that year. This was the 
last straw for Israel. 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, members and activists were 
arrested or removed from jail, and deported to southern Lebanon (Edwards 1996:158), 
effectively paralyzing the domestic decision-making capabilities of Hamas. Among the 
                                                          
86 The al-Qassam logo, found on their website: www.qassam.ps. 
77 
 
deported were West Bank leaders such as Hassan Yousef and Husayn Abu Kuwik, but also al-
Qassam commanders and activists (Abu Amr 1993:14).  
 
However, despite the temporary setback, these deportations had a somewhat positive side 
effect for Hamas. The movement received massive international media attention, as the Israeli 
move was condemned by the international community as a breach of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (Edwards 1996:158). According to Mahmoud Musleh, the deported leaders 
established contact with each other and planned future resistance strategies. The international 
pressure was on Israel to allow them back into the OPT, and when they returned they were 
well received. When asked about the implications of the deportations for the West Bank 
branch, Musleh referred to a quote from the Egyptian Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna: 
“when you trim a tree – it gives you more fruit next year” (Mahmoud Musleh in interview 
with author). Although the al-Qassam brigades also suffered from a lack of leadership after 
the deportations, it continued to function. During the early months of 1993, the al-Qassam 
brigades continued to attack Israeli targets, including the killing of soldiers, settlers and 
civilians (Edwards 1996:159). Hamas thus demonstrated that the compartmentalization of the 
militant wing had been a strategic success. Even under exceptional pressure, Hamas retained 
its military capabilities and was able to mount serious attacks against Israel. 
The Hebron massacre and West Bank suicide attacks  
When the PA was established in 1994, Hamas initially withheld attacks against Israeli targets 
for a few months in order to test the new Palestinian authority (Mishal & Sela 2006:69). 
However, the Hebron massacre in February 1994 completely turned the tables. The massacre, 
were the Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein killed twenty-nine Palestinians inside the Ibrahimi 
mosque in Hebron, provoked Hamas to resume its violent campaign (Mishal & Sela 2006:69). 
This incident was also the trigger for a new and more violent tactic by Hamas, largely 
originating from the West Bank. Yehia Ayyash, an engineer from Rafat in the West Bank, had 
joined the al-Qassam network during the first Intifada (Chehab 2007:55). The Hebron 
massacre infuriated Ayyash, which eventually led to a new phase in the use of force from 
Hamas. He gathered co-students and co-members of the al-Qassam network to create bombs, 
which was to be used in several suicide attacks during the next two years (Chehab 2007:54-
56). The first attack came in April 1994, when a West Bank man killed eight Israelis with a 
suicide car-bomb in the city of Afula (Chehab 2007:56). By October 1994, the bombs 
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designed and constructed by Ayyash had killed at least seventy Israelis, with more than four 
hundred injured (Chehab 2007:57). 
 
As noted above, Israel completed the security barrier between the Gaza Strip and Israel in 
1996, forcing al-Qassam activists on the Strip to focus on Israeli targets inside Gaza. Among 
these targets were Israeli settlers and soldiers. As a result of the limited options available to 
the Gaza activists, the West Bank cells became increasingly important for Hamas to be able to 
carry out attacks inside Israel. Al-Qassam cells there had access to Israel through open fields 
from the West Bank, or by using fake IDs to get through Israeli checkpoints (Chehab 
2007:58). As mentioned in chapter seven, Hamas agreed to hold a period of calm (tahdiyah) 
during the Palestinian elections of 1996. Also in this period, Israeli intelligence operatives 
managed to track down and kill their prime target, Yaha Ayyash. Ayyash was wanted for 
almost every suicide bomb between 1994 and 1996 (Edwards 2010:218). The murder on 
Ayyash was revenged by his West Bank students in four suicide bombings, all carried out in 
1996. These attacks also had political ramifications, as they interfered with the Israeli 
elections in May 1996 (ICG 2004:9). 
 
According to an International Crisis Group report, Hamas wanted to ruin the re-election of 
Prime Minister Shimon Peres in the middle of the Oslo period, and replace him with 
Benyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu`s uncompromising stance against the Oslo accords was 
perceived, according to this claim, to discredit the Accords and the PA more than Hamas 
could do themselves (ICG 2004:9, 10). However, at this point in time, the latest attacks were 
too much for Israel to bear, prompting another round of crackdowns on Hamas in 1996. 
In addition to the arrest of almost every political Hamas leader in the West Bank, the 
crackdowns were also devastating for its social and military activity. Several al-Qassam cells 
were uprooted in the West Bank, and their weapons confiscated. However, Benyamin 
Netanyahu did win the elections in 1996, which soon led to the suspension of the Oslo 
accords, just as Hamas had hoped. However, Hamas was also left largely paralyzed by the 
crackdowns, and Netanyahu claimed to have restored security for Israel (ICG 2004:10). 
Despite these crackdowns, a limited network of al-Qassam cells in Hebron, Jerusalem and the 
northern region of the West Bank continued to carry out attacks against Israeli targets 
between 1996 and 2000 (Mishal & Sela 2006:224). These cells were under the command of 
the outside leadership of Hamas, which is an indication of the limited power and control held 
by the West Bank political leadership within Hamas (Mishal & Sela 2006:224).  
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The second Intifada and “Operation Defensive Shield” 
The second wave of suicide bombings were initiated during the second Intifada. Hamas did 
however not engage in violent attacks during the first month. But as clashes continued to 
mount, and Islamic Jihad unleashed the first suicide bomber of the Intifada, Hamas also 
decided to participate in the uprising. Hamas justified attacking Israeli targets with claims that 
there are no such thing as Israeli civilians,87
 
 and that it had popular support in the population 
for the use of force (Esposito 2005:86, ICG 2004:16, 17). Hamas thus kept track of public 
opinion for suicide attacks, and calculated that new waves of suicide bombers would increase 
their support.  
According to Michele K. Esposito, Palestinian factions carried out 135 suicide attacks 
between 28th of September 2000, and 27th of September 2004. At least 38 of these attacks 
were perpetrated by Hamas operatives (Esposito 2005:108). West Bank cells of al-Qassam, 
directed by Salah Shehadeh in Gaza, were central in the training of suicide bombers destined 
for Israel. Although Ayyash was killed in 1996, he had passed his knowledge to other 
operatives. A report from the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre states that 
the first two suicide attacks by Hamas were initiated inside of Gaza against Israeli targets. But 
then, the next nine attacks during 2001 were initiated by West Bank operatives of the al-
Qassam brigades, in various Israeli cities such as Kfar Saba, Netanya, Jerusalem, Wadi Ara 
and in the Jordan valley (http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/english/eng_n/pdf/suicide_terrorism_ae.pdf :281-296).  
The suicide bombers were from West Bank cities such as Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and Qalqilya, 
all easily reachable across the Green Line separating Israel and the West Bank. One of the 
worst suicide attacks perpetrated by Hamas operatives was the bombing at the Dolphinarium 
night club in Tel Aviv the 1st of June 2001. This operation killed twenty-one Israeli youths 
(Edwards 2010:89). However, it was an attack against a Netanya hotel on the 27th of March 
2002 which led to the most severe repercussions from Israel. The attack, during a Passover 
celebration, killed thirty Israelis (Edwards 2010:102). It was planned and carried out by al-
Qassam operatives from Nablus and Qalqilya, but the Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon was 
determined to hold Palestinian Prime Minister Yassir Arafat responsible for the Palestinian 
violence (Edwards 2010:103). The IDF thus escalated its responses to the Intifada, and 
intensified the operation called “Rolling response to Hamas”, an ongoing campaign already 
                                                          
87 It is argued by Hamas (and others) that no Israeli citizen is a civilian because the compulsory military service 
in Israel in reality makes all citizens soldiers (ICG 2004:17). 
80 
 
actively targeting Hamas inside the West Bank and Gaza (Esposito 2005:90). This campaign 
had led to massive raids into known Hamas-strongholds such as Nablus and Jenin during 
February 2002 (Esposito 2005:90).  
 
Later, from March 9th to May 10th in 2002, Israel executed Operation Defensive Shield, an all-
out assault on West Bank population centers and the Jenin refugee camp. The main goal was 
to isolate Arafat in Ramallah, but it was equally important to uproot terrorist factions such as 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and to confiscate their weapons and assets (Esposito 2005:91). 
Operation Defensive Shield was also followed by a series of other IDF operations, such as 
Operation Still-Water in late 2003, targeting Nablus and Jenin as these were major 
recruitment spots for suicide bombers (Esposito 2005:94). According to Mathew Levitt, 
Hamas cells from the Hebron area turned increasingly active from 2003. Members from a 
Hebron soccer team planned and executed five suicide attacks during the early months of 
2003 (Levitt 2004:3), and several suicide attacks as listed in the aforementioned report 
between 5th of March and the 31st of August 2004 is linked to the Qawasmeh clan. This clan 
was supposedly strongly linked to militant Hamas-cells in the Hebron area until today 
(Interview with anonymous political analyst).88
 
 Israeli operations in the West Bank led to a 
high number of casualties, with 250-300 Palestinians and 32 IDF soldiers killed in Operation 
Defensive Shield alone (Esposito 2005:91). Hamas, however, continued to mount suicide 
operations despite severe retaliations from Israel.  
The continuing Israeli military operations had devastating consequences for Hamas. From 28th 
of September 2000 to 27th of September 2004, the IDF assassinated 119 Hamas members, 
leaders and activists in Gaza and the West Bank (Esposito 2005:112-122). Among the most 
important were al-Qassam member Shehadeh in 2002, al-Qassam member Maqadmeh in 
2003, Hamas member Ismail Abu Shanab in 2003, and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his deputy, 
Dr. Abdelal Rantisi in March and April of 2004 respectively (Edwards 2010:107, 108). 
 
By 2003 Israel had also increased its security measures in the West Bank, erecting road-
blocks, building checkpoints and implementing travel restrictions. The most radical measure, 
however, was the construction of the security barrier surrounding the West Bank, which also 
                                                          
88 The Hebron area has in general had active militant-cells since at least 2003, which also killed four Israelis in 
the period before my fieldwork in October 2010 (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/four-israelis-
killed-in-shooting-attack-near-hebron-1.311318).  
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began in 2003 (Edwards 2010:148). Apart from the obvious humanitarian impact the West 
Bank barrier has for innocent Palestinians, it also made it more difficult for al-Qassam 
operatives to access Israel from the West Bank. It also made it increasingly difficult for 
Hamas operatives inside the West Bank to access weapons,89
 
 and the proliferation of 
checkpoints limited physical communication between West Bank leaders. Due to the 
elimination of almost every high-level West Bank leader in the period between 2002 and 
2003, it was now the Gaza leaders in Hamas that took control of the movement. 
It is also important to note that during Operation Defensive Shield and the following 
operations, the IDF not only fought Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but 
also the official PA security forces (ICG 2010:1). Many of these had joined the Intifada, and 
suffered the same consequences as other Palestinian militant factions. By mid-2002, however, 
the security forces were all but defeated, with their infrastructure in shatters, their 
headquarters in all Palestinian cities destroyed, and with significant amounts of their weapons 
confiscated. In the following period, Palestinian militias and even clans or families took 
control in lawless West Bank areas, until Palestinian security reform became an essential part 
of the Roadmap for Peace in 2003 (ICG 2010:1).  
 
The Roadmap then resumed Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation from 2003, leading to the 
slow recovery of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank. Coordinated security 
operations against all Palestinian factions suspected of having terrorist cells in the West Bank, 
has as a result characterized the West Bank since 2003/2004. 
 
Such operations were at times initiated by the PA itself, by the PA under pressure from Israel, 
or through IDF incursions into the West Bank in search of suspects. Hamas has however 
continued to establish armed cells inside the West Bank, and suicide attacks also continued 
throughout 2005 according to the aforementioned report. According to another Israeli 
intelligence report, the Gaza branch has faced difficulties in perpetrating terrorist attacks 
against Israeli targets after Israel disengaged from Gaza in 2005. They have instead 
concentrated on guiding and sponsoring cells based in the West Bank (http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_hamas_e.pdf). However, the continued 
pressure against al-Qassam-cells in the West Bank by Israel and the reformed Palestinian 
                                                          
89 Contrary to the extensive network of smuggler tunnels from Egypt to the Gaza Strip, al-Qassam cells in the 
West Bank has not had the same access to weapons and later rockets (Edwards 2010:130-133). 
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security forces pushed them underground. The West Bank barrier did also limit West Bank 
operatives in conducting operations inside Israel, which in turn has forced them to focus more 
on West Bank settlements.   
Conclusive remarks 
Intentional use of violence through shootings or suicide attacks is an integral part of the 
means employed by Hamas in their resistance against Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. 
Such methods are legitimated for Hamas from the popular support it receives from the 
Palestinian population, from its charter, and by claims delegitimizing the Israeli occupational 
power. It is important to emphasize that Hamas also was very active in militant attacks from 
the Gaza Strip in this period. Attacks launched from Gaza increased after the Israeli 
disengagement in 2005, and it escalated in intensity as al-Qassam managed to bring rockets 
into the strip through tunnels. However, it was violent attacks launched from the West Bank, 
by both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which led to retaliations in both 1996 and 2002 forward. 
Through coordinated crackdowns on Hamas in several West Bank locations, but particularly 
in Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron, Israel and the PA tightened the grip on Hamas. 
However, these crackdowns did not stop with the armed militant cells of al-Qassam. They had 
ramifications for the whole movement, as discussed in chapter six and eight. Hamas in the 
West Bank, through its militant wing al-Qassam, was thus perceived by Israel and the PA as a 
powerful enemy in the period of interest. 
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Chapter 8 
In search of influence; political activity in the West Bank between 
1993 and 2007 
Introduction 
Hamas has been politically active in the West Bank since 1988, although it was not perceived 
as a viable political force until 1992/1993. Hamas`s political work are based upon the same 
ideology and agenda both in Gaza and the West Bank. However, the political context in the 
West Bank has been more complex than in Gaza. The West Bank society has been more 
pluralistic, secular, and geographically varied in terms of political views, compared to the 
society in Gaza. Furthermore, Israeli military presence and strategic interests has focused on 
the West Bank, not the Gaza Strip.90
Political continuity: activity on universities and in professional associations  
 In this chapter I will discuss specific examples from the 
political activity of Hamas in the West Bank. I will first analyze elections on universities and 
professional associations, and then turn to the political process leading up to the local and 
national elections in 2005/2006. The outcome of the elections in the West Bank will be 
analyzed, with emphasis on the external pressure upon Hamas. It is the goal of this chapter to 
indicate the political position of Hamas in the West Bank in the period of study. In doing so, 
this chapter relies on interviews from my fieldwork, and the academic literature on Hamas. 
I will begin the discussion of Hamas`s political activity in the West Bank with a focus on 
elections for university councils and professional associations. Political activity on university 
campuses in Gaza and the West Bank was a significant part of the Brotherhood`s focus on 
building an educational, political and organizational infrastructure from the 1970s (Hroub 
2000:215). The Brotherhood entered student council elections to challenge the perceived 
secular trend in the West Bank society, and even controlled the Islamic university in Gaza. 
Secular nationalism was stronger in the West Bank than in Gaza, and Fatah thus gave the 
Brotherhood stronger competition in the West Bank university elections than in Gaza 
(Edwards 2010:211). Hamas continued this practice, and discovered that winning student 
council elections gave it a powerful, popular momentum, and a basis for popular legitimacy 
(Hroub 2000:215). Mahmoud Musleh confirmed this notion in interview with author. When 
asked about the importance of student council elections for the movement, he stated that 
                                                          
90 From 1967 to 2007 Israel established 121 settlements in the West Bank, and 16 in Gaza. Israel disengaged 
from the Gaza settlements in 2005. Approximately 290,400 Israeli settlers lived in the West Bank in 2008, 
protected by numerous soldiers (http://www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Index.asp, ICG 2009:20).  
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students constitute the pillar of the movement, as they are much more active in the society 
than other sectors (Musleh in interview with author). 
 
Universities and professional associations have regular elections for their councils or boards. 
Hamas has been a major contender for seats in these councils in order to increase its political 
influence. However, Hamas has not used its well-known name in this political activity. As a 
security measure they decided to create student blocs with other names. One of these blocs, 
the still existing “Kutla Islamiyya” (Islamic student group), can be used as an example. It is a 
network of student blocs closely linked to Hamas, found on several Palestinian universities 
(Edwards 2010:212). Hamas affiliated blocks has also used different names depending on 
time and place, and they have entered tactical alliances with other factions.91 The activity of 
these blocs has been funded by Hamas, and some members have also been active in other 
Hamas institutions (Lewitt 2006:129). Results from annual student council elections are 
important also beyond the university campus. Political scientists consider the results as an 
important barometer of political influence in the wider society, although these results fail to 
account for a range of factors92 (Bassem Ezbidi and George Giacaman in interview with 
author). Results are thus used to indicate political trends, in absence of local or national 
election results (Hroub 2000:81, Kristianasen 1999:35). The Birzeit University, being the 
biggest and most politicized university in the West Bank is often used as an example, also 
because of the wide geographical representation of students there (Hroub 2006:80). Hamas 
has also used favorable results from student elections during the 1990s, to indicate that the 
Palestinian population opposed the Oslo Agreements, and to emphasize the level of public 
support for Hamas (Hroub 2000:218, 229). Student elections, together with professional 
association elections have thus been among the major arenas for political activity in the OPT, 
partly because other arenas such as local and national elections has been closed.93
                                                          
91 Hamas won the 1993 elections at Birzeit University in an alliance with the PFLP (Fadil al-Khaldi in interview 
with author). 
 All of the 
political factions in Palestine have been active in these elections from time to time. However, 
the Israeli military administration, and later the PA have managed to limit the influence of 
these institutions in the Palestinian society (Gunning 2008:144). 
92 Students tended to be more radical than the rest of the population during the Intifadas, and the left wing 
usually get more support in student elections than what is recognizable in the Palestinian society (Senior political 
analyst in interview with author).  
93 Local elections were not held between 1976 and 2004/2005 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16918.  
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Hamas in student council elections 
According to Fadil al-Khaldi at the Student Affairs Office in Birzeit University, the student 
group affiliated with Hamas kept a low profile there between 1988 and 1993. The Islamic 
bloc did not have the strength and influence in the West Bank society to challenge Fatah until 
1993. Al-Khaldi also emphasized that it was after the 1993-elections that students agreed on a 
system of proportional representation for future student council elections. Until then the 
faction with the most votes won the whole council, which had favored Fatah (Fadil al-Khaldi 
in interview with author). The Jerusalem bloc, a Hamas-led coalition, hence won all nine seats 
in the 1993 elections at Birzeit. The victory in Birzeit represented a important infiltration of a 
traditional Fatah power centre in the West Bank, and was interpreted by Hamas as a victory 
for its political line in opposition to the Oslo process (Hroub 2000:217). Every year the 
student blocks on the West Bank pick their candidates for the student council, compete for 
votes in election campaigns, and participate in organized debates on campus before the 
elections. Their main objective is to advocate Islamic alternatives for the students (Senior-
political analyst in interview with author). However, a special poll on voting behavior from 
the student elections in al-Najah (Nablus) university in 1995, and Birzeit in 1996, shows that 
student agenda and larger political agenda, was almost equally important for students when 
they chose which bloc to vote for.94
 
 It is also important for each bloc to compete for votes 
among new students every year, as they are expected to vote for the same faction throughout 
his/hers education (Anonymous student in interview with author).  
Mahmoud al-Ramahi emphasized the long term effects for Hamas in winning student votes. 
According to al-Ramahi, students were likely to bring their political affiliation into their later 
occupations, thus influencing politics and elections further on (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in 
interview with author). University students have also been frequently recruited into the 
political leadership of different factions, because of their education and their political training 
from the election campaigns.95
                                                          
94 
 Several sources from my fieldwork also emphasized that 
through most of the period of interest in this thesis, there has been large numbers of students 
from Gaza in West Bank universities. Mahmoud Musleh stated that the influence of Gaza 
students have been significant, both in numbers and because many of these students became 
student bloc leaders.  
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/birzeit.html#factors, 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/annajah.html#whovote  
95 Examples are Marwan Barghouti of Fatah from Birzeit, Mahmoud Musleh of Hamas from Birzeit, Ismail 
Haniyeh of Hamas from Islamic University in Gaza (Hroub 2006:130). 
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Musleh also stated that: “the leaders of the movement are in Gaza, and leaders at the 
universities are from Gaza. This was not by force – it was accepted to be this way by members 
of the movement. The leaders of Fatah here in the West Bank used to ask Hamas members – 
why do you approve of this situation? Everything concerning Hamas is in Gaza? Their 
answer was that the Gaza leaders and students were more qualified than us, and they relieve 
us from large responsibilities, so we are happy with that” (Mahmoud Musleh in interview 
with author). This is an interesting statement, implying that the Gaza branch possibly also had 
a hand in the student councils on the West Bank.       
 
A closer look at a selection of results from different West Bank universities before the second 
Intifada shows how the fight for student support in reality was a fight between Hamas and 
Fatah. The two factions were locked in a struggle to acquire dominant positions in Gaza and 
West Bank communities (Mishal & Sela 2006:90). Other blocs representing factions such as 
the PFLP won just a few seats annually. Election results from Birzeit are most available. 
Figure 6 contains results from elections held between 1993 and 1999. It shows a close race 
between Hamas and Fatah for the 51 seats in the council.  
 
Figure 6: Student council elections at Birzeit, 1993 - 199996
 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates a comparative view on election results from Birzeit, al-Najah, Hebron and 
Gaza University in 1997. It is important to note different number of seats to vote for in the 
student councils, and the close competition between Hamas and Fatah.  
 
                                                          
96 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/birzeit.html#results, and transcripts of election results given to me at 
the Birzeit University.   
1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Others 0 8 11 8 11 9
Fatah 0 21 17 22 20 19
Hamas 9 18 23 20 20 23
0
5
10
15
20
25
Others
Fatah
Hamas
87 
 
Figure 7: Palestinian student council elections 199797
 
 
 
In Hebron, where the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas always have enjoyed great popular 
support, the Hamas-affiliated student bloc participated in elections as early as 1989. It won 
the student elections in the university between 1989 and 1992, but boycotted the elections in 
1993 as Yassir Arafat increased his efforts to win back Hebron.98 In 1998 Hamas won 15 out 
of 31 seats in the Hebron Polytechnic University (Fatah youth won 13) while the Hamas-
affiliated bloc won 19 of the 41 seats at Hebron University in 2000 (Fatah won 18).99
 
  
The al-Najah University is located further north in the West Bank, in the city of Nablus. Like 
Birzeit, al-Najah was traditionally a Fatah and PLO stronghold. However, when the first 
elections (during occupation) for the student council were held in 1996, Hamas surprisingly 
beat Fatah (Hroub 2000:218). In 1998 the Hamas bloc won 40 of the 81 seats, while Fatah 
won 35, and in 1999 the numbers were 42 for the Hamas-Islamic Jihad block, with 34 seats 
for Fatah100
                                                          
97 Knudsen 2005:1380, Kristianasen 1999:36, IPS Chronology No.4 1997, 
 (Kristianasen 1999:36). These results are in stark contrast to the Islamic 
University in Gaza, one of two universities in the Strip. The Islamic University was founded 
by al-Mujamma leaders, and several key-Hamas leaders have been students, teachers and 
Deans (Hroub 2006:126-135). In student council elections Hamas usually wins landslide 
victories, such as 60% in 1987/88, 75.5% in 1996/97, 74% in 1999/2000, and 100% in 2005 
(Irving Jensen 2009:107). An analysis of these elections must consider that the student 
http://www.nigelparry.com/diary/birzeit/elect97.html  
98 http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-11/news/wr-34103_1_student-council-election  
99 http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/2000.html  
100 http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/1999.html 
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councils originally work for student rights, welfare and interests on campus. They do not have 
direct political influence on Palestinian politics beyond campus. However, as the elections 
carry prestige, the results may indicate the growth and popularity of Hamas in the West Bank 
between the first and second Intifada. Furthermore, major Israeli arrest campaigns on Hamas 
members, leaders and activists between 1996 and 2000 (elaborated below), did not affect the 
strength of Hamas in the university elections. Hamas-affiliated blocs continued to work, 
despite numerous students were arrested, and regular razzias were carried out on West Bank 
universities. In addition, student elections are regularly contested by all Palestinian factions, 
including opposition groups. This is rare in national politics.  
 
The implications of the second Palestinian Intifada limited the ability of the West Bank 
universities to hold student elections between 2000 and 2003/2004.101 The elections held in 
2003/2004 would thus reflect on how the students, and to a certain degree the society at large, 
perceived Hamas`s approach during the second Intifada. Birzeit University held its first 
elections in 2003, while the al-Najah university held its first elections in 2004. The Fatah-
affiliated bloc won the elections in al-Najah with 38 seats out of 81, while the Hamas bloc 
won 36 seats.102
 
 The close competition between Hamas and Fatah blocks thus continued after 
the Intifada. Figure 8 show election results at Birzeit between 2003 and 2007. 
Figure 8: Student council elections at Birzeit, 2003 - 2007103
 
 
 
                                                          
101 http://www.birzeit.edu/news/16235/news  
102 http://www.zajel.org/article_view.asp?newsID=3884&cat=23  
103 Transcripts of election results given to me at th Birzeit University.  
2003 2005 2006 2007
Others 6 6 10 8
Fatah 20 23 18 21
Hamas 25 22 23 22
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Others
Fatah
Hamas
89 
 
The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank from 2002 and the subsequent arrest campaigns of 
Hamas members did thus not deter Hamas affiliated block from attending and winning the 
first elections after the Intifada. Figure 9 below illustrate student council elections in Birzeit, 
al-Najah, Bethlehem and Gaza universities in 2005. Note the results from the university in 
Bethlehem, which is a Catholic institution cooperating with the Vatican.104
 
  
Figure 9: Palestinian student council elections 2005105
 
 
 
In 2006 Hamas won the elections in both Birzeit and al-Najah.106
                                                          
104 
 But it could only hold on to 
the Birzeit council in 2007, perhaps as a result of the intensified factional fighting between 
Hamas and Fatah during early 2007. In sum, Hamas was strong enough to win student 
elections repeatedly in West Bank universities from 1993. They challenged Fatah dominance 
on politics, by increasing the focus on Islam on campus, involving students in pro-Hamas 
campaigns, and recruiting students to other Hamas institutions. Hamas victories in student 
elections was thus a challenge on PLO`s position as the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people (Hroub 2000:216). Hamas and Fatah spend huge amounts of money and human 
capacity in these election campaigns. In interviews with author, Mahmoud al-Ramahi and 
Mahmoud Musleh of Hamas emphasized the political training students get from participating 
in student elections. From these interviews I will conclude that the student council elections 
are seen as a useful asset for Hamas as a movement and political party. Moreover, Hamas 
http://www.bethlehem.edu/about/history.shtml  
105 http://www.haaretz.com/news/fatah-edges-ahead-of-hamas-in-bethlehem-student-council-elections-1.155894, 
http://www.birzeit.edu/news/16487/news, http://www.shiachat.com/forum/index.php?/topic/70360-the-islamic-
block-in-al-najah-university-victory/, Irving Jensen 2009:107.  
106 http://right2edu.birzeit.edu/news/printer360, http://212.14.233.53/article_view.asp?newsID=7058&cat=23  
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members and students have learned that representational legitimacy could help them wrest 
control of traditional Fatah strongholds (Hroub 2000:218).   
Activity in West Bank professional associations and unions 
The Hamas branch in the West Bank has also been active in the civil society, especially 
elections in professional associations and unions. In a historical perspective, there has been 
significant change within professional associations in the West Bank. From being under 
Jordanian administration in the period 1948 – 1967, most professional associations accepted 
to serve Palestinian nationalist goals during the 1980s and 90s, including PLO guidance and 
directives (Brown 2003:21). During the 2000s, professional associations have generally been 
occupied with the transition from being nationalist institutions, to meet the professional needs 
of members. This includes health benefits, continuing education, pay, legal regulations, and 
working conditions (Brown 2003:36). Associations in the West Bank have generally enjoyed 
a greater level of official recognition and formalization than in Gaza, especially when they act 
as representatives for a sector. Many leaders of such associations have had dual positions 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, thus also being PA or PLO officials (Brown 2003:22, 23).  
 
Elections for boards and directors are held regularly, and similar to student council elections, 
Hamas candidates are often affiliated with an Islamic bloc (Hroub 2000:216). The 
competition between Fatah and Hamas has also been a major conflict in these elections.  
A closer look at a few of these associations and unions will exemplify the extent of this 
political activity. Khaled Hroub lists the medical, lawyer and engineer unions, teachers` and 
nurses` unions, UNRWA employees` unions, and the chambers of commerce and industry as 
the institutions with most Hamas activity in Gaza and the West Bank (Hroub 2000:216). 
Mahmoud al-Ramahi stressed the medical and engineer unions as most important in the West 
Bank, but he also called attention to the lawyers union (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview 
with author). These are influential and important institutions in the Palestinian society, and the 
practice of union elections is well-established in the OPT (Gunning 2008:46). Such 
associations have a broad outreach in the society, with activities and interests in fields such as 
education, foreign aid, trade and industry. Certain associations also have direct political 
influence on the Palestinian society. Examples are lawyers and medical associations which 
have extensive influence on licensing and training of lawyers and doctors (Brown 2003:26, 
28). Considering that successful candidates in these elections probably are respected people 
within their associations, these associations have a high potential for political influence. In 
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contrast to student council elections, some of these elections are of single candidates. Personal 
qualifications of the candidate could thus be equally important as political affiliation (Hroub 
2000:231). This has been noted as an advantage for Hamas, as their religious faith and Islamic 
discipline is highly regarded compared to corruption and nepotism associated with Fatah 
candidates (Hroub 2000:231). Hamas made considerable achievements in elections for 
professional associations and unions from 1992. This was the same year it began to win 
student elections, and it was part of the struggle between Hamas and Fatah to win dominant 
positions in the society (Mishal & Sela 2006:90). In 1992, Hamas won the Chamber of 
Commerce in Gaza, Hebron and even Ramallah (Gunning 2008:42). As with the student 
elections in 1993, the victory in Ramallah was a surprise victory for Hamas in one of Fatah`s 
strongholds (Hroub 2000:218). However, records from professional elections are not publicly 
available in the same manner as student council election results. Still, according to Mishal & 
Sela, Hroub and Gunning, Hamas prioritized these elections, and ran in a close race with 
Fatah throughout the 1990s (Gunning 2008:42, Hroub 2000:216, Mishal & Sela 2006:90). 
But, winning elections in professional unions have brought little real power for Hamas 
beyond the mandate of the union. The real power is sought from local and national elections.   
Political activity on the local and national level 
Despite being a strong participant in student elections and professional unions, Hamas is 
better known for its political activity on the local and national level. When Hamas decided to 
make it a political goal to win seats in the government, it also made it possible to classify the 
movement as a political party (Harmel 1985:406, 407). In order to discuss local and national 
elections, I must present the larger political context in Palestine between 1993 and 2007. This 
includes political processes such as the Oslo period and the second Intifada.  
Hamas on the sidelines during the Oslo period  
I will begin this section with a discussion of the period between 1993 and 2000, or in other 
words the core period of the Oslo Agreements. As mentioned, Hamas was slowly rising as a 
political movement in the early 1990s. However, in 1994, the Hamas movement at large was 
left marginalized after the Oslo process and the establishment of the PA, which it had 
completely rejected.107
                                                          
107 Hamas rejected both the negotiations and the final settlement, since the peace talks involved a splitting of 
Palestinian land, international intervention, recognition of Israel and because the deal would set the parameters 
for the future Palestinian state (Edwards 2010:71). 
 Polls from the OPT in 1994 also showed that the Palestinian people 
saw no alternative to the Oslo Agreements (Kristianasen 1999:22). In December 1994, 16.6% 
of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank supported Hamas, while 43.1% supported 
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Fatah. In December the numbers were 10.1% versus 45.4% (Giacaman & Lønning 1998:138). 
Despite their opposition to the establishment of the PA, Hamas could not go openly against 
the will of the people by attacking it, and thus had to agree internally on other strategic 
options.108
The splitting of the Hamas leadership into the internal and external branches made 
communication difficult. For the West Bank branch communication was even more 
complicated by continued Israeli imprisonment of its leaders (as from 1994 also the PA) and 
continued Israeli occupation and settlement expansion (Kristianasen 1999:22). The internal 
and external leaderships reached somewhat different conclusions regarding the elections. 
Internal leaders, or more precisely the Gaza leaders, had a moderate approach, and preferred 
to establish a political party and participate in the elections. The external leaders on the other 
hand, linked the elections to the Oslo accords, and rejected the idea (Mishal & Sela 2006:162-
166). Before Hamas reached a final conclusion on the issue, a few leaders in Gaza and the 
West Bank nominated themselves for elections. Among these were Sheikh Hamami from the 
West Bank, and Ismail Haniyeh from Gaza. However, they changed their minds after internal 
pressure and fear of low electoral support for Hamas, enabling the external leadership to insist 
on a boycott of the elections (Muslih 1999:9).  
 In this process, a few prominent Hamas members from the West Bank, Hamid 
Bitawi from Nablus and Mahmoud Salameh from Jenin even accepted official posts in the 
PA. At the same time West Bank leaders Sheikh Hamami and Husayn Abu Kuwayk opened 
up for a dialogue with the Israeli government (Muslih 1999:24, 25). Hamas was at the time 
also dragged into the larger discussion on democracy and whether to participate in the 
elections for the Presidency of the PA and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), 
scheduled for 1996. Throughout 1993 and 1994 Hamas held internal discussions regarding the 
elections, and whether or not to establish a political party (splinter of the political wing) to 
represent its constituency and confront the PA (Edwards 1996:164, Mishal & Sela 120-126).  
Hamas PLC member Mohammad Totah from Jerusalem, supported this by stating 
“participation would imply unacceptable recognition of the Oslo accords,109
                                                          
108 Hamas thus temporarily joined the rejectionist group “Damascus Ten” in February 1994, a group of ten 
organizations opposing the Oslo deal, despite their ideological differences (Edwards 2010:73). 
 Israel`s 
continued presence in the OPT and the inadequacy of the current election law” (Mohammad 
Totah in interview with author). As the movement agreed on a boycott, a major internal split 
109 Elections for the PLC was based on the Oslo II agreement (signed in Taba 24/9 1995). The Oslo II was a 
continuation of the Oslo process, concerning the PLC, redeployment and security arrangements, legal affairs, 
cooperation and other miscellaneous provisions (http://www.reut-
institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=565).  
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between Gaza and Amman were avoided.110
It was the Gaza leaders who maintained contact with the PA on behalf of Hamas in this 
period. Meetings had been arranged on high levels since 1994,
 However, underlying differences had reached the 
surface. The external leaders did not feel the everyday effects of the Israeli crackdowns. It 
was thus easier for them to advocate the historical solution with violent resistance, not 
political participation (Gunning 2008:112). Hamas also boycotted the Presidential elections, 
as there was no real contender to Arafat.  
111
There is no record of similar agreements with the West Bank branch. The West Bank was in 
practice divided into small enclaves of self-rule, which separated the local branches of Hamas 
geographically. This was a result of the Israeli redeployment in the West Bank, as part of the 
Oslo agreements. This separation of the West Bank cities and districts, and the emerging 
restrictions on movement, severely limited the ability of the West Bank branch to maintain 
communication, hold Shura meetings, and work in a coherent way. The Gaza branch also had 
the official spokesman in Mahmoud al-Zahhar in this period. Statements from West Bank 
leaders were more unusual (Hroub 2000:225). However, Jamal Mansur, a Hamas leader in the 
West Bank, stated that he was in favor of a boycott of the elections. His argumentation was 
that the elections would legitimize the DOP`s fragmentation of the Palestinian people, and 
serve the interest of Israel (Muslih 1999:10). But the West Bank leaders had not decided on a 
common stance on the elections, and they did not have enough power to influence on the 
dispute between the Gaza leaders and the external leaders (Kristianasen 1999:28). According 
to Bassam Jarrar, a leading Islamic figure with connections to Hamas in the West Bank, there 
was no centralized leadership in the West Bank at the time (Kristianasen 1999:28). This 
implies that political power and influence inside Hamas balanced between Gaza and 
Damascus in this period, while the West Bank branch focused on the struggle against the 
occupation on the ground. In addition, the PLO also maintained its strong presence in the 
West Bank. In January 1996, Yassir Arafat thus won the presidential elections with 88.2% of 
 discussing the election issue 
and Palestinian infighting. Hamas and the PA agreed that Hamas would keep a period of calm 
(tahdiya) in PA controlled areas (A and B) during the election period in 1996. As Hamas kept 
its promise, it was later rewarded with permission to open an official bureau in Gaza city 
(Kristianasen 1999:27).  
                                                          
110 Still, Hamas leaders in Gaza convinced members to vote for independents known to be Hamas friendly 
(Kristianasen 1999:27).  
111 Meetings held in Gaza in April 1994, between Arafat, Haniyeh, al-Zahhar and others (Hroub 2000:104).  
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the votes. In the PLC elections Fatah won or controlled 68 of 88 seats in the Council 
(Edwards 2010:83). Despite the Hamas boycott, observers still claim that participation of 
Hamas supporters reached as much as 60-70% (Shikaki 1996:18). As Fatah entered office in 
1996, the Hamas branch in the West Bank was further marginalized, both in terms of 
geographical separation and political influence.   
Hamas under pressure in the West Bank 
In the period between the 1996 elections and the second Intifada in 2000, the Hamas 
movement in general was politically sidelined. The security situation had deteriorated in both 
Israel and the OPT during 1995 and 1996. Several agreements were thus signed between 
Israel, the PA (PLO), and the international community to save the peace process and stop acts 
of terrorism. The first agreement was signed in Sharm al-Sheikh in 1996, following an 
intensified period of Hamas suicide attacks in Israel. In the period after 1996, the Jordanian 
government thus cracked down on Hamas leaders in Amman, as part of their commitment 
against acts of terrorism from the Sharm al-Sheikh summit. At the same time, the PA initiated 
the largest campaign against Hamas so far, covering the West Bank and Gaza. Over 1200 
Hamas members, activists and supporters inside the OPT were arrested. In addition, Hamas 
controlled mosques were put under PA control, and as noted in chapter six, institutions in the 
network of social and political compartments of Hamas were raided and closed down 
(Edwards 2010:219). Among those arrested were al-Rantisi, al-Zahhar and Muhammad Taha 
from Gaza, and Jamal Salim, Jamal Mansur and Mahmoud Musleh from the West Bank 
(Tamimi 2007:195, Edwards 2010:219).  
Mahmoud Musleh from Ramallah explained how Hamas as a movement, both in Gaza and the 
West Bank was more or less paralyzed between 1996 and 2000. Most of the internal leaders 
of Hamas were in and out of prison (including Musleh who was in a PA prison near for 16 
months during 1997 and 1998), which made it difficult to communicate within the 
organization. But Musleh also emphasized the inherent force of Hamas, the support in the 
population although many leaders were imprisoned: “The people were wondering at that time 
– where was Hamas? – was it crushed? But when the second Intifada started, the power and 
strength of Hamas re-emerged, and the street turned green once again” (Mahmoud Musleh in 
interview with author).  
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In early 1997, the Hebron agreement was signed between Israel and the PLO.112 The 
agreement included Israeli redeployment and the establishment of TIPH in Hebron.113 
However, the security situation continued to deteriorate in Israel and the OPT during 1997 
and 1998. Hamas continued its terrorist activity against Israeli targets. Israel responded with 
further arrest campaigns both in Gaza and the West Bank, and targeted killings of Hamas 
leaders.114 In October 1998 Israel and the PA agreed on the Wye River memorandum, in 
practice targeting Hamas like the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement (Tamimi 2007:89). Although 
Israel and the PA never fully implemented the agreed-upon measures, the PA did act 
decisively on its commitment to pressure Hamas. During 1999 and early 2000, the PA 
arrested numerous Hamas leaders and supporters in the West Bank and Gaza.115
The Second Intifada  
 The slow 
Israeli withdrawal and transfer of authority to the PA also created an environment of self-
ruled enclaves in the West Bank, where Hamas had little political influence in the period.  
In the wake of the failed peace negotiations in the Camp David summit, and the provocative 
visit of Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the 
second Palestinian Intifada broke out on the 29th of September 2000 (Hroub 2006:49). 
The Palestinian people had seen seven years of broken promises from the Oslo agreements, 
and became frustrated (Hroub 2000:48). The second Intifada started out as a non-violent 
uprising, but quickly turned so violent any chance of a peace agreement faded. 
Demonstrations spread from Jerusalem to the West Bank, Gaza and even Israeli towns such as 
Nazareth. As the Intifada erupted, many Hamas leaders were imprisoned, and the focus of the 
movement was armed struggle, not politics. Hamas initiated a series of suicide attacks from 
early 2001, targeting Israeli public space in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. These attacks are 
discussed in chapter seven. Fatah leaders had also established its own militant wing in 2000, 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades116
                                                          
112 The agreement was based on the Oslo II agreement from 1995, and it included responsibilities on both sides. 
The Hebron agreements included provisions from earlier negotiations, and new specific provisions regarding the 
city of Hebron (
 (Schanzer 2008:75). This radicalization of Fatah turned into a 
problem for Yassir Arafat. Israel did no longer see Fatah as a moderate alternative in peace 
talks, and the attacks by the al-Aqsa brigades put Fatah in the same category as Hamas. Israel 
responded to armed Palestinian attacks with missile and bombing raids into the OPT during 
http://www.tiph.org/en/About_TIPH/Mandate_and_Agreements/Hebron_Protocol/).   
113 The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is a civilian observer mission in Hebron, with 
members from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, Italy and Switzerland (See previous footnote).   
114 http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/9701.pdf 
115 For details see ”Chronology” from every edition of International Palestine Studies”, between 1998 and 2001.  
116 The al-Aqsa brigades co-opted Islamic symbols and slogans, and even criticized its own political leadership 
in Fatah for being corrupt and inefficient (Edwards 2010:99). 
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the Intifada. Furthermore, the Israeli military and political establishment blamed Fatah, the 
PA and Arafat for not maintaining security (Edwards 2010:103). March of 2002 turned into 
one of the most violent months of the second Intifada.117 Israel again blamed Arafat and the 
PA, despite Hamas being responsible for the latest attacks (Edwards 2010:103). The Israeli 
response was the largest military operation in the West Bank for years, “Operation Defensive 
Shield” during spring of 2002. As noted in chapter seven, Israeli forces re-occupied West 
Bank cities, crushed PA ministries118 and security offices, and detained thousands of 
prisoners, among them numerous Hamas leaders and supporters (Edwards 2010:103). The 
continuation of the Intifada and the rising death tolls led to the “Roadmap for Peace” in 2003, 
initiated by the US and the Quartet119
Hamas decides to participate in local and national elections 
 (Edwards 2010:107). According to the Roadmap, the 
PA would end the violence and implement democratic reforms, while Israel would end 
settlement activity and support the emergence of a reformed Palestinian government. In the 
midst of the Intifada, Israel increased its efforts to kill high level Hamas leaders. Already in 
2001 Israel had killed two of the most important political leaders on the West Bank, Jamal 
Mansur and Jamal Salim, while Sheikh Hassan Yousef was imprisoned. Within the next two 
years, almost every high-level leader of Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank had been 
assassinated or imprisoned, including Sheikh Yassin and al-Rantisi (Edwards 2010:107). 
Needless to say this had serious ramifications on the activity of the movement. Hamas in the 
West Bank was thus paralyzed, and their main focus was to fight Israel and Fatah/PA, and to 
stay out of prisons. Its activity was thus confined to committee work on a local level, and 
social welfare which was important for Hamas in this period.   
The 1996 boycott of the elections was not a clear cut decision, but needed long deliberations 
within the movement. Hamas was thus not opposing elections in principle, only the frame 
given to it by the Oslo agreements. Hints of a possible reorientation within the movement had 
first been announced in 1996, when Sheikh Yassin aired the idea of a truce with Israel 
(Edwards 2010:82). Later, statements by Sheikh Yassin in 2003 indicated a period of calm 
(tahdiyah), and in 2003 Hamas formally committed to a unilateral ceasefire with Israel 
(hudna) (Edwards 2010:108, 109). However, the turnaround was not made until 2005. Hamas 
                                                          
117 Israel killed 40 Palestinians in Gaza 8th of March, Hamas`s suicide bombers killed eleven Israelis the 9th of 
March, another 30 Israelis on the 27th of March, and 3 Jewish settlers were shot the 28th of March (Edwards 
2010:100-102).  
118 Israel`s first and main target was Arafat`s compound in Ramallah, the Muqata, where Arafat was isolated 
until his death in 2004 (Edwards 2010:103).   
119 The Quartet consists of The UN, the US, Russia and the EU.  
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decided to participate in both local and national elections, after long internal deliberations and 
consultations, according to the principle of Shura (Tamimi 2007:210, 212). Hamas wanted to 
capitalize on its growing political and military strength, as the Oslo process ran into 
difficulties in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Edwards 2010:232). The peace process had not 
been able to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite attempts in Camp David in 2000, 
and the Road Map from 2003. However, Hamas leaders had come to the conclusion that 
Yassir Arafat was getting closer to sign away Palestinian areas in those negotiations. Any 
possible peace agreement between Israel and the PA/PLO was thus viewed as a threat to 
Hamas`s resistance project, and the only way Hamas could block such an agreement was to be 
a part of the PLC (Edwards 2010:233). International pressure mounted on Arafat by 2002 to 
reform the PA and announce new presidential and parliamentary elections. Palestinian 
factions began a series of talks on national unity and internal reform by late 2002. The talks 
were mediated by Egypt, and Hamas`s prominent role in the talks was a sign of its renewed 
strength (Edwards 2010:237).  
“Change and Reform” in local elections 
On the 5th of May 2004, Yassir Arafat announced that local elections would be held in 
December 2004 (ICG 2006:3). Arafat probably intended the political inclusion of Hamas in 
these elections to be a mechanism were he could offer them power-sharing, in order to better 
control them (ICG 2006:3). However, Yassir Arafat died in November 2004, and the 
following presidential elections of 2005 were won by Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah (Edwards 
2010:241). Local elections were supposed to be carried out in five parts, but the last stages 
were never completed.120
                                                          
120 The first round was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza during December 2004 and January 2005. The 
second round was held during May 2005, while the third and fourth round was only partly completed. The fifth 
round was never held due to the situation in the OPT after Hamas won the PLC elections in 2006. Elections thus 
remains to be held in 60 towns and villages, including Gaza city and Hebron  
 During the first round, candidates were not asked for party 
affiliation when they registered, and thus run as independents (NDI report 1st round 2005:18). 
For the second round this was changed, and candidates could choose to be affiliated with a 
specific party-list (NDI report 2nd round 2005:5). The third and fourth rounds had party-lists 
with proportional representation (NDI report 3rd and 4th rounds 2006:1). These changes were 
made by the Higher Committee for Local Elections (HCLE), created by the PA. According to 
Mahmoud al-Ramahi, these changes were initiated as a response to the strong results of 
Hamas in the first rounds. In interview with author, Al-Ramahi discussed the preparations 
made by Hamas in the West Bank. He stated that Hamas carefully picked candidates who 
http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=6&cid=14#sub5  
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were seen as reliable, trustworthy and influential in their local areas, such as doctors or 
lawyers who could get strong support from the local population (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in 
interview with author). Many of these candidates were also closely linked to the local social 
welfare work of Hamas, which, as noted in chapter six, played an important role in the West 
Bank in this period. This tactic was thus intentional, and showed how Hamas was aware of 
the importance of winning grassroots support. Hamas also focused its election campaign on 
issues were the Fatah government had failed (Gunning 2008:149-151). The result was the 
“Change and Reform” bloc, which drew attention to corruption and lawlessness in the 
Palestinian society (Edwards 2010:254). According to Mahmoud al-Ramahi and Independent 
politician/researcher Ziad Abu Amr, Hamas candidates for the Change and Reform bloc were 
not necessarily members of Hamas. Some were asked to represent Hamas because of their 
political and religious merits (al-Ramahi and Abu Amr in interview with author). Hamas, or 
more precisely the lists supported by Hamas, won eighty-one municipalities throughout the 
OPT and Fatah won 121. A large number of these seats where in highly populated urban 
districts, where Fatah was expected to win (Gunning 2008:146). However, there were more 
Palestinians living in areas with Hamas-run municipalities than in Fatah controlled areas 
(Gunning 2008:147). In Gaza, Hamas won seven out of ten municipal councils in the second 
round, which increased the enthusiasm in the Gaza branch for participation in the legislative 
elections (Tamimi 2007:2010). This new situation was also significant in terms of the political 
influence of Hamas in the West Bank. For the first time, Hamas was in a position of power, 
and local Hamas representatives assumed important roles such as mayors. It was the first time 
Hamas was officially in charge of social service delivery, and a part of the official political 
system. Although the local authorities have little power, and their revenue base collapsed 
during the Intifada, they remain in many cases the largest local employer, and a focal point in 
the day-to-day relations with Israel (ICG 2006:10).  
Hamas running local West Bank municipalities 
The Palestinian local elections led to a fragmentation of the West Bank in terms of 
municipalities run by Fatah or Hamas. Hamas had won several key urban areas, such as 
Qalqilya in the West Bank and Rafah in Gaza. In addition Hamas won 74% in urban areas 
such as Nablus, al-Bireh, Ramallah and Jenin.121
                                                          
121 
 Hamas immediately started to work in the 
local municipality councils it had won, aiming to show the Palestinian population what it 
would do if elected to national power (Gunning 2008:152). In local West Bank villages such 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16918 – Palestine section.  
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as Bidya and al-Shiyukh the Hamas-led municipalities began work to improve on 
infrastructure and safety and increased tax revenues to pay for water and electricity (Gunning 
2008:152-154). Furthermore, International Crisis Group refers to several sources that praise 
the Hamas-run municipal councils for their work ethics, the enforcement of law, the handling 
of finances and their efforts to provide efficient services (ICG 2006:11, 12). Other media 
reports from the West Bank during 2005 and 2006 indicated that Hamas was able to limit 
corruption, modernize the running of the municipalities, handling budgets better than Fatah, 
cleaning the streets and increasing their credibility among the population.122 On the other 
hand, accusations have been noted on mismanagement and nepotism (ICG 2006:11, 12). 
Hamas-run municipalities also faced problems with the international community, which was 
increasingly reluctant to continue the financial support for municipal projects after the 
election victory in 2006.123
 
  
It is interesting to note the perspective of Mahmoud al-Ramahi on this matter. He emphasized 
the challenges elected Hamas representatives faced when they entered their municipality 
offices during 2005. He cited the example of al-Bireh municipality, where local 
administrative staff was Fatah supporters, who immediately went on strike to protest against 
Hamas. Al-Ramahi claimed this also happened in other municipalities. He continued to state 
that the central government (PA) had put their own representatives into the municipality 
council to bloc certain projects, and that the PA “strangled” Hamas-run municipal councils 
throughout the West Bank financially, top-down. In addition, the PA security forces often 
arrested council members (Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview with author). It is clear from al-
Ramahi`s claims that Hamas as a movement felt Fatah sabotaged their political work. The 
suspension of aid from the international community in the aftermath of the Hamas election 
victory in 2006, also affected local governance, and especially Hamas-run municipalities. A 
report from CHF International, an organization sponsored by USAID working on local 
democratic reform, states that the suspension of aid led to financial problems in the 
municipalities, and no donor investment in local projects.124
                                                          
122 
 The freeze in Western donor 
support for Hamas-run municipalities, and according to Hamas, discriminatory budgetary 
allocations by the PA, cut deep into budgets and left a trail of broken commitments by Hamas. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/04/international/middleeast/04hamas.html?ref=hamas 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1151969,00.html  
123 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8307465.stm  
124 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN957.pdf  
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To deal with the budget crisis, Hamas-run councils in Qalqilya, Bethlehem and al-Bireh have 
thus cut expenditures, raised taxes and leased or sold municipal assets (ICG 2006:12).   
External pressure on Hamas   
Israel never approved of Mahmoud Abbas` idea of integrating Hamas in politics and PA 
institutions to make it more moderate (ICG 2006:15). Israel also put pressure on the PA to 
arrest Hamas leaders and activists, and imprisoned several Hamas politicians, including the 
mayors of Qalqilya and Jenin, and council members in al-Bireh and Kufur Aqab.125
Hamas wins the 2006 PLC elections   
 The 
international society also made a policy U-turn during 2005, when it assessed its financial 
assistance to Palestinian municipalities. The EU-commission provided €30 million in 
emergency assistance to municipalities in 2002 during the Intifada, but ended the support in 
late 2005 as Hamas entered office (ICG 2006:25). Donor assistance was a critical source of 
support for the municipalities, and projects sponsored by USAID or European governments 
was quickly halted and not renewed. EU aid officials also instructed the PA to not pay money 
to Hamas-led municipalities, which led the PA to use their own governors as middlemen 
when disbursing aid (ICG 2006:27). Mahmoud al-Ramahi also emphasized that the PA 
increasingly made use of its governors in the period before the 2006 elections, as a measure to 
circumvent the Hamas-led municipalities, and bring power back to the Fatah-led PA centrally 
(Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview with author). However, as the PLC elections drew closer, 
international aid was increasingly channeled through UN agencies, not the PA, including a 
$10 million contribution from Norway (ICG 2006:27). Arrests (PA and Israel) and sanctions 
(economical) thus limited the ability of Hamas-led municipalities to function.  
By late 2005, Hamas viewed the Oslo agreement, the main obstacle for participation in the 
1996 elections, as no longer relevant (Mohammad Totah in interview with author). Popular 
support for Hamas was rising, and its recognition regionally had increased. Hamas members 
in Gaza were enthusiastic about the PLC elections, encouraged by the local elections. 
However, in the West Bank, and according to Tamimi especially in Hebron, members were 
less eager to participate (Tamimi 2007:210). Still, once the decision was made, Hamas united 
behind the new strategy and deployed thousands of highly educated media advisers, teachers, 
and political analysts to design strategies and the election manifesto, and form the public 
rhetoric of Hamas (Edwards 2010:248, 249). The election campaign was successful, and the 
final results surprised Fatah, Israel, the international society and even Hamas itself. Hamas 
                                                          
125 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN957.pdf  
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won seventy-four seats in the 132-seat parliament, while Fatah won forty-five 126
External pressure on Hamas  
 (Tamimi 
2007:218). Hamas won absolute majority in the parliament, and Hamas was for the first time 
in the head-seat of Palestinian politics (Edwards 2010:259). The election results from the 
West Bank was however more surprising than the results from Gaza. Hamas had excellent 
election results from the local elections in Gaza, and it had managed to turn the unilateral 
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 into a claim of victory for their resistance (Edwards 
2010:245). Support for Hamas had thus been rising in Gaza since the Israeli withdrawal. In 
the West Bank however, the election results were more complex. In Hebron, a conservative 
and religious city, Hamas won all of the nine seats. In Nablus, a traditional Fatah stronghold, 
Hamas won five seats and Fatah one seat. In Ramallah, the PA capital and a secular and 
liberal Fatah town, Hamas won four seats and Fatah just one (Edwards 2010:259). Fatah did 
better in areas where it put big name candidates in their home towns, such as Mohammad 
Dahlan in Khan Younis, Gaza, and Saeb Erekat in Jericho (Edwards 2010:259). The newly 
elected PLC with two thirds majority held by Hamas had its first session in Gaza on the 6th of 
March 2006. Negotiations between Hamas and other Palestinian factions regarding a national 
unity government failed during March, and Hamas proceeded to form its own government on 
the 29 of March 2006 (Tamimi 2007:228). The cabinet line-up was heavily dominated by 
Gaza leaders in the most important roles, including Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister, 
Mahmoud al-Zahar as foreign minister and Siad Siam as interior minister (Edwards 
2010:271). Deputy prime minister/health minister Nasser al-Shaer and finance minster Omar 
abd al-Razaq both from Nablus were the exceptions.  
The new Hamas government was immediately met with severe restrictions by Palestinian 
president Mahmoud Abbas, Israel and the international community (Edwards 2010:261-270).  
Mahmoud al-Ramahi referred to this situation as a farce in interview with author, and stated 
“the West promoted hypocrisy not democracy”. Abbas used presidential decrees to strip the 
government of control of much of its institutional base, including the police force, the media, 
and the border crossings with Israel (Tamimi 2007:229). Abbas also began the planning of a 
parallel government and new security forces with the support of the international community 
(Tamimi 2007:229). The Quartet quickly stated that assistance to the PA would only continue 
if Hamas accepted its conditions.127
                                                          
126 Independent candidates with Fatah ties run for the same seats as official Fatah candidates. Fatah thus 
competed against own candidates and lost up to eighteen seats in the parliament as a result (Edwards 2010:259). 
 Israel refused to deal with Hamas, as it is listed as a 
127 Renounce violence, recognize Israel and respect previous agreements (Edwards 2010:262). 
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terrorist organization, and threatened to hold back around $60 million in customs revenues it 
collected on behalf of the PA each month (Edwards 2010:262). However, Hamas was 
determined that their electoral victory did not mean it would give up on the armed resistance 
(Edwards 2010:271). According to Mahmoud al-Ramahi, Fatah intentionally blocked all PLC 
sessions from the beginning. Furthermore, the staff he administered as Secretary General of 
the PLC, numbering 600, boycotted their work assignments. As with the local municipalities, 
he claimed that the staff was loyal to Fatah. In practice, the situation made al-Ramahi 
singlehandedly responsible for administrative and procedural affairs on behalf of the PLC 
(Mahmoud al-Ramahi in interview with author). Presidential decrees and measures by 
Fatah128 and the PLO to bring down the Hamas government also increased the tension 
between Fatah and Hamas (Tamimi 2007:234). A national dialogue conference were held 
during May 2006, where Abbas gave Hamas the ultimatum to reach a deal with Fatah based 
on the “Prisoners document”,129 or face new restrictions (Tamimi 2007:237). The conference 
ended without agreement, and both Hamas and Fatah instead increased their focus on 
controlling the security forces130
 
 (Tamimi 2007:238).  
After the elections, Gaza was controlled politically by Hamas, while the security forces were 
controlled mainly by Fatah, leading to a deteriorating security situation (Edwards 2010:272). 
A power struggle between Hamas and Fatah was the inevitable result, centered on controlling 
the security forces in Gaza. At the same time Israel increased its border closures and targeted 
bombings in Gaza, to stop militant groups launching rockets into southern Israel (Edwards 
2010:273). During a tunnel attack against a Israeli military installation close to Gaza in June 
2006, a militant Hamas cell killed two Israeli soldiers and kidnapped a third, named Gilad 
Shalit (Edwards 2010:273). Israel retaliated with airstrikes on strategic targets in Gaza, and 
large arrest campaigns on Hamas members and PLC representatives (Edwards 2010:274). 64 
Hamas members were arrested, most of them in a Ramallah hotel in the West Bank (Tamimi 
2007:244). The arrests put almost all of Hamas`s West Bank leadership in Israeli prisons. 
Among the arrested were also top-level members of parliament such as Mahmoud al-Ramahi, 
and Nasser al-Shaer.131
                                                          
128 Desperate Fatah leaders worked to circumvent Hamas` PLC power back into the hands of president Abbas, by 
delimiting the power of the PLC (Edwards 2010:263). 
 The PLC was thus unable to convene throughout much of 2006.  
129 Officially the National Reconciliation Document, an 18 points document calling for a broad based National 
unity government, formally endorsed by Hamas and Fatah (ICG 2007:16). 
130 There were a myriad of security forces under the PA: Directorate of Internal Security (DIS), Presidential 
Guard, Preventive Security, the National Security Forces and General Intelligence (Edwards 2010:272).  
131 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article615087.ece  
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In February 2007 Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a national unity government, with Hamas 
holding nine Cabinet seats and Fatah six (Edwards 2010:277). According to Ziad Abu Amr, 
the Independent Minister of Foreign Affairs in the unity government, Hamas agreed to drop 
high level and hard-line names, to increase the chances of receiving the foreign aid which the 
Palestinians so much depended on (Ziad Abu Amr in interview with author). Hamas 
controlled the Prime Minister`s office, the Interior Ministry`s security forces, and other 
departments dealing with cultural, social, welfare and education issues. Fatah had gained a 
position in the government, but the most prestigious ministry had gone to the “Third Way 
party” established by Salam Fayyad, not Fatah (Edwards 2010:279).  However, the national 
unity government did not manage to erase the Hamas-Fatah conflict or convince donors to 
resume the aid. Hamas had also outgrown Fatah in Gaza in terms of public support and 
weapons, and were better organized (Edwards 2010:278, 279). Violence resumed in April 
2007, and turned into a violent military takeover by Hamas during June 2007 (Edwards 
2010:286-288). Fatah was severely beaten, and by 15th of June 2007, Hamas was in charge of 
the Gaza Strip. This armed takeover constitutes a watershed in Palestinian history, and 
especially the history of Hamas. In the aftermath of the Gaza takeover, Hamas and Gaza was 
further isolated by the international community, and Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the national 
unity government. The international community, the Quartet and Israel began to focus on 
economical development in the West Bank, and to make sure that Hamas was completely 
marginalized there.  
Conclusive remarks 
Hamas has been politically active in the West Bank since 1988, although it did not have 
enough influence in the West Bank to compete with Fatah until 1993. The student council 
elections in the West Bank quickly turned into the most important political arena for Hamas in 
the early 1990s. Here it competed mainly with Fatah, and it maintained strong political 
influence on several West Bank universities throughout the period under study. The 
participation in student council elections, and professional association elections, has thus 
represented continuity in the political activity of Hamas. Moreover, these elections have been 
noted as the major arena for Hamas to challenge the dominating Fatah party for influence, in 
their competition to win dominant positions in the society. Hamas members and students 
learned that representational legitimacy could help them to wrest control from Fatah in 
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traditional Fatah areas, and it represented a challenge to the PLO`s position as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people.  
 
The Hamas branch in the West Bank has been severely wing-clipped by Israeli and 
(sometimes) PA crackdowns in the period of interest. In the period between 1996 and 2000 
the movement was paralyzed, and further campaigns against the movement followed during 
the second Intifada. Still, as Hamas decided to turn from political boycott to participation, and 
run in the 2005 municipal elections, it managed to mobilize and win an unexpected victory. 
Hamas was thus for the first time in a position of political power in the West Bank, although 
arrests (PA and Israel) and sanctions (economical) limited the ability of Hamas-led 
municipalities to function. The 2006 elections also led Hamas into the political head-seat in 
national politics, winning major victories in the West Bank. The cabinet line-up in the first 
Hamas-led government was heavily dominated by Gaza leaders in the most important roles, 
signifying that the West Bank branch had less political leverage inside the Hamas movement. 
However, immediately after the victory, the external pressure mounted on the movement, in 
terms of economical sanctions, and political boycott. In the period leading up to these 
elections, Hamas had outgrown Fatah in Gaza, both in terms of militant strength, and popular 
support. As the first Hamas-led government broke down in 2006, and the National unity 
government of 2007 failed to restart international financial assistance, Palestinian infighting 
increased – centered on control of the Palestinian security forces in Gaza, and from 2007 - 
how to share the power. In the West Bank however, the international society succeeded in 
undermining Hamas by strengthening the position of Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah from 2006. 
The Hamas-Fatah conflict re-ignited on the 10th of June 2007 in Gaza, and Hamas completed 
the takeover the 15th of June.   
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Chapter 9 
Summary and conclusive remarks 
 
The starting point for this thesis was the political position of Hamas in June 2007. The 
movement initiated a militant takeover of the Gaza Strip, evicted Fatah officials, and 
continued the political governance of the strip. The takeover was facilitated by the strong 
military force of Hamas`s Gaza branch, but was grounded in solid grassroots support and a 
strong political position. However, Hamas has also been politically active in the West Bank 
since 1988, which after all is the core area of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the largest 
part of occupied Palestinian land. An immediate effect of the Gaza takeover was an increase 
in the international society`s focus on the West Bank, and the ongoing project of establishing 
a viable secular Palestinian state, seated in Ramallah. To do so, the PA, with international 
backup, has targeted Hamas leaders and institutions in the West Bank in the period from 2007 
forward. The goal is to make sure the movement is completely marginalized both in terms of 
military strength and political position, to avoid a similar takeover in the West Bank.  
 
This study of Hamas is based on a three-way dividing of the movement`s main activities. This 
three-way divide is found both in Gaza and the West Bank, and it is focused on providing 
social welfare to poor Palestinians, initiate militant attacks against Israeli and Palestinian 
targets in adherence to the ideology and strategy of the movement, and to work for political 
influence in order to achieve its goals. This three-way approach proved successful for Hamas 
in Gaza in 2007. However, why did Hamas not attempt to take control in the West Bank at the 
same time? This leads directly to my research question;  
 
• What has been the political position of Hamas in the West Bank between 1987 
and 2007?  
 
To be able to answer my research question, I began with a thorough investigation of the 
history of Hamas, and its roots in the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.  
The activity, ideology and goals of the Brotherhood have influenced Hamas in several ways. 
The internal organization of Hamas is inspired by the Brotherhood, the notion of Jihad is 
inherited from the Brotherhood, and the strong focus in Hamas to be a provider of social 
welfare, Islamic education and emergency assistance to Palestinians, is a continuation of 
similar Brotherhood activity. However, the Palestinian Brotherhood developed differently in 
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Gaza and the West Bank. For the West Bank branch of the Brotherhood, the period between 
1948 and 1967 was an important period of political participation, in contrast to the Gaza 
branch and its focus on violent attacks against Israel. After a period of downfall until 1967, 
the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood re-emerged stronger and faster than the West Bank 
branch. This development was caused by socio-economical, ideological and political factors, 
which differed in Gaza and the West Bank. The Brotherhood ideology did not have fertile 
ground in the West Bank, which was dominated by secular and nationalist forces. Israeli 
policies also played a significant role in creating a stronger Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza than 
in the West Bank. Their direct and indirect support for the al-Mujamma in Gaza made it a 
strong social and political force during the 1970s and 80s, while Israeli strategic interests in 
the West Bank (settlements) led to restrictions against the West Bank Brotherhood. When 
entering the period of the first Intifada, the Brotherhood thus had its gravity in Gaza, 
including leaders, finances and institutions.  
The political position of Hamas during the formative period, 1987 – 1993 
The Gaza Strip was the core area for Hamas in the formative period. The movement itself was 
established first in Gaza, and then spread to the West Bank. The same was true for the first 
militant al-Qassam cells, the first Intifada strikes and communiqués. Hamas was also the hub 
for finances and the seat of the leadership (which held talks with Israel). The West Bank 
branch developed slower than the Gaza branch, and as Israeli arrest campaigns led to a re-
structuring of the movement, the West Bank branch were given a secondary role. The 
deportation of 415 Islamists in 1992 also hit the West Bank branch hard, as they had a small 
pool of leaders to recruit from. On the other hand, the West Bank initiated its social work in 
this period, including integrating political leaders into Zakat committees. However, as the 
Intifada ended, and the Oslo period started, the movement in general was left politically 
sidelined. The West Bank branch did only have the strength and influence to challenge Fatah 
politically in the West Bank in 1993. 
The political position of Hamas as a result of its social work 
Social work was the first activity of the West Bank branch, inherited from the Brotherhood. 
The scope of Hamas`s social and religious work has grown substantially in the West Bank 
during the period under study. Recipients of Hamas`s welfare services thus constitute the 
backbone of Hamas, the grassroots support. I have argued that Hamas in the West Bank has 
directed the main part of its social work through “external institutions”, especially institutions 
funded and operated by Zakat committees. Hamas has thus placed reliable and influential 
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members in these committees, as well as activists working in all levels of these institutions. 
During the 2000s, Hamas was the most influential Palestinian faction within Zakat 
committees, and one of the most important providers of social welfare in the West Bank. The 
role of Hamas as a social welfare provider was especially important during and after the 
second Intifada. The heavy Israeli/PA pressure upon these institutions began in 1996, and 
intensified after the 11th of September 2001. Note that the PA was reluctant to completely 
crush the social institutions affiliated with Hamas, as it relied on the services of these 
institutions. Islamic social welfare work is controversial, accused of being a smoke-screen for 
the recruitment, funding and facilitation of terrorists. Still, despite the withstanding pressure, 
Hamas has continued to be an important provider of social welfare, and this has been an 
important factor in the massive popular support for the movement in the West Bank during 
the local and national elections. However, there is no evidence to support claims that this 
welfare support is contingent upon conditional support in elections.  
The political position of Hamas as a result of its militant activity 
The aforementioned deportations of Hamas leaders in 1992, the heavy pressure upon political, 
social and military institutions in the period 1996-2000, continuing during the second Intifada 
(Operation Defensive Shield), is a result of the violent militant attacks perpetrated by the 
militant wing of Hamas, the al-Qassam brigades. The intentional use of violence through 
shootings or suicide attacks is an integral part of the means employed by Hamas in their 
resistance against Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. Hamas attacks from the West Bank 
turned increasingly important for the movement after 1996. The Israeli security fence 
surrounding Gaza forced the Gaza operatives of al-Qassam to focus on Israeli targets inside 
the strip. The West Bank cells of al-Qassam on the other hand, had more or less open access 
to Israel until 2003, which made the West Bank cells decisive in suicide attacks against Israeli 
cities. Through coordinated crackdowns on Hamas in several West Bank locations, but 
particularly in Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron, Israel and the PA tightened the grip on 
Hamas. However, these crackdowns did not deter West Bank al-Qassam operatives in 
perpetrating attacks against Israeli targets. Although it is impossible to evaluate the actual 
military strength of the West Bank cells in terms of numbers, it is clear that Israel and the PA 
perceived Hamas, through its military wing al-Qassam, as a powerful enemy in the West 
Bank between 1987 and 2007.  
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The political position of Hamas in the West Bank 
An important political development within Hamas was the success of the West Bank branch 
in university council elections from 1993 forward. Large universities such as Birzeit, Hebron 
and al-Najah (Nablus) became important political bastions for Hamas, and the political 
activity on West Bank campuses represents continuity for the political work of Hamas. 
Together with professional associations, it has been a major arena for Hamas to exert political 
influence in the period of interest. However, in terms of local and national politics, Hamas 
was a marginal factor in the West Bank until 2005. During the Oslo period, the movement 
was completely left out, and it also boycotted the first national elections in 1996. From 1996 
forward, Israel and the PA succeeded in marginalizing Hamas politically, as their leaders were 
imprisoned or forced to keep a low profile, and local elections postponed. Furthermore, 
during the second Intifada the main activity of Hamas in the West Bank was violent resistance 
and suicide attacks, not politics. During and after the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield, a 
large number of the West Bank political leadership were imprisoned, and large parts of the 
movement was paralyzed. Another important factor is the internal organization of Hamas, as 
discussed in chapter five. Political power inside Hamas has never been centered in the West 
Bank, but fluctuated between Amman/Damascus and Gaza. It is possible to speculate whether 
thus was an intentional decision by Hamas, as the West Bank branch was under more heavy 
external pressure. This pressure from both Israel and the PA, and restrictions on movement 
inside the West Bank, has led to trouble in physical communication for the West Bank 
leaders, and it forced them to meet in secret and hold names of its leaders a secret.  
 
The political turnaround in Hamas, from boycott of the 1996 elections, to participation in 
2005 and 2006, makes it possible to discuss Hamas as a political party. The victory in 2005 
set Hamas in a position of power in the West Bank, as their representatives assumed positions 
in the municipal councils. However, from 2005 forward, the external pressure mounted on 
Hamas, now also from the international society. The Hamas-led municipal councils faced 
economical sanctions, employee boycotts, political restrictions and arrest campaigns. As 
Hamas also won the 2006 national PLC elections with massive popular support in the West 
Bank, its political influence and power reached a peak.  
 
The Hamas victory in the 2006 elections was however the beginning of the downfall for 
Hamas in the West Bank. Immediately after the victory, the external pressure mounted on the 
movement, in terms of economical sanctions, and political boycott. Internal fighting between 
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Hamas and Fatah re-ignited, focusing on the control of the security forces, and later 
disagreements on power-sharing in the unity government. Furthermore, the 2006 government 
broke down, several Hamas PLC members were arrested, and the 2007 National unity 
government failed in its attempt to regain international support and aid. Hamas was 
outgrowing the Fatah party in Gaza, while Fatah still was the strongest party in the West 
Bank. In the fighting between Hamas and Fatah forces during 2007, Hamas thus managed to 
overtake Gaza, while Fatah maintained control in the West Bank.   
 
In sum, Hamas in the West Bank has thus been a significant social and militant force in the 
period under study, but a range of combining factors has undermined its political influence. 
The Fatah party and the PLO thus dominated West Bank politics until 2005, while Israel, the 
PA and the international society has directed political events in the West Bank since 2006.   
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